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ABSTRACT 
 
Under the ancient threat of morbidity and mortality from 
infectious diseases, human societies have responded for 
thousands of years by imposing social containment measures.  
Even before theorists and laymen recognized the existence of 
pathogenic organisms, or fully understood the principles of 
contagion, many societies and individuals did empirically infer 
that such diseases were transmissible from human to human (as 
well as sometimes between animals and humans).  Having few 
effective technological measures to prevent or treat contagions, 
they did devise a variety of socio-behavioral procedures for 
separating overtly ill persons or suspected disease-carriers from 
nominally uninfected people.  These methods included various 
kinds of quarantines and isolations.  By the early years of the 
American republic, all of the states and many other jurisdictions 
had the legal power to impose them, and they have long 
remained on the codebooks of much of the country even as 
secular trends and bio-scientific  
xv 
 
 
advances appeared to reduce the dangers of epidemic disease in 
the Developed World.     
 
 In recent years, however, there has been a recognized  
resurgence of infectious diseases in Western countries, and such 
developments as microbial resistance to antibiotics are 
threatening present-day control technologies.  Under these 
circumstances, it is hypothesized here that societies must plan 
for the renewed usage of the ancient socio-legal contagion-
controls, including quarantines and isolations, at least as part of 
a multi-pronged response to the renewed challenge of 
epidemics.  However, the existing quarantine/isolation laws do 
not universally reflect modern scientific understandings of 
disease processes, and they have always conflicted with other 
socio-ethical and political “goods” such as individual liberties and 
commerce. 
 
Thus, it is submitted here that it has become crucial to 
understand the historic character of quarantine-type measures 
on a “macro” plane, in order to learn from past errors, and to 
xvi 
 
help develop modern quarantine/isolation laws and practices that 
reflect current bioscientific and legal thinking.  The instant 
Dissertation analyzes the longstanding system of socio-legal 
controls over contagion, presenting a hypothetical structure that 
distinguishes them along several “Dimensions.”  In addition, it 
presents a functional schema that would help public health 
policy-makers, legislative drafters, and administrators to address 
individual contagions in terms of another set of “Dimensions,” 
which would be more responsive to evolving bio-scientific and 
jurisprudential thought.  To that end, this Dissertation presents a 
simple Algorithm that can be utilized when developing 
contagion-control laws that can be closely fitted to particular 
contagions, their specific manifestations, and their epidemic 
phases. 
 
1 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“The commander of a vessel … on his or her arrival in any of the 
waters of this state, shall immediately hoist and keep his or her colors 
in the shrouds of the vessel as a signal that he or she has come from 
some infected place or has infection or contagion on board.” 
 
   --R.I. Gen. Laws 23-9-14 (currently in effect) 
 
 
 
To prevent the spread of contagion, “[t]he department of health may, 
if it considers it proper, take possession or control of the body of any 
living person, or the corpse of a deceased person….”  
 
               --Cal. Health & Safety Code 120140 (current California law) 
 
 
“All cities and towns of this state shall have the power to … set up … 
hospitals … and pesthouses anywhere in the county … and cause 
persons afflicted with contagious, infectious or pestilential diseases to 
be removed to such hospitals or pesthouses … and to cause persons 
who have been exposed to such diseases … to be removed to some 
suitable place of detention and detained for a reasonable length of 
time. 
 
         -- Code of Ala. 11-47-134 (currently on Alabama’s code books)  
 
 
“The board [of health of a city] shall at once place in a conspicuous 
position[,] on the premises where … a person is isolated or 
quarantined[,] a placard having printed on it, in large letters, the 
name of the disease….” 
   
2 
 
--Page’s Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3707.08 (currently in force) 
 
 
A ship trapped in a harbor for forty days, stricken by deadly 
infectious disease, flying the yellow banner of quarantine to warn 
everyone away…. A sick person bearing the overt stigmata of a 
dreaded disease, ritually denounced and driven out of his community 
for life…. A house barricaded, with armed guards around it, to keep 
outsiders out and the inmates in, with a placard on the window 
warning of “Quarantine!”…   
 
A. Summary of the Historical Theory of This Dissertation 
 
Throughout history, infectious pathogens have played a vast and 
profound role in human social systems, as they threatened mankind 
with disease, disability, death, and social disarray.  Epidemic and 
pandemic diseases such as leprosy, plague, yellow fever, smallpox, 
diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, cholera, tuberculosis, syphilis, and polio 
induced fear by their very names.   
 
For centuries, however, the human response to contagion was 
hobbled.  Basically, most societies and theorists lacked the conceptual 
systems and technical methods to comprehend the existence of 
pathogens and their transmissibility.   (In fact, the very notion of 
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pathogenic microbes, and the principle of contagion itself, remained 
highly controversial in Western medicine well into the 19th century).  
Often, people attributed the causation of epidemics to such factors as 
miasmas, celestial misalignments, or divine retribution for collective 
sin.  Nor, at a practical level, did medical practitioners have many 
effective preventives or therapies to address infectious diseases.  
Human ills were prevented or treated by nostrums and practices that 
were sanctified only by ancient authority, creeds, and traditions.  Most 
of these actions were ineffective (except for the placebo powers of 
belief), and morbidity and mortality from infection remained high. 
 
 Long before the “Germ Theory” became the dominant 
explanatory paradigm for infectious diseases in Western culture 
(identifying these disorders as the frequent outcomes of complex 
interactions between pathogens and their human hosts), some 
theorists, rulers, and laypeople did infer the process of contagion on 
empirical grounds alone.  Without clearly understanding the dynamics 
of infection and epidemic disease, they could sense, in a rough sort of 
way, that these plagues somehow spread from person to person (or 
sometimes from animals to people).  In response, polities developed 
various socio-behavioral methods for controlling contagions, some of 
which would eventually be called “quarantines” and later, “social 
4 
 
distancing” (see discussion below, Chapter I).   These comprised a 
broad spectrum of occupational and assembly restrictions, 
banishments, and incarcerations of alleged disease-carriers.  The 
strictest types of procedures would take some of the following forms: 
 
In many places, communities would drive out sick individuals 
and allegedly exposed persons into a state of temporary or permanent 
exile.  Historically, for example, so-called “lepers,” syphilitics, and 
“phthisics” (TB sufferers) were prime targets of such official actions 
(reflecting a complex admixture of public health fears, religious-moral 
beliefs, and revulsion towards some physical symptoms).  Some 
societies established “leper colonies,” “lazarettos,” “pesthouses,” 
“quarantine camps,” “sanatoria,” and “isolation hospitals,” and they 
sometimes sent armed policemen to haul infected persons into such 
institutions by force.  On occasion, jurisdictions would take the 
ultimate step—and execute infected people or quarantine-breakers. 
 
On a wider scale, health officials would sometimes barricade 
entire households inside their dwellings, along with the sick persons 
themselves, place quarantine placards on their doors, and sometimes 
post flags or emblazon red crosses on the buildings (during the Great 
Plague of London in 1664, signs on those stricken homes would plead 
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“May God Have Mercy on Us”).  Eventually, the American colonies and 
later states and territories would also employ such practices against 
smallpox and other feared scourges.  In some jurisdictions, the 
authorities would make provision for treating and feeding the home 
confinees; in other localities, they would simply leave the ill and the 
potentially ill inside their sealed homes to die.  Armed guards (“vi et 
armis”) would make sure that the doomed inmates stayed within the 
walls. 
   
At a yet-wider scale, some apprehensive polities would also 
suspend community functions and close public facilities in whole 
areas afflicted by plagues, and they would bar vehicular traffic in or 
out of infected places.  They might blockade buildings and whole 
neighborhoods—throwing cordons sanitaires around those 
geographical areas.  (Sometimes, the collective-safety motives of such 
civic actions were complicated by other social attitudes and politics, 
including a dislike of minorities.  For example, major district 
quarantines were thrown over the Chinatowns of Honolulu and San 
Francisco as recently as 1900 when Yersinia pestis plague broke out in 
those neighborhoods—and the motives in implementation may have 
reflected a mixture of public health zeal and prejudice against Chinese 
immigrants.) 
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Fearful states, territories, provinces, and central governments 
also sometimes quarantined fellow states, territories, and 
provinces.  (As always, human motives could be mottled—commercial 
competition and power-conflicts were sometimes other goals for such 
quarantines.)     
 
In deep and abiding fear of Yersinia pestis plague and other 
diseases, many nation-states also developed a hodgepodge system 
of international quarantines to prevent the importation of epidemic 
diseases from foreign countries.  Over the centuries, a haphazard body 
of customary international law arose to further these ends.  (For 
example, although there was considerable variation in practice, 
international maritime custom gradually institutionalized the “yellow 
jack”—a yellow, or yellow-and-black banner that suspected or infected 
ships at sea would have to fly from their main masts to show that they 
were under quarantine.  It is the leit-motif of this Dissertation.)  A 
government might proclaim that another country was plague-infested, 
or declare that the other country did not practice strict enough controls 
over internal and imported contagions, and it would thus impose strict 
quarantines over that country’s flag vessels.  (Since collective human 
behavior is often complex, though, disease-control might once again  
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be only one goal in such state actions—others might be national 
hatreds, power politics, and commercial rivalries.)       
 
As a more global perspective increased in the late 19th Century, 
a number of countries began to participate in international 
conventions to control pandemics through global sanitary and 
quarantine regulations.  Over the next century and a half, and through 
wars and changes of international bodies, these regulations were 
slowly and episodically revised.   
    
Thus, over the centuries, collective fears and beliefs about 
contagion (plus other social goals) built up a heterogeneous body of 
local, state/provincial/territorial, national, and international quarantine 
laws that long remained on codebooks across the world.  Since law-
development tends to move at a different pace from science-
development, these laws sometimes continued to enshrine long-
outmoded concepts of contagion, which did not reflect the changes in 
scientific understanding of this natural process.  (Examples of this 
were the laws to control leprosy, or “Hansen’s Disease.”  Out of a 
combined revulsion for the symptoms of this disease, religious 
condemnation, and fear of transmission, many polities imposed harsh 
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constraints on victims of the disease for centuries.  Some, including 
several U.S. jurisdictions, continued to invoke these laws well into the 
20th century, even as science was coming to realize that the disease--
for all its sometime fearsomeness—was not highly contagious.  See the 
discussion below.)   
     
In terms of their general impact on controlling contagion, 
quarantines (and related methods) have varied greatly throughout 
history.  Sometimes they have failed to abate plagues, and the 
diseases have broken through the socio-legal barriers and saturated 
populations.  On other occasions, however, social-containment 
methods have abruptly stopped, or at least reduced, the impact of 
pestilence.  In such cases, their value in preventing suffering, death, 
and social chaos could not be gainsaid. 
 
In almost all cases, though, quarantines have been born of 
desperation, and they have always required social trade-offs that were 
never easily accepted.  To protect communal interests in the collective 
avoidance of disease, they could trammel individual interests in life, 
liberty, marriage, property, and the right to travel freely.   At a wider 
level, quarantines could also impede the free flow of commerce within 
and between nations, impair comity between jurisdictions within 
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countries, and raise sovereignty conflicts between countries.  (While 
there were some commonalities of interest between the quarantined 
and everyone else, these were usually not many….)  During 
extremities of public and official terror, states often resorted to 
compulsory quarantine measures—but they were usually buffeted, 
opposed, and circumscribed by the conflicting social, economic, 
political, and legal interests.  These conflicts went on well into the 
dawn of the modern age. 
             
Eventually, as Western societies modernized, collective host 
resistance against pathogens improved, and chances for host exposure 
to the microbes decreased.  These secular trends followed “macro” 
socio-economic developments such as improving levels of nutrition, 
better working conditions, and cleaner housing.  In addition, broad 
public health (“PH”) measures such as urban sanitation, organized 
clean-water and sewage-disposal systems, and arbovector controls 
began to reduce the threat of epidemics.  For its part, Western 
biomedical science increasingly understood the mechanisms of 
pathogenic disease, and it introduced new targeted methodologies for 
controlling it, such as diagnostic tests, vaccines, and antimicrobial 
agents. 
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Within several decades from the late 1800s to mid-1900s, these 
multiple societal developments made epidemic infectious disease 
decreasingly important in Western life.  First, the dramatic pestilences 
of plague, smallpox, diphtheria, cholera, and yellow fever began to 
recede in incidence and impact.  (The Spanish Influenza of 1918-1919 
was another widely-lethal epidemic event, but its spread was limited in 
time.)  By the first half of the 20th century, public and official attention 
was able to focus more and more on previously “background” chronic 
contagions like TB.  After the development of vaccines and immune 
sera, and the antibiotic revolution of the 1930s through 1950s, 
poliomyelitis—the great child-crippler--may have been the last major 
scourge to terrify the general public in Western nations, and the Salk 
and Sabin vaccines virtually vanquished this contagion in those 
countries within ten years after 1954. 
 
The last four decades of the 20th century saw a period that will 
be called here “the Window Era” of freedom from pestilence in the 
West:  For perhaps the first time in most of human history, several 
generations grew up without facing constant major risks from severe 
epidemic disease (except for less-lethal pandemics of influenza and 
some venereal diseases).  Infant mortality rates dropped, life spans 
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increased, and chronic, non-contagious diseases became the greatest 
concerns.  (This change in the dominant causes of morbidity and 
mortality of modernizing countries has been labeled the 
“epidemiological transition.”)  In the face of these trends, many people 
in the Developed World started to think that contracting an infectious 
illness, and dying from it, was an affront--a sign that some individuals 
or society had failed in their duty to protect them, rather than seeing it 
as an unavoidable hazard of life.  During this “Window Era,” too, many 
people thought of the old rough-and-ready quarantines as no more 
than ancient stories from the lives of grandparents.  (This was a view 
shared in some more educated circles.  In a 1967 speech, for example, 
the U.S. Surgeon-General declared that modern science had 
successfully conquered pestilential diseases, making them only a 
concern of the past, and he urged agents of public health to focus their 
future efforts on managing non-communicable disorders  (Stewart WH, 
cited by Magnus, 2008). 
      
Meanwhile, during those decades of comparative quiescence on 
the epidemic front, the general laws of individual liberty evolved in 
a number of countries, including the United States, with legislatures 
and courts extending wider substantive and procedural rights in 
contexts such as searches and seizures, imprisonment, and 
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involuntary institutionalization for mental disease.  By the 1960s, there 
was, in many legal subject areas, a generally wider conception of the 
rights of personhood as against the interests of the community.  
Mainly, these developments took place in non-quarantine areas of law.  
 
On the other hand, the old laws of quarantine themselves actually 
remained in the codebooks of many jurisdictions (including all U.S. 
states and territories, and many of the country’s localities), as well as 
in international laws and treaties, during the “Window Era.”  For 
decades, they remained largely unreviewed and unrevised.  In recent 
years, some quarantine statutes and regulations have been updated to 
reflect changing views on individual rights, mainly regarding 
procedural due process.  However, these laws have continued to 
accord great written authority to health officials to impose controls to 
stop the spread of disease across populations, overriding many 
individual freedoms when deemed appropriate.  In practice, of course, 
the ancient laws were rarely applied during the decades of the 
“Window Era.” 
       
Despite the foregoing complacency about contagion felt by many 
Westerners during the “Window Era” of the mid-20th century, natural 
reality at a micro-ecological level did not justify beliefs that such 
13 
 
diseases were mere figments of the past:    
 
First, numerous infectious diseases had never actually been 
eliminated in the Third World during the years from 1960 through 
2000:  Even while the industrialized countries greatly reduced such 
ancient scourges as meningococcal meningitis, tuberculosis, cholera, 
malaria, trachoma, dengue fever, and Yersinia pestis plague, they 
remained endemic in many parts of the Developing World during those 
decades, causing at least sporadic cases, plus periodic outbreaks of 
severe morbidity and mortality.   
 
Moreover, it has since become increasingly recognized in the 
West that old pathogens were still evolving during the “Window Era” 
(such as some strains of Staphylococcus aureus), and “new” 
pathogens were emerging as overt threats to mankind (such as the 
flavivirus that causes Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever)--due to a complex 
web of human and natural forces.  (Among many other interrelated 
contributors to this trend, there were changing host susceptibility and 
exposure factors, such as over-population, wars and migrations, 
human entries into enzootic ecosystems, and rapid global travel--and 
such pathogen evolutionary factors as increasing virulence and 
antibiotic resistance.  Environmental factors, such as global warming, 
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have also been posited to play a part.)  During the 1980s, HIV/AIDS 
became the first major sign of this ominous development in micro-
ecology (although, for all its widespread and deadly impact, it was a 
relatively slow-moving epidemic, and much of the general public could 
view it as mainly a scourge of marginalized sub-populations).  
However, other signs of returning plagues followed in the ensuing two 
decades, including the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”), 
which struck eastern Asia and Canada (plus a few other areas) in 
2002-2003.   
 
Now, many scientists, policy-makers, and members of the public 
foresee a storm-tossed future in the arena of infectious diseases.  One 
widely-feared pandemic hazard may be avian influenza caused by a 
mutation of the A/H5N1 virus, enabling it to spread easily between 
human hosts.  Another much-discussed danger is the theoretical 
possibility of epidemics spawned by bio-warfare and bio-terror, 
drawing on technologies like the creation of chimeras (which might 
include bioengineering bacterial genomes to resist antibiotics, and 
restructuring viral genomes to defy extant vaccines).  This particular 
field of research has been appropriately described as “public-health-in-
reverse.”  Even without avian flu or bio-terror, however, the current 
dynamics of the complex ecology in which pathogens interact with 
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other organisms, including animal and human hosts, raises legitimate 
concerns about epidemics as a renascent threat to global health.             
    
 As a result of this web of trends, the “Window Era” may now be 
closing.  In this context, old questions reappear about the 
appropriateness of quarantines and other socio-behavioral controls in 
the abatement of communicable diseases.  These questions need to be 
addressed in light of modern scientific evidentiary standards and in 
light of modern legal and socio-behavioral thought. 
 
 
B. Objectives and Structure of this Dissertation:  Hypothesis 
This Dissertation will address the following question:  In the face 
of renascent epidemics, should quarantine-type methodologies play a 
significant role in the human response?  If so, in what form? 
 
1. Hypothesis  
 It is submitted here that quarantines and other socio-legal 
controls over contagion have a definite role to play in future public 
health efforts to impede the transmission of pathogens between 
human hosts—but it is a role that needs to be appropriately informed 
and qualified. 
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 It is further submitted that prospective usage of such contagion-
controls first requires a broad-scale and thorough knowledge of their 
historic applications, in order to draw insights from their efficient and 
appropriate usages in the past --and also from their flawed historical 
implementations.   This Dissertation will provide such a review and 
analysis of historic usages of quarantines and related measures.  To 
further this process of inquiry, analysis, and preparation, this 
Dissertation will also propose a structured approach to quarantine-
associated socio-behavioral controls over contagion (utilizing the 
concept of “Dimensions,” as shall be further discussed below).  
      
 In the light of historic experience, moreover, it is stressed that 
socio-legal controls must be implemented, in futuro, in ways that 
reflect current bioscientific understandings of contagion, particularly 
current knowledge of the specific features of individual communicable 
diseases.  In addition, the set of contagion-control procedures should 
reflect a thorough recognition—and a balancing--of other socio-legal 
factors that currently pertain to such actions, including contemporary 
developments in constitutional law relating to individual liberties, and 
modern social scientific data on the socio-cultural impacts of such 
measures.    This Dissertation will present a hypothetical Algorithm 
which can be used by policy-makers and statutory/regulatory 
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draughtsmen to apply tailored scientific knowledge to each contagion, 
its forms, and its epidemic phases.  This system of questions to be 
asked regarding each disease will also rely on disease “Dimensions.”   
          
C. Stages in the Assessment of Quarantines 
Basically, quarantines and other socio-behavioral control 
methodologies are complex procedures that raise a multitude of issues 
at many levels of analysis.  They can be assessed from at least three 
major perspectives:  the bio-scientific, the legal and/or ethical, and the 
socio-cultural.  This dissertation will focus primarily on the first set of 
factors, which are fundamental to the whole process of quarantining, 
but a consideration of all of the factors would be necessary for 
legislators and health officials determining whether to promulgate, 
revise, or implement quarantine laws:   
 
1. Bio-scientific Considerations of Quarantines 
 A priori, it is important to evaluate the potential bio-scientific 
value of quarantines in curbing the transmission and spread of 
communicable diseases.  It would not be appropriate to retain such 
procedures without examining their scientific validity just because they 
had been used so extensively in the past and still remained on so 
many modern codebooks.  If it were ultimately determined that 
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quarantines were actually no more than relics of the past that modern  
science and technology had outmoded, there would not be any point in 
retaining them as public health tools. 
 
In fact, there is some paucity of rigorous data about the 
effectiveness of quarantines in many circumstances; it has not been 
widely possible to assess them under conditions of tight experimental 
control (and, indeed, there might be some ethical concerns about 
doing so).  However, historical and observational accounts do exist 
regarding the power of quarantines in the face of some past 
epidemics.   (The quarantining of American Samoa during the Spanish 
Influenza of 1918-1919 was one such episode; some quarantines 
imposed in Asia during the 2002-2003 SARS epidemic provided other 
notable examples.  See the accounts in Chapter I, below.)   
 
On the whole, it will be submitted here that quarantine-type 
methods of public health control can have a genuine potency in 
slowing, ameliorating, or even abating plagues, and they should not be 
jettisoned because of their often-blunt features, very long histories, 
and sometimes questionable applications in the past.  Recent events 
have shown that even though these public health devices may seem to 
be crude, archaic, and historically erratic compared with such current-
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day technologies as vaccines, antimicrobial drugs, phages, and 
immunotherapy, nevertheless, isolation and quarantine procedures, 
plus some more limited social distancing mechanisms, have a very 
definite role to play as part of a multi-pronged counter-strategy 
against pathogens.  But that role must be an examined, scientifically-
valid, and nuanced one that is appropriate to specific disease 
circumstances.  The discussion in Chapter II, below, will aim to present 
such a targeted assessment that fits quarantine laws to the needs of 
particular contagion challenges.  
 
2. Legal-Ethical Considerations of Quarantines 
Even when, as here, it is concluded that quarantines and other 
socio-behavioral and legal instruments are scientifically-supportable 
parts of a public health response to outbreaks, a full inquiry can not 
end there.  There remain other levels of analysis to consider, including 
questions of law and justice:   
Throughout history, quarantines and other socio-behavioral 
controls have almost always provoked deep tensions and conflicts 
between the collective health and safety (at least as quarantiners 
construed it) and competing socio-legal “goods”--such as individual 
freedom, the free flow of commerce, regional autonomy, and national 
pride and sovereignty (at least as quarantinees, civil libertarians, 
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merchants, and foreign offices interpreted them).  At different times, 
and in different places, jurisdictions have put differing emphases on 
these often-divergent social interests, moving the “balance” in one 
direction or the other on the “scales” of policy favor.  This was true 
with regard to the basic substantive question of whether or not to 
quarantine at all, and it also pertained to the specific procedural 
implementations of those quarantines.  …There is nothing simple about 
such balancings—but all too often they have been made within the 
contexts of crises and chaos, inadequate planning and information, 
and sub-optimal conditions of social equity and governance. 
     
a. Quarantine Conflicts between Individuals and 
Collectivities    
In juxtaposing the collective safety vis-à-vis the interests of 
individuals in liberty (and the interests of merchants in free-flowing 
commerce, among other divergent interests), it seems arguable that 
there needs to be some fundamental deference to the survival of 
communities (even if one does not necessarily ascribe to a utilitarian 
ethic of providing “the greatest good for the greatest number”).  The 
old Anglo-American common law had a maxim in this battle of the 
legal interests:  “Salus populi suprema est lex!” (“The health of the 
people is the supreme law!”).  Of course, it should be stressed that 
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this principle was always an over-simplification, which did not address 
the actual need to balance the equities in situation-specific ways, 
particularly at the procedural level of implementation.  Here, 
enlightened law-making and law-administration might be advised to 
follow the doctrine of “the least restrictive alternative” (“LRA”) (see the 
discussion below). 
       
b. Quarantine Conflicts between Jurisdictions  
A collateral legal issue in quarantines concerns the tensions that 
these contagion-control procedures have often provoked (or—more 
realistically—exacerbated) between different governmental 
jurisdictions:  Beyond the classic conflict between individuals and 
communities, history has often seen wider tugs-of-war between 
localities and states (or territories or provinces), between co-equal 
regional authorities, between regional authorities and central 
governments, between whole nations, and between individual nation-
states and a rising international “community.”  (There were many such 
conflicts in past history.  Yersinia pestis plague, in its long and deadly 
challenge to mankind, has frequently pitted nations against one 
another, as they tried to bar its return to their shores with maritime 
quarantines.  More recently, the 2002-2003 outbreak of SARS also 
triggered many inter-jurisdictional conflicts throughout the world, 
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including tensions within Canada between the City of Toronto, the 
Province of Ontario, and the Canadian National Government in 
Ottawa—as well as with the World Health Organization [“WHO”] in 
Geneva.) 
 
          While the federalized governance systems of countries such 
as Canada, the United States, and Australia have some advantages in 
responding to localized outbreaks of disease—to the extent that such 
systems confer a measure of autonomy-of-action to local governments 
that are closest to incipient events of this kind, they may face an 
adverse trade-off when epidemics become wider in scope:  In the 
latter circumstances, federalized polities may face very real dangers of 
fragmented or overlapping authority and disparate resources.  
Quarantines and other contagion-control measures taken in one 
jurisdiction might contradict actions taken in a higher, co-equal, or 
lower jurisdiction.  (These dangers became very real in 1918-1919, 
when the fragmented American system of governance led to a widely 
disparate response to the influenza pandemic.  At one point, for 
example, the U.S. Surgeon General issued an order closing down 
public places in the state of Indiana to stop the spread of flu, and the 
state’s Health Department acquiesced.  However, the Health 
Commissioner of Indiana returned from a trip out-of-state, and he 
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promptly countermanded the federal order--asserting that the U.S. 
government could not tell him what to do.  The Indiana State Health 
Department then overruled its own Commissioner, and reinstated the 
federal directive.  Immediately around these battling state officials, 
meanwhile, the municipal authorities of Indianapolis instituted their 
own ban on public gatherings within the city limits.  The public 
confusion caused by these various governmental actions did not help 
abate the pestilence. See 
www.1918.pandemflu.gov/your_state/indiana.html.)    
 
3. Social and Pragmatic Considerations of Quarantines 
In addition to the foregoing bio-scientific and socio-legal 
considerations, quarantines raise other considerations, highly 
pragmatic in nature:  Just because quarantines can impede the spread 
of pathogens through a susceptible human population, and just 
because legitimate legal and ethical arguments can be made for 
imposing them to protect the public’s health, it does not necessarily 
follow that humans will comply with them.  (In reality, they often have 
not.)   
Into this arena now come a variety of issues that can be 
informed to some extent by social scientific understandings of human 
behavior:  The extent to which individuals, small familial and social 
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groups, and larger populations comport with public health directions to 
practice quarantines can depend on many independent variables.  
Since quarantines can be onerous, stigmatizing, frightening, and even 
dangerous to people subjected to them, there often have to be strong 
reasons to induce their participation.   
 
While inducements to accept quarantines are often legal 
compulsions, especially in individualistic cultures like the one in 
America, most Western health officials would clearly see such actions 
as a last resort, and they would prefer to use more positive types of 
reinforcement for cooperation to the extent practically possible.  For 
example, when trying to get victims of active tuberculosis to comply 
with medication regimens, many state laws would initially offer them 
the option of “directly observed” outpatient treatment, and they would 
only escalate to home confinement or compulsory institutionalization 
when the tuberculosis patients would not acquiesce to the more liberal 
regimes of care (see the discussion of the culpability dimension of 
quarantines, and the “LRA,” below).   
 
At an even more “hands-off” level, public health authorities may 
try to appeal to the “enlightened self-interest” of potential 
quarantinees.  For example, they might use “social marketing” 
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methods to encourage flu-infected or exposed persons to “self-
quarantine” by invoking concerns for the safety of extended family 
members or workplace friends.  These methods of invoking civic duty 
may have a greater chance of success in more communitarian and/or 
authoritarian cultures like those of Mainland China and Singapore.  
(During the 2002-2003 SARS epidemic, for example, Singapore 
managed to get a large number of potentially-infected citizens to 
submit to extended home confinements or even institutionalization for 
the greater good of the island community.  While the city-state’s laws 
verged on the draconian, public compliance seems to have been 
voluntary for the most part. That might not happen so readily in the 
United States, however.)     
 
A wide sense that quarantine laws are at least being imposed 
benevolently, intelligently, “transparently,” and equitably might 
mitigate some quarantinees’ anger and resistance—but, in all 
likelihood, such program characteristics would still not preclude most 
angry opposition, and some degree of coercion would probably have to 
be imposed in many circumstances.  
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D. Summary Statement of Purpose 
 
1.  A Need to Prepare a Multi-Pronged Plan in Advance of 
Crises 
Thus, with epidemics approaching, while some of the defensive 
weapons of modern medicine (such as chloroquine, methicillin, and 
vancomycin) are losing their clout, it might prove necessary to 
consider some of the ancient quarantine controls, at least as part of a 
multiple-containment strategy in certain circumstances.  In other 
words, when the nuclear weapons fail, defenders may need to dust off 
the old harquebuses (or, at least, they may need to prepare for battle 
against pathogens using the whole panoply of PH weapons, both 
Mediaeval and modern).   
 
In advance of the coming plagues, however, it is also crucial to 
review the hoary legal weapons of quarantine to try to ground them as 
much as reasonably possible on modern scientific understandings of 
contagion and epidemics.   Moreover, it is important have a balanced 
understanding of the potential socio-legal impact of those historic 
tools.  Out-of-control epidemics can be profound disrupters of human 
life, individually and collectively—but so can these PH response-
instruments themselves.  Policy-makers and citizens would be well-
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advised to recognize and prepare to handle the conflicts between 
social “goods” that they will surely engender.  Modern policy-makers, 
lawmakers, and administrators need to conduct a broad and informed 
review of quarantines, taking into account present-day concepts of civil 
liberties, civic powers, and ethics.  It is also important for planners to 
anticipate the public resistance that quarantining and other social-
distancing measures will inevitably generate, and to prepare measures 
(such as “social marketing” campaigns) ante hoc to ameliorate it as 
best as reasonably possible.    
 
It would be prudent to plan a coordinated approach to 
contagion-containment that would be responsive to local conditions at 
the outbreak sites—but that could also transcend local, regional, and 
even national boundaries as needed for a coordinated response to 
epidemics and pandemics.  The many conceptual and pragmatic issues 
need to be addressed, and the laws practiced, before deadly events 
force their implementation.   
 
Optimally, the PH response to a developing epidemic would be a 
situation-specific version of one of several pre-planned scenarios, with 
a complementary use of several procedural responses to the particular 
threat.  The chosen scenario would be tailored as best as possible to 
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the distinctive features of the disease (at least to the extent that this 
could be understood).  Possibly, this multi-pronged response would 
emphasize different response measures at different stages of epidemic 
development (such as quarantines during the initial phase of the 
outbreak, possibly associated with chemoprophylaxes—if these are 
available, even as vaccines are being developed, followed at a later 
stage by a mass or targeted vaccination campaign).  Of course, it is 
unlikely that mankind’s actual response to a burgeoning plague will 
follow a rational and preplanned script, as past episodes have too 
often shown.  But the goal is to introduce as much order as can 
reasonably be done.     
 
It is highly preferable that such reviewing, weighing, planning, 
and drafting of laws, rules, and policies be done in the relative quiet 
before plague ships (and airplanes) appear over a national horizon. 
 
2. A Need for Inter-Disciplinary Cooperation in Quarantine 
Preparation 
As part of this epidemic preparation process, it might be added 
that several professions (as well as the general public) will have to 
participate in revising and drafting quarantine laws, as well as in their 
ultimate implementation.  Among others, these professions will have 
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to include bio-scientists, social scientists, public health administrators, 
law enforcement officials, and lawmakers in the executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches of multiple levels of government.  These are 
professions with differing traditions, languages, and even world-views, 
and they often do not communicate very closely together.   
 
In the face of recent events (including the terrorist attacks of 
2001 and the anthrax mailings of the same year, as well as the 
A/H1N1 influenza pandemic of 2009), as well as in fear of future 
events (particularly avian flu), there has been some degree of 
rapprochement between these professions, and some degree of 
collective planning in some places.  However, it remains variable in 
much of the U.S. and elsewhere. 
 
It is hoped that this Dissertation will have some modest value in 
providing some common concepts and a workable lingua franca that 
can help surmount the barriers between professions that must come to 
work together.  
 
When fast-moving and lethal epidemics return to the West, there 
will inevitably be some chaos, but PH’s goal should be to manage it 
and mitigate it as much as prudent preparation permits.  There will 
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also inevitably be controversy when contagion-controls are used, but 
effective planning might moderate its extremity.       
 
E.  Content of Dissertation Chapters:  Some Proposed 
Working Taxonomies 
 To advance the pragmatic purpose of promulgating scientifically-
based quarantine (and other social-distancing) laws, this Dissertation 
will propose some hypothetical “taxonomies” of quarantines and 
contagions:  One taxonomy will analyze quarantine-type procedures in 
terms of a set of fundamental characteristics (or “Dimensions”), and 
a second taxonomy will identify a separate set of functional 
“Dimensions” of communicable diseases.  It will be posited that these 
sets of dimensions would constitute a number of independent (though 
sometimes-overlapping) spectra along which individual socio-legal 
control procedures and individual diseases can vary.  The goal will be 
to develop laws that are nuanced to reflect the general characteristics 
of individual contagions.   
 
1.  Chapter I:  A Taxonomy and History of Quarantines          
        Chapter I of this Dissertation will address the quarantine/social 
distancing procedure “facet” of the present topic, briefly defining those 
control methodologies.  It will analyze and structure them in terms of 
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five basic “Dimensions” of “Breadth,” “Depth,” “Temporality (or 
duration),” “Protective Purpose,” and assessed “socio-legal Culpability 
of quarantinees.”  
 In a sequence of Sub-sections, this Chapter will illustrate the 
foregoing “Dimensions” of socio-legal contagion-control, and their 
specific types, in two fundamental ways:   
 a. Historical Backgrounds of Each Quarantine “Dimension” 
and Type  
 First, each Sub-section of Chapter I will present abbreviated 
historical accounts of each type of quarantine along the various 
Dimensional spectra—which will also highlight the biomedical and 
socio-legal issues that such quarantines can raise.  Through this 
structure, the Dissertation will show how a set of particularly dreaded 
epidemic diseases (viz., leprosy, the Yersinia pestis plague, smallpox, 
yellow fever, cholera, the venereal diseases, TB, Spanish Influenza, 
and SARS) helped shape this body of law.  Particular focus will be 
given to several archetypal quarantine events that took place in the 
United States and its territories at the dawn of the modern age, since 
they encapsulated many of the issues that would rise again if 
quarantines are re-imposed in futuro.  This historical overview is 
important in providing a deeper understanding of the truly ancient  
 
32 
 
character of these PH procedures—which may, for all of that, still have 
an important role to play in the disease-wars of this millennium.  
 
 b. Some Present-Day Examples of Each Dimensional Type 
of Quarantine 
 Next, each Sub-section of Chapter I will also cite some examples 
of present-day American quarantine laws that fit the various 
Dimensions and types.  This will show that many of these quarantines 
are more than curious figments of past ages—they remain active law 
on the books of certain jurisdictions that could be invoked again in the 
face of future epidemics.  Thus, they would require re-examination and 
reconsideration in the quiet time before plagues return to American 
shores.    
 
2. Chapter II:  A Taxonomy of Contagious Diseases (Strictly 
Functional) 
         Chapter II of this dissertation will focus on the second major 
“facet” of this topical area—the targeted contagious diseases 
themselves.  This chapter will structure those diseases in terms of the 
second set of fundamental “Dimensions.”   It will be noted that some 
of these proposed Dimensions of contagion are already familiar to 
theorists and practitioners of the PH-related sciences, although the 
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approach adopted here may differ from their general concepts and 
practices.  Among other differences, the goal here is not necessarily to 
follow classificatory systems used in basic microbiology, but to 
emphasize the important functional characteristics of the diseases in 
how they interact with the human species in social and legal contexts.  
While the proposed system will comport with the underlying scientific 
understanding of contagions (which is a crucial objective here), it will 
particularly stress attributes of diseases that can be pragmatically 
applied in the formation and structuring of control laws, policies, and 
management strategies. This approach will hopefully permit the 
introduction and application of cost-benefit analyses, theory, and 
management to the formulation of balanced socio-legal methodologies 
for controlling contagions. 
 
Some of the Dimensions of contagion to be discussed in Chapter 
II will pertain to the general nature of the diseases themselves, 
associated particularly with their pathogenic agents (as they interact 
with human host and environmental variables).  These will include 
notably the diseases’ normative “Severity,” “Efficiency of 
Transmissibility” (including their respective “Reproductive Number” and 
other variables of epidemic dynamics), “Modes(s) of Transmission,” 
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and “Duration“ (particularly presence, frequency, and usual normative 
duration of asymptomatic carriage). 
 
Another sub-set of Disease Dimensions will focus on the 
biomedical and PH status of the communicable diseases under present 
scientific conditions, viz., the extent to which their aetiology is 
currently known, their diagnosability with existing clinical/laboratory 
techniques, their preventability with present technologies, and their 
treatability with extant therapeutic agents.   
   
       Ultimately, the foregoing taxonomy of disease will generate an 
Algorithm, or at least a series of roughly sequential questions, which 
can provide guidance on whether or not quarantines would be useful 
control devices--and, if they could be, then what types would be 
optimal under the particular circumstances involved. 
 
a. Realistic Qualifications to the Above Objectives 
The basic aim here will be to reflect the current consensus state 
of biomedicine and public health science when formulating or updating 
disease-control laws—to the best that this can be reasonably done 
under normal scientific, executive, legislative, and administrative 
conditions.  In reality, however, this objective is subject to constraints 
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at several points in the process of law-development: at the scientific 
end of the process (as will be discussed further below), it is fully 
recognized here that the foregoing Dimensions of disease are not 
scientifically incontestable, invariable, or immutable.  As is widely 
recognized, the state of scientific understanding is often subject to 
intense disagreement, with competing theories and debated data.  At 
the time that quarantine laws are being made or revised, for example, 
disease dynamics, aetiologies, diagnostic tests, prophylaxes, and 
therapeutics may be unknown or unavailable, or they may only be 
understood or available in a sub-optimal form.  Even when there is a 
period of broad consensus on some principles, the complexity of 
nature usually requires the recognition of multiple exceptions to those 
rules.  Moreover, the present scientific situation will likely change with 
time (either by ideological and methodological evolution or revolution), 
so the “reality” (or at least the Kuhnian “paradigm”) that is widely 
construed at a particular point in time may quickly become only 
yesterday’s reality. 
 
Nor can it be assumed that the policy-making and law-making 
stage of the process will necessarily be smooth and rational, based on 
a clear-eyed access to scientific thought and data, or on an insightful 
and non-ideological application of it.  (In the general PH arena, the 
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present-day battles over immunization laws illustrate this reality:  Too 
often, general doctrinal belief-systems, emotions, and narrow political-
economic goals enter into the process, clouding the admission of 
scientific light on the issue of whether or not to immunize children, 
whether or not to compel it, and, if so, under what circumstances.) 
           
         The best that could be realistically sought is a reasonably 
rational and systematic mechanism for the periodic review of laws, and 
a process, set up ante hoc, that would allow policy-makers, law-
makers, and administrators to access current scientific thought on 
communicable diseases.  This would hopefully reduce the long-term 
enshrinement of ancient assumptions that science has passed by.  One 
possible systemic approach would involve regular legislative/executive 
consultation with scientific advisory committees composed of 
recognized leaders in the field.  (This approach can have drawbacks, of 
course.  For example, it might put a premium on orthodox scientific 
thought at the expense of heterodoxical thought and research that 
may create tomorrow’s understandings.  Still, it would hopefully keep 
law reasonably close to bioscience as it developed.)        
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CHAPTER I:  QUARANTINES AND OTHER SOCIO-LEGAL 
PROCEDURES FOR CONTROLLING CONTAGIONS-- 
  A PROPOSED TAXONOMY 
 
A. Preliminary Considerations of Nomenclature 
 
1. Range of Methods of Contagion-Control 
 At this juncture, it is important to briefly note the range of 
possible methodologies by which public health can combat 
communicable diseases (particularly in their epidemic forms), and to 
mention the terminology that will be used here to describe these 
measures: 
 
 In the broadest sense, “weapons against contagions” can range 
from the most technologically primitive to the most sophisticated, and 
these have tended to follow a historical path from the oldest to the 
newest (though, as shall be noted throughout this work, a number of 
future situations may call for the use of the oldest methods).  From a 
technological perspective, this spectrum of measures would include the 
ancient quarantines themselves at one end--and modern-day 
methodologies such as immunizations and anti-microbials at the other.  
(Other measures would include the set of anti-infection procedures 
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used especially in nosocomial settings, which are sometimes termed 
“barrier protection techniques.”  These would include the proper use of 
masks, gowns, and gloves, as well as simple handwashing, alcohol 
hand-rubs, and decontamination.  Finally, this widest and most general 
category of procedures used to abate infectious transmission might 
even encompass such methods and instrumentalities as sewage-
disposal systems and vector-management programs.)  Taken together, 
this very broad panoply of methodologies will be denoted here as 
“contagion-controls.”    
 
 Within this most encompassing category of contagion-control 
methods, some sub-categories may be identified, although the terms 
are used somewhat variably in the literature:  In recent years, a 
number of authors have started referring to the non-technological 
weapons against contagion as “non-pharmaceutical interventions” 
[“NPIs”] (also, “community mitigation”). (e.g., Aiello AE, “Research 
findings from nonpharmaceutical intervention studies for pandemic 
influenza and current gaps in the research,” Amer. J. Infect. Cont., 
38(4), 251-58 (5/10)).  These terms will be used here where 
necessary, though they are not very informative.  Perhaps a better 
label for this set of PH methods would be “socio-legal contagion-
controls” (or “socio-behavioral controls”) since they consist mainly 
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of measures that seek to reduce the spread of pathogens across 
human population groups by legally managing human host behavior.   
 
 As shall be discussed further below, the set of socio-legal 
contagion controls can range from the most voluntary to the most 
compulsory, and they can extend from the loosest and most 
permissive to the most restrictive and draconian.  At one end of this 
gamut would be PH exhortations to practice good hygiene in the 
personal and community interest (often using modern “social 
marketing” techniques).  Some “in-between” actions would include the 
closure of public places and enjoinders to stand apart from other 
people.  Finally, there would be the strict-confinement quarantines and 
isolation measures themselves.   
 
 The term “social-distancing” is increasingly used in the social-
scientific and medical literature to describe some interpersonal 
contagion-controls.  Different writers also use this term in different 
ways, encompassing classic quarantines or not.  So far, however, it has 
not been widely used in American PH legal statutes (although one 
Indiana state law does allude to it; Burns Ind. Code Ann. s 16-41-9-
1.6 [2011]).   In the instant Dissertation, “social distancing” will be 
used in a broad sense (since it is a good and evocative term for this 
40 
 
panoply of non-technological contagion-controls), but it will be 
particularly used to refer to the subset of protective measures--such 
as school closures or mandating staggered work schedules--that do 
not impose the most severe or intense quarantine-like restrictions. 
  
a. Partial List of Contagion-Control Modalities 
 A partial list of contagion-controls, not meant to be exhaustive, 
might include the following procedures that can be used to reduce the 
transmission of pathogens between individuals and across populations: 
  
(1)        Longer-term interventions   
       (a)       Infectious waste-control facilities and systems 
       (b)       Vector-abatement programs 
       (c)       Nosocomial infection-control procedures, 
including barrier-protection techniques and decontamination 
methodologies.  (Usage of gowns, gloves, goggles, masks and 
respirators where appropriate.) 
      (d)       Disease surveillance and reporting systems 
(active and passive)     
     
(2) Epidemic-control and prevention interventions – 
Technological 
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(a) Vaccination 
(b) Chemoprophylaxes (e.g., antimicrobial drugs, 
antiviral agents) 
 
(3) Epidemic-control and prevention interventions – Socio-
Behavioral  
(a)    Social education 
                 (b)    Individual restrictions on employment 
(c) Bans on public gatherings 
(d) Closures of public places, such as government 
buildings, schools and colleges, sports arenas, 
taverns, churches. 
(e)  Discontinuation or limitations on public 
transportation   
(f)  Physical spacing directives 
(g)  Workplace closures and/or telecommuting 
(h)  Quarantine and isolation 
  
 The main focus of this Dissertation will be the classic 
quarantine/isolation types of socio-behavioral contagion-controls, since 
they most clearly raise issues of bioscience, social science, ethics, law, 
and public policy.  However, some due notice will also be given to less-
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restrictive procedures, especially under circumstances where 
contagion-control and epidemic abatement plans involve multi-pronged 
(or “layered”) responses. 
 
 So-called “self-quarantining” methods will be considered to a 
limited degree in this Dissertation, since they are part of the panoply 
of social controls over communicable diseases, and their efficacy and 
effectiveness are subject to some bioscientific assessment.  However, 
they clearly do not carry the “baggage” of socio-legal concerns that 
compulsory procedures can carry, so they will not be central to the 
present discussion.  Of course, the voluntary types of social contagion-
controls and the compulsory ones would usually not be implemented 
disjunctively; in most modern jurisdictions, they would more likely be 
part of a total epidemic-response “package,” either employed 
simultaneously or sequentially (with “softer, ” persuasion-type 
approaches being preferred initially, and the “club” of compulsion 
being held back for instances of non-cooperation). 
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2.  Another Note on Nomenclature:  Definitions of 
“Quarantines” 
 a. Brief History and Etymology of “Quarantines” 
          De facto quarantines probably date back thousands of years in 
various places, particularly with regards to certain infectious diseases.  
As shall be seen, for example, leprosy (or “Hansen’s Disease”) 
provoked socio-legal responses that ranged from expulsion from 
communities, to permanent home confinement, to incarceration in 
“lazarettos,” to exile on remote islands (as well as to summary 
execution in some polities).  However, these procedures were not 
generally labeled “quarantines” until at least the Middle Ages in 
Europe.   
 
The term “quarantine” itself originated during the desperate 
14th century years of the “Black Death” (or “la Mortallegra Grande”—
“the Great Dying,” as the Italians then called the apocalyptic 
pandemic), when some maritime city-states along the Mediterranean 
littoral tried to keep infected ships, cargoes, and travelers from 
entering their ports.  The authorities in several of those jurisdictions, 
including Venezia (Venice) and Ragusa (modern-day Dubrovnik), 
began requiring that vessels wait in their harbors for long periods of 
time before obtaining the right to land (especially if they were carrying 
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passengers who were obviously diseased, or if they had sailed from 
foreign ports known to be stricken with outbreaks of plague).  Based 
on crude observation, officials inferred that there was some period of 
time before plague symptoms became manifest, and some time before 
the symptomatic illness would run its course to recovery or (more 
usually) to death.  In addition, it was then thought that certain cargoes 
were particularly prone to carrying the unknown element of plague, so 
they required long exposure to God’s purifying air and sunlight before 
these items became safe.  Presumably, mandating such lengthy time 
delays would ensure that the ships and those aboard them could no 
longer transmit the plague to the cities.  In practice, the lengths of 
time of confinement in the harbors were variable, but thirty or forty 
days and nights were often imposed.  The old Venetian word for the 
forty-day period was “quarantena,” which may have derived from the 
French term “quarantaine” (which itself originated in the Latin word for 
“forty,” “quadraginta”).  In all probability, this choice of time period 
was inspired more by religious tradition than by any empirical 
knowledge of incubation periods, but the term “quarantine” stuck. It 
was eventually adopted by the English in the 17th century, and polities 
gradually applied it to a wide variety of loosely-related contagion-
control procedures.  (See, e.g., Merriam-Webster’s Student Dictionary, 
www.wordcentral.com, accessed 10/13/11; also see Tyson P, “A short 
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history of quarantine,” Nova, www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/short-
history-of-quarantine.html, accessed 10/13/11.)           
 
b. Focus on Quarantines of Humans Only 
 It may be added at this juncture that many infectious diseases 
affect animals and plants, some of which are of significance to human 
consumption needs, commercial and economic concerns, and even 
macropolitics and international affairs.  (Even bio-warfare and bio-
terror could be practiced against the animate and inanimate food 
sources of enemy nations—and they sometimes have been.  For 
example, the bellicose powers of World War I restrained themselves in 
few ways in their drive to win, using weapons such as flamethrowers 
and poison gas against enemy combatants; although these nations did 
not resort to biological warfare to any notable degree, there were 
some reports that the Kaiser’s Germany tried to introduce glanders in 
cattle destined for use by the Allies.)  To try to inhibit the spread of 
contagion in commercially-important animals and plants, many 
countries and lower-level jurisdictions have set up complex legal 
systems of animal and plant quarantines.  These procedures can have 
significant impacts on human societies, especially when the diseases in 
question are zoonoses, such as SARS in civet cats and avian influenza 
in poultry—with a potential for severe human impact at a later stage of 
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zoonotic development.   Nevertheless, such quarantines are outside 
the scope of this Dissertation, since they raise many bio-scientific, 
societal, and legal issues that are not involved in human quarantines, 
and they fail to invoke many of the issues that arise in the latter (such 
as individual human liberties).       
 
3.  Quarantines in Present-Day American Law--Definitions 
        Every American state and territory has a body of human 
quarantine statutes in its codebooks, and some have additional 
quarantine-related regulations in a separate set of administrative 
codes.   (In addition, numerous lower-level jurisdictions, including 
some “home rule” counties and chartered municipalities, have also 
promulgated contagion-control ordinances and administrative rules.)  
Historically, most jurisdictions have defined these PH procedures in a 
roughly similar way, though there have been variations in specific 
terminology (which could sometimes have significant socio-legal 
impact in implementation).   
 
 One important variation involves the distinction between 
“quarantines” per se and “isolation,” which is worth examining in a 
little more detail because it can have some major impacts on PH policy 
and administration at the interface of law and science. 
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 a. “Quarantine” vs. “Isolation”: A Definitional Difference 
 with Policy Implications 
(1) The Unitary Concept of “Quarantine” 
 In traditional medical lexicons, a “quarantine” was defined as “a 
strict isolation imposed to prevent the spread of disease” 
(dictionary.reference.com/quarantine, accessed 10/19/11).  In other 
words, the words “quarantine” and “isolation” were essentially used 
interchangeably here.  In this formulation, “quarantine” was a simple 
and undivided concept, referring to the sequestration of any 
individuals or groups who were obviously--or possibly—capable of 
transmitting infectious diseases to other people (after the development 
of the “Germ Theory,” these would be individuals or groups who were 
thought to be infected with pathogens).  It thus encompassed a broad 
array of persons whose only common feature was known or suspected 
exposure to a communicable disease, leading to this evident or 
questionable state of infection.  They may, individually, have had a 
spectrum of symptomatology that ranged from the “totally” 
asymptomatic, who appeared “well” to observers--to the openly and 
desperately ill, who might be coughing violently into the ambient air.   
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 Some American jurisdictions still employ this basically unitary 
definition of “quarantine.”  For example, the State of Hawai’i still 
defines it rather simply as  
[t]he compulsory physical separation, including the restriction  
of movement or confinement of individuals or groups believed  
to have been exposed to or known to have been infected with  
a contagious disease, from individuals who are believed not to 
have been exposed or infected, by order of the department [of 
health] or a court of competent jurisdiction. 
(Haw. Rev. Stats. 325-8(a), 325-20(a); emphases added). 
 
(2) Distinguishing between “Quarantine” and “Isolation” 
 On the other hand, some present-day parlance in public health 
distinguishes between “quarantine” for exposed persons who are 
nominally “healthy,” and “isolation” for exposed persons who are 
“overtly ill.”  As part of the spate of recent state legislation against 
bioterrorism and other public health emergencies (q.v.), numerous 
American jurisdictions have adopted this relatively standardized 
definition for “quarantines” and “isolation.”  While individual states and 
territories have varied the specific wording of this basic definition to fit 
different local emphases (which can also have differing practical 
implications), the usual definitions are similar to the ones in North 
Dakota’s Century Code Annotated.  This code defines “quarantine” (per 
se) to mean  
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 the physical separation and restrictions on movement or travel 
 of an individual or groups of individuals, who are or may have  
 been exposed to a contagious or possibly contagious disease  
 and who do not show signs or symptoms of a contagious disease 
from nonquarantined individuals to prevent or limit the 
transmission of the disease to nonquarantined individuals 
 
(NDCA s 23-07.6-01, subsec. 6; italics added), and it defines 
“isolation” to mean 
 the physical separation and restrictions on movement or travel 
 of an individual or groups of individuals who are infected or 
 reasonably believed to be infected with a contagious or possibly 
 contagious disease from nonisolated individuals, to prevent or 
 limit the transmission of the disease to nonisolated individuals 
 
(No. Dak. Cent. Code Ann. s 23-07.6-01, subsec. 3; italics added). 
    
 A number of other jurisdictions (e.g., 10 Guam Code Ann. s 
19104; LSA-R.S. s 29:762 (13); Mont. Code Ann. s 50-1-101; Nev. 
Rev. Stats. s 441A.115; Or. St. s 433.001(5), (10); Va. Code Ann. s 
32.1-48.06) echo this distinction between “quarantine” and “isolation,” 
although their specific wording can vary.  For its part, South Carolina 
gives more detail for certain contexts, identifying the quarantinees as 
“healthy people who have been potentially exposed to a contagious 
disease,” while isolates are “individuals known or suspected (via signs, 
symptoms, or laboratory criteria) to be infected with a contagious 
disease” (SC Stat. 44-4-130 (N); emphases added). 
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(3)  Arguments for and against a Unitary definition of Quarantines 
Various fundamental arguments could be made favoring and 
disfavoring the use of unitary and binary conceptual definitions of 
“quarantine/isolation,” and these definitions could have significant 
policy implications: 
 
  (a) Arguments Favoring a Bifurcated Conceptual Approach to 
“Quarantines” and “Isolations” 
On the one hand, very pragmatic grounds could be advanced for 
adopting the current binary definition of “quarantines” and “isolations” 
used most widely in public health and state laws.  Fundamentally, PH 
laws and practices need to consider the differing points of view of the 
primary parties involved in a quarantine/isolation:  Certainly, PH 
authorities have clear goals in preventing any infected persons from 
passing pathogens on to a larger society, so they would likely want to 
throw a wide net around all theoretically exposed persons—whether 
presently ill or not.  However, the confinees themselves have 
legitimate interests of their own, which may overlap the collective 
interest—but often do not.   
 
In many cases, “quarantinees” will be possibly-exposed people 
who still feel well (or mostly well) and who will not readily accept the 
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living conditions and restrictions of strict hospital settings.  More 
importantly, these people will also not want to be placed in the same 
“isolation” quarters as the demonstrably diseased, since they may 
reasonably assume that—while they might theoretically have already 
been “exposed to illness” in the community--they might not have 
actually been infected in this way, and they could still avoid the 
contagion if they are not intermingled with the actively ill in an 
isolation unit.  At the very least, they will expect a “quarantinee” public 
health status (and appropriate separate lodgings and conditions) 
somewhere between the assumedly unexposed citizenry and the 
confirmed infectious isolates.  (South Carolina’s updated quarantine 
law recognizes this medical need to separate quarantinees from 
isolates, instructing the state’s Department of Health and 
Environmental Control that “individuals isolated because of objective 
evidence of infection or contagious disease must be confined 
separately from quarantined asymptomatic individuals…” [SC Code 
1976 Ann. s 4-4-530(B)(2), emphasis supplied].)      
 
For their part, many ill people themselves would also resist being 
isolated in infectious-disease institutions.  (At least, this would be true 
to the extent that they remain alert and protective of their own self-
interests; in any case, their significant others would have such 
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concerns on their behalf.)  Many such symptomatic persons would 
want to remain at home in familiar surroundings.  Moreover, some 
might believe that their own malady was not really severe and 
communicable—and they, too, would object to being put in communal 
wards with the contagiously-ill.  At the very least, they would want to 
be isolated in sophisticated treatment facilities that would best restore 
them to health.   
 
Historically, quarantining jurisdictions have varied in how well 
they reflected these differing confinee interests:  In the centuries after 
the Black Death, some countries and city-states along the 
Mediterranean littoral--including Marseilles, Leghorn, and Messina--
developed relatively elaborate maritime quarantine facilities 
(“lazarettos”) that routinely confined all crews and passengers of ships 
from plague-infected countries (see below, this Chapter).  To some 
extent, these lazarettos would lodge seemingly healthy quarantinees in 
separate quarters within the grounds, while segregating the overtly-
sick confinees in special buildings (although the latter facilities could 
hardly be considered quality hospitals in which the sick could get well).  
Over the centuries, though, most quarantining jurisdictions have 
thrown “healthy” infection “suspects” into common quarters with the 
overtly ill—under conditions that were highly insalubrious for everyone.   
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Some recent discussions of quarantines have underscored the 
distinction between “quarantining” the exposed and “isolating” the 
sick.  For example, some authors have argued that “isolation” of the 
sick is generally justifiable, while “quarantining” of the asymptomatic 
is controversial (Day T, et al., “When is quarantine a useful control 
strategy for emerging infectious diseases?” Amer. J. Epid., 
163(5):479-485 [2006]).  In their view, some contagions such as 
SARS do appropriately call for isolation of the overtly ill—but they do 
not justify wholesale quarantining of the merely exposed, as Mainland 
China and some other polities did in 2003.    
 
In addition, one of these groups of writers has posited, on a 
theoretical basis, that quarantines and isolations can almost work 
inversely to one another in the course of an epidemic (Day, et al. 
2006).  They have suggested that in some epidemic situations, 
effective isolation of the overtly ill will reduce the value of quarantining 
of the asymptomatic “well.”  Conversely, if isolation of sick persons 
proves inefficient, quarantines could be effective--provided that 
several circumstances are present.  (These criteria would be: Initial 
cases of the disease could produce multiple secondary cases; there 
was a high probability that the exposed but symptomless individuals 
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will be placed in quarantine; there was a high probability that these 
quarantinees will not transmit infection while in quarantine; there was 
a high probability that the quarantinees will be promptly isolated if 
they develop signs and symptoms of the disease; and the 
asymptomatic period of the disease was neither too short nor too 
long).         
 
(b)Arguments Favoring a Unitary Conceptual Approach to 
“Quarantines” 
Having said the above, it must nonetheless be noted that there 
may also be some legitimate arguments against adopting the sharply 
binary distinction between “quarantining-the-exposed” and “isolating-
the-sick”: 
   
In biomedical reality, the distinction between simple “exposure-
to-disease” (calling for “quarantine”) and “sickness” (calling for 
“isolation”) may not be as robust as some present-day state laws 
attempt to assert.  It is more realistically a process continuum than a 
dichotomy (in terms of time and clinical manifestations), a spectrum 
rather than a bright line in the sand:    
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First, “healthiness” or “wellness” itself is a hard and vague status 
to define—and it may prove deceptive.  The process of host-exposure-
to-pathogens can actually involve a sequence of events that extend 
from “contamination” (surface contact with pathogens), to sub-clinical 
infection, and only sometimes to overt and severely symptomatic 
illness.  At a subtle and sometimes barely detectable level, a 
physiological conflict may really be developing in a seemingly “healthy” 
host’s body between the pathogens and his immune system, which 
may, or may not, culminate in some degree of symptoms.  During that 
time, this individual may be silently incubating an infection that makes 
him dangerous to others.   
 
Moreover, when “overt” symptoms do appear, they can be 
subjective and subtle:  Simple cephalgia (headache), a feeling of 
“malaise,” or a “scratchy throat” might simply reflect stress (perhaps 
induced in suggestible minds by the fear of a threatened contagion), or 
they might be the prodromal symptoms of a lethal bout of influenza or 
some other epidemic disease.  While “signs” of illness might in 
principle be more objectively observable than subjective “symptoms,” 
even they can have a range of interpretations—for example, the 
presence of a body temperature in the 98.7° - 99.9° F range might be 
defined as a “fever” or not, depending on an individual’s baseline 
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temperatures and on an diagnostician’s own premises. And it might 
not necessarily signify that the individual had contracted the particular 
feared disease.  During the early days of the SARS outbreak in 2003, 
for example, there were no quick and effective diagnostic methods for 
this new contagion, so PH authorities in various countries started 
“rough-and-ready” thermal screenings of travelers at the borders or 
even inside the countries.  However, this methodology was not very 
specific to the targeted disease, and its diagnostic efficacy could be 
legitimately questioned (see discussion below).  
 
In contagion-control practice, too, perception of “signs and 
symptoms” in an individual disease “suspect” may be only as good as 
the observer and the tools available to him.  During an epidemic, for 
example, decisions about who to allow aboard an airplane may devolve 
upon US Transportation Security Administration screeners based on no 
more than spot-observations of people in a line (or on questions posed 
to would-be travelers regarding their subjective state of health).  Such 
non-medical observers might watch for gross stigmata of disease such 
as skin lesions or violent coughing; in so doing, they might overlook 
subtle incipient signs and symptoms such as faint sweating and 
headache, or they might too-aggressively assume that sufferers from 
a common cold have SARS or avian influenza.  
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 (c) The Usage of “Quarantine” in this Dissertation 
In light of the above discussion, this Dissertation will adopt a 
nuanced approach to the definition of “quarantine”:  For ease of 
reference, it will use the term “quarantine” to encompass all 
confinements of allegedly- infected people (whether or not they were 
floridly symptomatic).  This would be especially useful when describing 
historical practices during the centuries when “quarantines” were not 
distinguished from “isolations.”  On the other hand, this Dissertation 
will acknowledge the present-day distinction between the two 
confinement procedures when this is appropriate, since it might impair 
policy analyses to overlook this distinction.  
________________________________________________________ 
B. A Practical Model of Disease-Control Methods by 
“Dimensions”—General Description 
 This Dissertation proposes a taxonomic model for quarantine-
type contagion-controls, which will hopefully elicit their fundamental 
distinctions, and help clarify when they should be used.  Like 
contagious diseases themselves (see Chapter II, below), quarantines 
and other socio-legal disease-control methods have some fundamental 
features that could be considered semi-independent “Dimensions.”    
 
58 
 
 It may be practical to consider these methodologies as varying in 
terms of their Dimensions of (1) “Depth,” (2) “Breadth,” (3) 
“Duration,” (4) “Objectives,” (or “Purposes”), and (5) the 
“Culpability” of the persons subjected to them.  (Other attributes 
would also be present.)  
  
1.  “Depth” of Quarantines (Severity) 
 First, a public health contagion-control methodology could be 
said to vary along a Dimension of “Verticality” (or “Depth”), which 
refers to its intensity or Severity (just as contagions themselves can 
differ on their own “Severity” Dimension [see Chapter II, below]).  The 
“Depth” Dimension is a continuum from the mildest forms of 
behavioral restriction (e.g., placement on disease registries for 
surveillance purposes), to intermediate steps (e.g., “modified 
quarantines” against leaving an area or practicing certain trades), to 
the harshest measures (e.g., “strict” or “total” quarantines in closed 
institutions—including even prisons), as shall be discussed further 
below.   
  
2. “Breadth” of Quarantines (Individuals and Areas Covered) 
 Second, a disease-control method can also be characterized in 
“Horizontal” terms, which refers to its “Breadth” or width of covered 
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individuals or of space itself.  The subjects can be people (as well as 
plants and animals), conveyances, structures, and geographic areas:  
the narrowest of isolation measures or quarantines are imposed on 
individual persons.  (Archetypal examples were historic quarantines 
placed over solitary victims of leprosy and tuberculosis, see below.)  
They can also cover groups of persons, varying in numbers (though it 
can readily be seen that the definition of multiple covered persons can 
potentially raise special legal and social concerns).   
 
  Distinguishable are those quarantines that are applied to 
vehicles or vessels, such as ships, trains, motor vehicles, and aircraft.   
 
 Classically, too, quarantines can be thrown over varying spaces 
and jurisdictions:  In widening concentric circles, laws may enable 
health authorities to quarantine parts of a building (such as an 
isolation room or ward within a hospital), whole buildings (typically, 
homes, sanatoria, or official “pest-houses”), institutions (including 
entire worksites, hospitals, schools, and colleges), neighborhoods or 
districts, municipalities, parts of counties, whole counties, states or 
territories or provinces, countries , and groups of countries.  Generally 
speaking, the wider the “breadth” of quarantines, the more difficult 
they can be to implement, legally, socially, and pragmatically.  (This 
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Dimension of quarantines will be described in more detail below.) 
 
3. “Temporality” of Quarantines (Duration) 
 Just as there is a Temporal Dimension to diseases and their 
infectiousness (see Chapter II), there is also a Time Dimension to the 
public health methods used to control them—which can have major 
consequences in practice:  For example, a health officer may place 
strict quarantines over a smallpox victim and over a sufferer from 
multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis, set to last for the duration of their 
respective illnesses or infectious periods.  --In the first case, the 
quarantine would likely last for weeks (ending with the recovery or 
death of the patient); in the latter case, however, the quarantine could 
go on for years or even decades. 
 
4. “Objectives” of Quarantines (Who Is Being Protected?)   
 Next, disease-control methodologies also vary in terms of their 
immediate “Objectives” or “Purposes.”  This Dimension addresses the 
questions of “Who is quarantining whom?  Whom do the quarantines 
aim to protect?”  Classic quarantines aim to constrain exposed and 
infected persons in order to protect the collective community from 
their infections; however, other disease-control methods are imposed 
on unexposed and uninfected persons themselves—in order to keep 
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them from contracting pathogens from the infectious.  (There is some 
overlap between these types of methods and their objectives.)  
Regardless of goals, the methodology of each type of action could vary 
from light to harsh. 
 
a. Protective Quarantines 
At one end of the protective continuum, many state and 
territorial laws direct health authorities to protect the uninfected and 
unexposed from exposure to pathogens by closing public places and 
forbidding public gatherings during disease outbreaks.  These partial or 
modified quarantines would be relatively limited types of constraints.  
More severe/intensive measures could include home-confinements and 
evacuations to protect the confinees (as shall be shown below). 
 
5. “Culpability” of Quarantinees (in a Legal Sense) 
The final “Dimension” of quarantines addresses the explicit or 
implicit way in which a society and its legal system regards the moral 
and/or legal “Culpability” of quarantined persons:  In their most basic 
form, quarantines, isolations, and lesser social-distancing measures 
are “neutral” about the morality and legality of the restricted persons.  
They are, in this case, strictly elemental, non-criminal measures by 
which communities preserve themselves from destruction by 
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contagions and the infectious persons who carry them.  However, 
quarantinees and isolates sometimes defy the directions of health 
departments and courts, or break health regulations, and their 
behavior now develops a more culpable character under the law.  At 
the other end of this spectrum of “Culpability” would be individuals 
who transmitted their infections to others by reckless conduct--or even 
by intention (such as bioterrorists).  This extremity of conduct is 
somewhat distinctive from the rest, and it is not central to this 
Dissertation, but it does deserve mention and will be noted in the 
subsection discussing this Dimension of quarantines.   
 
C. The Independence of the “Dimensions” of Contagion-
Controls 
 Finally, it is important to stress that these “Dimensions” of 
contagion-controls are not isomorphic.  While they often overlap to a 
certain degree, they are independent dimensions in many respects—
which can have important consequences for the implementation of 
these measures, and for their outcomes in curbing contagion and in 
socio-legal effects.  For example, it will be seen that some behavior 
controls may be stringent (intense in the scale of “Depth”)--but apply 
to few people or geographic areas (limited in the scale of “Breadth”), 
or vice-versa.  Also, they might vary in how long they are 
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maintained—from days to lifetimes, irrespective of their how stringent 
they are or how many people they control.  The contagion controls 
may also have features of “Purposes” and implied “Culpability” that 
can overlap the other Dimensions, but do not necessarily follow them 
closely (for example, some very strict, restrictive quarantines, which 
highly disrupt individuals’ lives, might be imposed on them for their 
own protection, rather than to protect society from them).                
________________________________________________________ 
 D. The Dimensions of Contagion Controls:  Detailed 
1.  “Depth” of Quarantines 
 As was noted above, the panoply of socio-behavioral controls 
over contagion can first be distinguished on the “Dimension” of 
“Depth,” or “verticality,’ which refers to the intensity or severity of the 
procedures, and the degree to which they restrict the subjects’ 
behavioral freedom:  These restrictions can range from limited to 
extreme.   
        
a. “Modified” or “Partial” Quarantines 
 Some nonpharmaceutical contagion-controls only impose limited 
restrictions on people, and these have sometimes been designated 
“modified” or “partial” quarantines.  (Alternatively, they could be 
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categorized as non-quarantine “social distancing” procedures.)     
    
(1) Occupational restrictions to control contagions 
 A form of individual modified quarantines narrows the field of 
activities that individuals can do, most commonly involving choice of 
occupations or occupational functions.  Examples would include 
proscriptions against work in food service trades by persons who are 
infected with the Salmonella typhi bacterial agent of typhoid or by the 
virus of hepatitis A.  Teaching and daycare work are other occupations 
that are often legally barred to carriers of certain diseases, including 
active tuberculosis.   
 
(a) Some Historical Examples of Occupational Restrictions 
  (i) The case of “Typhoid Mary” Mallon 
 The historical case of “Typhoid Mary” Mallon presented a stark 
example of an occupational restriction to control contagion, and it will 
be further discussed below. 
 
  (ii) People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson  
 The 1922 Chicago case of People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 
302 Ill. 422, 134 N.E. 815, also involved a typhoid carrier.  In this 
instance, the typhoid carrier was a boardinghouse keeper, whose 
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house was quarantined and placarded to keep her from infecting any 
more boarders.    
 
  (iii) School Bd. of Nassau Co., FL v. Arline   
 In the much more recent (1987) case of School Bd. of Nassau 
Co., FL v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S.C. 1123, 94 L.Ed.2d 307, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided an associated issue pertaining to a 
schoolteacher who was dismissed from her job after developing bouts 
of active TB.  The Court ruled, inter alia, that this teacher’s contagious 
disease constituted a handicap within the meaning of Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. s 794, which entitled her to 
some protection against employer discrimination—and thus dismissal--
for her disability. 
      
(b) Some Present-Day U.S. Occupational Restriction laws 
 Almost all American states and territories (as well as many 
smaller jurisdictions) continue to authorize “modified” or partial 
quarantine  measures to restrict infected individuals’ practice of certain 
professions or trades.  For example, Arizona authorizes its 
cosmetology board to take disciplinary action or deny a renewed 
license to cosmetologists who practice their trade while knowingly 
66 
 
carrying an infectious or communicable disease (Ariz. Rev. Stat. s 32-
572.A.1), and an Arkansas statute likewise forbids massage therapists 
from working when they can transmit such diseases to their clients 
(Ark. Code Ann. s 17-86-302(a)(4)). 
  
(2) Public Place Closures and Bans on Public Gatherings 
An important type of modified quarantine involves the closure of 
public places and the banning of public gatherings.  The settings that 
are closed can include places of amusement (such as pool halls, 
saloons, and theaters), schools and colleges, and even places of 
worship.  This measure has often been used during major outbreaks 
(with varying degrees of success in different times and places). 
 
It is important to stress here that such closures and bans do not 
rank high in the spectrum of potential restrictiveness:  Persons 
subjected to them essentially retain the right to roam the world--save 
for the interdicted places, and they retain the right to circulate--so 
long as they do not congregate en masse.    
 
That said, it should nonetheless be recognized that such official 
actions can still be controversial--and they have indeed been so 
historically, especially when certain institutions are closed:  For 
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example, people have raised social, political, and legal objections to 
the official closure of churches.  In the U.S., it might be claimed that 
such actions contravene the provision in the First Amendment to the 
Constitution that prevents governmental restrictions on the freedom of 
worship.  Even the peaceful assembly of citizens is protected by this 
amendment to the Constitution.              
 
 (a) Some Historical Examples of Public Place Closures and Bans on 
Public Gatherings 
Numerous American jurisdictions imposed public place closures 
and bans on public gatherings in 1918 and 1919 to try to stop the 
spread of Spanish Influenza, and they provoked some sharp resistance 
in several areas (see, e.g., www.1918.pandemicflu.gov, accessed 
6/2/11).  In Rhode Island, for example, PH officials ordered closure of 
churches, incurring the wrath of some clerics:  A Roman Catholic 
priest, William I. Simmons, opposed this measure, urging people to 
“assemble in their place of worship and implore the assistance of God, 
in supplication and prayer.”  (On the other hand, a Massachusetts 
Presbyterian minister countered that people could pray at home as 
readily as in church.)  In a similar episode on the other American 
coast, the Seattle, Washington city administration banned religious 
gatherings for a period of two weeks at the height of the pandemic, 
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and some churchmen objected.  (In response, the mayor snapped 
back that “religion which won’t keep for two weeks is not worth 
having.”) 
 
 (b) Some Present-Day U.S. Laws for Closing Public Places During 
Epidemics 
 In addition, numerous U.S. jurisdictions assert their authority to 
ban public gatherings during epidemic outbreaks:  For example, New 
Mexico explicitly empowers its state health department to “close any 
public place and forbid gatherings of people when necessary for the 
protection of the public health” (N. Mex. Stats. Ann. 1978 s 24-1-3.E).  
For its part, Utah also confers like powers on local health departments 
within its borders (Utah Code Ann. 1953 s 26A-1-114(1)(e)).  (See 
also Colo. Rev. Stats. 25-1-506(1)(d), 25-1-708(1)(d); Burns’ Ind. 
Code Ann. 16-20-1-24, 16-19-3-10; Kan. Stats. Ann. 65-119; Md. 
Pub. Safety Code Ann. 14-3A-03(d); Mich. Comp. Laws 333.2453(1), 
333.2253; Minn. Ann. Stats. 144.12(1)(9); Mississippi Code Ann. 21-
19-17; Mont. Code Ann. 50-2-118(2), 50-2-116(1)(c); Tenn. Code 
Ann. 68-2-609(2),(3); Utah Code Ann. 26-1-30(2)(i); 18 Vt. Stats. 
Ann. 126(d)(5); W.Va. Code Ann. 16-3-1; Wisc. Ann. Stats. 252.02(3); 
Wyo. Stats. Ann. 35-1-240).   
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 (c) Analysis of Laws Closing Public Places and Banning 
Gatherings 
 On balance, it is evident that modified quarantines, like all socio-
legal contagion-controls, have the potential of conflicting with other 
major public interests.  Certainly, they should be implemented with 
foresight, advance planning, and sensitivity to the facts of a situation.  
Nevertheless, it is also submitted that such measures can play a vital 
role in abating epidemics under certain circumstances (and there is 
some degree of empirical evidence to support this conclusion).  
Weighing the equities, it is arguable that the modified quarantines are 
mild enough on the spectrum of severity as to require a lower 
threshold of benefit before they can be implemented, and many 
epidemics—such as the past Spanish Influenza or the potential future 
avian flu--would have enough severity (q.v.) to cross that threshold.   
 
 Ultimately, it is submitted here that PH officials need to act with 
sensitivity to social, religious, and legal rights--but in a pandemic as 
deadly and widespread as the Spanish Influenza, salus populi suprema 
est lex. 
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b.“Strict” Or “Classic” Quarantines 
 To the extent that many non-specialists faintly remember 
quarantines from decades before the “Window Era” of the late 20th 
century, they usually think of “strict” or “classic” quarantines.  These 
measures involved major constraints on the liberties of quarantinees, 
with confinement in closed settings to prevent the transmission of 
pathogens.         
 
(1) Location of the Quarantine or Isolation 
 The locus of confinement of strict quarantines or isolations could 
range in severity from the individuals’ own homes, to closed wards 
within general hospitals, to special isolation hospitals, to remote 
islands, colonies, or settlements.  At its most extreme, it could actually 
include confinement in jails (as shall be shown below).   
  
 These specific loci can have major practical consequences—both 
in terms of individual patient health and in terms of contagion-control:  
From the perspective of the confinees themselves, retention in the 
home would probably be preferable in many cases, since it would 
impose fewer legal and procedural constraints on them, and it would 
allow them to remain in familiar surroundings with their significant 
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others.  These conditions could be psychologically beneficial (and, as a 
result, they could also confer some subtle physical benefits on the 
patients).  In addition, if quarantinees or isolates had been 
misdiagnosed and they did not, in fact, have a deadly disease, they 
would clearly gain from not being placed in an isolation hospital with 
actual infectious sufferers from such a malady.  It is true, of course, 
that patients’ homes might not always provide the facilities, trained 
personnel, or equipment for the optimal treatment of complex 
infectious diseases.  Clearly, individual circumstances would vary in 
these respects.  On the whole, however, diseased persons, suspected 
diseased persons, and their families have often resisted—sometimes 
fiercely—historical seizures and forcible transportation to public 
isolation facilities.  (See the discussion below.) 
  
 From the perspective of society, on the other hand, confinement 
and treatment in situ of the infectiously ill may not confine their 
contagion as effectively as would a specially-designed isolation facility.  
This certainly depends on the nature of the specific homes and the 
isolation centers involved in particular cases.  On balance, it is likelier 
that better disease containment would be provided by carefully- 
designed isolation hospitals or wards within general hospitals (which 
might include such engineered facilities as reverse air flows, plus 
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trained personnel practicing barrier nursing techniques).  This is not 
always true, of course, since the nosocomial spread of infections is not 
a rare phenomenon.  (It certainly was a major component of the SARS 
crisis of 2002-2003, below.)  In any event, it should be stressed that 
some facilities are singularly inappropriate for contagion-containment;  
these would include penal institutions--but that did not prevent PH 
officials from using them for this purpose on some occasions in the 
past.         
 
(a) Historical Illustration of Various Types of Quarantine “Depth”:  
A Close-Up View of the Case of “Typhoid Mary” Mallon 
 The story of “Typhoid Mary” Mallon is a classic illustration of the 
application of partial and strict quarantines in the case of one person. 
In its outlines, it is a well-known tale, and Mary Mallon’s name has 
become synonymous with a certain kind of contagious process, but the 
legal and procedural details of the episode are nonetheless informative 
on the “Depth” Dimension of quarantine.   
  
  Mallon was an Irish immigrant who arrived in the U.S. in 1883, 
where she practiced the trade of cook in private households around 
New York City.  During the next twenty-four years, cases of typhoid 
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fever appeared in a succession of homes where she worked.  
Whenever typhoid started, Mallon would quit and move on to another 
employer.  Eventually, one homeowner contacted a pioneer sanitarian 
named George Soper, who began to trace the association between 
Mary Mallon and the string of typhoid outbreaks in the region (the 
concept of asymptomatic carriage of pathogens was not well-
understood at that time).   
 
 In 1907, Soper finally tracked the cook to a prosperous home in 
Manhattan, where one resident had died of typhoid, and he demanded 
that she submit samples of her body fluids for testing.  A large, feisty 
woman, Mary Mallon lunged at the sanitarian with a kitchen knife, and 
he promptly departed the premises.  She then fled again.  However, 
Soper soon regained Mary’s track, and he arrived at her new 
workplace with a phalanx of New York constables, who ordered her to 
surrender to the health department.  When she refused, the five men 
hauled her kicking, screaming, and fighting into a paddy wagon, where 
they had to physically hold her down all the way to the Willard Parker 
Hospital for Contagious Diseases.  At the hospital, it was eventually 
determined that Mary Mallon’s colon was a living culture tube for 
Salmonella typhi, although—as her conduct had shown---she was 
scarcely impaired herself by the continuing infestation. 
74 
 
 
 Mary Mallon was then consigned to a small hut on lonely North 
Brother Island in New York Harbor, within sight of the looming city but 
entirely cut off from it.  She refused to undergo the cholecystectomy 
that was proposed by the health authorities as a means to decrease 
her excretion of S. typhi, and she instead fought her confinement in 
judicial forums all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.  After her legal 
protests failed in 1910, Mary Mallon grudgingly consented to a New 
York Health Department order that she never again work as a cook, 
and she was released under partial (occupational) quarantine. 
 
         Now, however, the previous pattern recurred:  Moving about 
under an alias, Mary Mallon resumed her culinary occupation in various 
homes and institutions, and outbreaks of typhoid followed her 
everywhere.  With the relentlessness of Inspecteur Javert in Les 
Miserables, Soper followed the typhoid-carrier to a Westchester 
household, and seized her once more.  This time, however, there were 
to be no official reprieves.  Mary Mallon remained strictly quarantined 
on North Brother Island for the rest of her long life, finally dying alone 
of cardiovascular disease almost a quarter of a century later.  (See, 
e.g., www.britannica.com/EBchecked/611790/Typhoid-Mary, accessed 
1/22/2012; Leavitt JW, Typhoid Mary:  Captive to the Public Health 
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[1996]; Okin P, The Return of “Typhoid Mary”:  The Past and 
Prospective Impact of Quarantines in the Face of Recurring Epidemic 
Diseases [unpublished manuscript, 1987].)                  
 
 (b) Some Present-Day U.S. “Strict” Quarantine Laws 
 Every American state and territory (as well as some lower-level 
jurisdictions such as certain counties and large incorporated cities) 
retains strict quarantine laws on its codebooks today, and these laws 
might astonish some present-day people with their continuing 
conferral of official powers.  Many of these statutes and ordinances 
date back almost unchanged to the decades before the “Window Era” 
of the late 20th century, although there have been some more recent 
efforts to modernize and standardize their concepts, structure, and 
terms.  (Notably, some scholars have advanced a model interstate 
quarantine act, which some jurisdictions have adopted.  Also, recent 
concerns over possible emerging infectious diseases, bio-terror, and 
other public health emergencies have led to additional revision and 
expansion of some of the laws.)    
 
 A fairly standard type of traditional strict quarantine law is an  
Oklahoma statute, 63 Okl.St.Ann. § 1-504, which provides that 
 
[w]henever a local health officer determines or suspects  
that a person has been exposed to and may be incubating  
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a communicable disease of public health concern, the local  
health officer may impose a quarantine upon such person  
and require such person to remain out of public contact  
and in the place or premises where such person usually stays.    
Notice thereof shall be given in accordance with the rules and 
regulations of the State Board of Health. It shall be unlawful  
for such person, or any other person, to violate the terms or  
conditions of the quarantine. 
 
Whenever a local health officer determines or suspects that  
a person has a communicable disease of public health concern,  
the local health officer may impose isolation upon such person  
and require such person to remain out of public contact and  
in an adequate treatment facility or in the place or premises  
where such person usually stays.  Notice thereof shall be given  
in accordance with the rules and regulations of the State  
Board of Health. It shall be unlawful for such person, or any 
other person, to violate the terms or conditions of the isolation. 
 
__________________________________________________
2.  “Breadth” of Quarantines 
 As was noted above, the “Quarantine Dimension” of “Breadth” 
addresses the varying sizes of quarantine-type contagion-controls in 
terms of horizontal space, or in terms of numbers of persons affected.  
 
 Quarantines and other social-distancing procedures have 
historically been thrown over a roughly concentric range of persons, 
population groups, polities, and geographic spaces--ranging from 
individuals to whole nations, and current laws in many jurisdictions 
continue, at least in principle, to confer such official PH powers.  These 
will be discussed below, illustrating quarantines of each size by noting  
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some historical examples, and by noting some present-day American 
laws that authorize the different types.    
 
 a.   Individual Quarantines 
 The narrowest quarantines in population “Breadth” would be 
those thrown over individual persons.  Because of their direct conflict 
between the collective interest in safety and individuals’ interests in 
liberty, these sorts of quarantines have often illustrated in particularly 
graphic terms the potential medical, legal, and social issues involved. 
  
 Thus, although “wider” types of quarantines (see “area 
quarantines,” below) can raise some of the same issues of science, 
law, and social behavior as individual quarantines, the latter type of  
quarantines will be discussed here at somewhat greater length.              
  
 For sharper illustrative purposes, too, this discussion of 
Dimensional type will focus on “strict” types of quarantines for 
individuals (see above discussion).   
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(1) The Writ of Habeas Corpus in Individual Quarantines 
Do individuals have powers to contest their quarantining?  In 
legal theory, they do have some possible remedies.  In historic 
practice, however, these potential rights have only rarely been upheld 
in individual cases:  
 
Since Mediaeval times, England—and countries that later 
generally followed its legal system, like the American republic and the 
Hawaiian kingdom—have accorded confined individuals the nominal 
right to seek a writ of habeas corpus.  In legal Latin, this writ means 
literally “I-may-have-the-body,” signifying that a judge who decides to 
grant such a petition will order a jailer or other confining official to 
present him with the prisoner’s body (presumably still living and not-
too-badly damaged by torture or privation).  During the ensuing 
hearing, the inmate may adduce evidence and legal arguments to 
contest his detention.  In other words, habeas corpus is only a 
procedural right, not a substantive one:  Getting an adjudicator to 
grant this writ is only a first step for the confinee; he or she must still 
make a substantive case to convince the judge that the detention is 
illegal because it violates one of the jurisdiction’s constitutional 
principles, statutes, ordinances, or regulations (for example, by  
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claiming, under U.S. Constitutional law that it constitutes “cruel and 
unusual punishment” in contravention of the Eighth Amendment). 
Over the centuries, confined persons of all sorts have sought 
the writ of habeas corpus—including, most often, criminal defendants--
and sometimes they have gotten it, have received a judicial hearing, 
and have been eventually freed.  Tellingly, though, one set of confinees 
has rarely received such writs in most jurisdictions following the Anglo-
American-tradition—and this may be the most legally “innocent” 
confinee group of all:  persons quarantined for the mere status of 
being infectious (see discussion below).  Among these were HD 
quarantinees held in American, Canadian, and Hawaiian leprosaria. 
During the heydays of leprosy-segregation programs, few of these 
persons would get legal representation and try to challenge the justice 
of their detention (in part because many of them were sick, poor, 
powerless, and ill-informed about the laws of their respective 
countries).  In the rare instances when they did seek the writ, they 
rarely won it.  This may reflect the general attitude of the law towards 
quarantined persons (salus populi suprema est lex). However pitiable 
their situation, society wanted most of all to protect itself from their 
contagious disease.                     
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(a) Historical Overview of Some Individual Quarantines—Responses to 
Particular Contagions 
Over the centuries, many major contagions have provoked 
polities to impose individual quarantines, but several diseases have 
been particular prods for such contagion-controls (most sharply raising 
the PH, social, and ethical aspects of quarantining):  leprosy, 
tuberculosis, syphilis, and gonorrhoea.  Leprosy and TB were the 
quintessential contagions of loneliness—forcing their victims into 
solitude; the STDs were diseases of coupling, but they also induced 
some societies to segregate their carriers.  The following account 
summarizes very briefly the long and complex role of these several 
contagions in shaping quarantine laws.         
 
(i) Leprosy 
Leprosy (now sometimes called “Hansen’s Disease” [“HD”] in an 
effort to reduce stigma) is one of mankind’s oldest diseases, dating 
back thousands of years in the Indus Valley on the Indian sub-
continent, in Palestine, and in the Nile Valley of North Africa.  Its 
pathogen, Mycobacterium leprae, has evolved primarily in humans. 
(North American armadillos may be the only other host or reservoir 
species in nature—which should, in principle, make HD an easier 
contagion to eradicate someday). Over the millennia, this bacterium 
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has even lost the function of many of its genes, but this evolutionary 
process has not made it less harmful to man:  HD clearly illustrates 
the process of heredity-environment interaction, since it tends to only 
cause symptoms in individuals with a genetic susceptibility to it.  
 
While human immunological responses to M. leprae vary across 
a spectrum from most to least (generally, from “tuberculoid” to 
“lepromatous” in character), the most inadequate host responses to 
the pathogen are generally associated with severe symptomatic 
manifestations—which can include extensive nerve, skin, ocular, and 
skeletal damage, with consequential deformities and blindness.  (While 
leprology is not widely discussed in the modern Western medical 
literature, some works in the last two decades may be noted for 
delineating these signs, symptoms, and sequelae of leprosy:  See, 
e.g., Boggild AK, Keystone JS, & Kain KC, “Leprosy:  A primer for 
Canadian physicians,” CMAJ, 170(1), 71-78 [1/6/04]; Jacobson RR & 
Krahenbuhl JL, “Leprosy,” Lancet, 353(9153) 655-660 [2/20/99]; 
Modlin RL & Rhea TH, “Immunopathology of leprosy.”  In RC Hastings 
(ed.), Leprosy (2d ed.) (Edinburgh:  Churchill Livingstone, 1994, at 
225-34); WHO Expert Committee on Leprosy, Seventh Report 
[Geneva:  WHO Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 874, 1998].)       
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For centuries, revulsion at the sometime stigmata of leprosy 
became intermingled in a complex way with fears of contagion and 
with religious beliefs about the disease, prompting lepraphobia.  In 
Biblical times, the Old Testament Book of Leviticus directed priests to 
denounce “lepers” as “unclean,” and to have them driven from the 
communal camp.  Given the vagaries of diagnostic procedures in those 
early times, however, it seems likely that many dermatological 
disorders were mislabeled “leprosy”—lumped in with the specific set of 
syndromes that M. leprae actually caused. This was probably still often 
true in Medieval times, although modern paleopathology has indicated 
that there was indeed a vast but slow-moving pandemic of true HD in 
Europe during those centuries.  It was addressed with a variety of 
responses by different individuals and polities--but the most common 
reactions were banishment, confinement, and even execution.  Setting 
a theme that would recur in future centuries, the Roman Catholic 
Church developed a “Leper Mass,” which mixed in a curious way 
primitive medical diagnoses with priestly banishment to a living death; 
yet, the Church also motivated the construction of lazarettos and 
monastic leprosaria, where monks and nuns would nurse lepers out of 
charitable devotion.  By the late Middle Ages, however, these  
 
83 
 
institutions would become empty of their inmates (for unclear reasons, 
although the Black Death may have been one final factor). 
 
During the ensuing centuries, Hansen’s Disease persisted in only 
a few places in Europe (notably parts of Scandinavia) where there 
were special genetic susceptibilities to the pathogen, but the 
expansion of Western colonialism, international commerce, and 
immigration in the 1800s prompted a rising fear of imported leprosy.  
(Now, to some extent, ancient lepraphobia became intermingled with 
xenophobic views on Third World immigration.)  Thus, by the end of 
that century, several North American and Pacific polities had begun to 
promulgate new laws and set up leprosaria as barricades against this 
ancient disease.  Notable among them were Canada’s provinces of New 
Brunswick and British Columbia, the U.S. states of Massachusetts, 
Louisiana, California, and Washington, and the new U.S. territories of 
the Philippines, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and Hawai’i.  
(Few people now realize that the progressive Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts ran a small, compulsory “leper colony” on remote 
Penikese Island in Buzzards Bay, southwest of Cape Cod, between 
1905 and 1921.  Early in the 20th century, too, British Columbia 
operated an even harsher colony on D’Arcy Island, where a handful of 
Chinese leprosy victims were essentially left to die.)  Most famous (or 
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infamous, depending on one’s perspective) were the “leper 
settlements” established on the Kalaupapa Peninsula off the Hawaiian 
island of Moloka’i, and at Carville on a bend of the Mississippi River in 
Louisiana.  (There is a fairly extensive literature on the latter two 
leprosaria.  See, e.g., the accounts in Tayman J, The Colony: The 
Harrowing True Story of the Exiles of Molokai [NY:  Simon & Schuster, 
2006], 432 pp.; Gussow Z, Leprosy, Racism, and the Public Health 
[Boulder, Co:  Westview Press, 1989], 265 pp.  On the other hand, 
very little has been written about the other little lazarettos.  Note, 
though, Johnston P, “BC’s ‘Island of death’ marked a sad chapter in 
Canada’s history,” Can. Med. A. J., 152(6):951-52 [Mar. 15, 1995]; 
Levison JH, “Beyond quarantine:  A history of leprosy in Puerto Rico, 
1898 to 1930s,” Hist. Cienc Saude Maguinhos, 10(Suppl. 1):225-45 
[2003]; Cyr P, “The exiles of Penikese Island:  Politics, prejudice, and 
the public health,” Spinner, 3:120-131 [1984].)  
 
((a)) A classic individual quarantine system:  Hawai’i and 
the lazaretto at Kalaupapa 
The evolution of the above-referenced lazarettos over time 
tended to follow some similar patterns (although there were, of 
course, some individual differences based on multiple variables, 
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including local socio-economic-cultural differences between the polities 
involved).  While the history of any of the foregoing leprosaria could be 
used to illustrate in sharper relief a program of individual quarantines 
for leprosy, one of them will be used as an exemplar here:  the 
leprosy-segregation system established in the archipelago of Hawai’i 
on the eve of the modern era, with its particular locus on the 
Kalaupapa Peninsula.  Its outlines are fairly well-known to many 
informed people, in part because of the heroic efforts of Father Joseph 
Damien de Veuster and Mother Marianne to care for the afflicted, but 
its specifics may not be so generally familiar.  It is worth emphasizing 
that the goal here is not to present another biography of the 
celebrated people of Kalaupapa, but to provide a brief “biography” of 
the PH system that surrounded them.     
 
To summarize Kalaupapa’s long history:  
 
By the mid-1800s, the kings of Hawai’i and their Western 
physician-advisors had become increasingly alarmed over what they 
perceived to be a rising incidence of leprosy in the Sandwich Islands 
(i.e., Hawai’i); it was one of numerous diseases that had been 
introduced by European and American émigrés and by Asian contract 
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laborers on the sugar plantations.  (Ironically, TB was probably 
spreading much faster on the islands, but it elicited much less terror 
than leprosy.)    
 
In response to this primordial fear of leprosy, the Kingdom 
passed a law in 1865 (“the Leprosy Act”) that provided for the seizure, 
isolation, and seclusion of “all leprous persons, who shall be deemed 
by competent authority to be capable of spreading the disease.”  King 
Kamehameha V selected a site for a lazaretto on the small, bleak 
volcanic peninsula of Kalaupapa protruding off the north coast of 
Moloka’i Island.  It was a dramatically-effective natural prison, with 
1,600-foot green cliffs (“pali”) on one side and the wild blue Pacific on 
the other.   
 
On a cold, bleak January day in 1866, the first forlorn cohort of 
sickest “lepers” was herded onto the deck of a seedy schooner, and 
transported through the storm-tossed waters of the Kaiwa Channel to 
the rocky shore of Kalaupapa.  Only minimal preparation had been 
made for their reception, and they were marooned with no 
medications, few provisions, and barely any access to water; their 
residences were merely decaying huts in the abandoned village of 
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Kalawao. Within the ensuing months, most of these first castaways 
would die from the combined effects of leprosy, malnutrition, and 
privation (their bodies often went unburied where they fell).  However, 
the Kingdom kept rounding up more leprosy suspects and leaving 
them on the barren basaltic shores of Kalaupapa.       
  
 For almost a decade after its founding, the Kalawao lazaretto 
remained little more than a primitive dumping ground, where the 
Kingdom of Hawai’i tried to distance its infectious leprosy sufferers as 
far as possible from clean society.  In that early environment, the 
essential absence of any internal institutions on the peninsula led to 
conditions of social chaos, where the strong often preyed on the weak.  
Since the inmates knew that they had been abandoned to die by the 
Kingdom, many felt free to run riot—what worse could the authorities 
do to them?  (Leprosy was then thought to be violently communicable, 
and it terrified the uninfected, so some of the more aggressive 
confinees would intimidate the early managers of the settlement by 
threatening to embrace them or even bite them.)  The infamous motto 
of Kalaupapa from about 1866 to 1873 was the native Hawaiian phrase 
“a'ole kanawai ma keia wahi!”— literally, “in this place, there is no 
law!”   
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 (In accuracy, the exiles of Kalaupapa were not generally sinners 
or saints, gargoyles or greats, but a varying panoply of human beings 
who were mainly unified by their common immune deficiency to M. 
leprae.  The behaviors of some of them under the extreme stress of 
this situation did range from extremes of exploitation to extremes of 
unsung devotion to others—but they more usually involved ordinary 
efforts at survival under the multiple handicaps of leprosy and 
abandonment.)              
 
It is well known that Father Joseph Damien de Veuster 
volunteered to join the exiles on their grim volcanic peninsula in 1873, 
and, by force of will, he gradually brought a measure of common 
purpose and social order to the desperate coterie of people.  Damien’s 
story has become justly celebrated (it was famous even during his 
lifetime, and it was widely recalled in recent years when the priest was 
sanctified by his Church).   
 
However, it is not so often recognized that after St. Damien’s 
death from leprosy in 1889, the successive Hawaiian Kingdom, 
Republic of Hawai’i, U.S. Territory of Hawai’i, and U.S. State of Hawai’i 
maintained the leprosy-segregation policy for another 80 years—well 
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into the modern era in medicine.  It was a complex and autonomous 
system, which created a whole separate leprosy quarantine zone 
within the Hawaiian Islands—not geographically far from the rest of 
society, but virtually walled off from it.   
 
The Hawaiian leprosy-segregation system had its own laws and 
enforcement machinery (e.g., Hawaii Terr. L., S. L. 1907, Act 122, 
amending R. L. Sec 1122):  In its early years, to recount it very 
briefly, police officers would conduct episodic dragnets across the 
islands to hunt down suspected “lepers” (who were often hiding), and 
then haul them in chains to the Kaka’ako or Kalihi Receiving Stations in 
Honolulu for forced examination.  Later, the detection procedures 
became more institutionalized, with a small coterie of inspectors 
(usually paid on a bounty basis) who would track down reputed HD 
victims in homes and workplaces, or regularly check schoolchildren for 
the anaesthetic lesions that might signify early lepromatous leprosy.  
(Alternatively, private physicians would be expected to report their 
own patients to the PH system.)  At the Receiving Station itself, the 
diagnostic system eventually came to include bacteriological 
examinations of skin scrapings for the bacilli of leprosy, plus clinical 
examinations of naked male suspects or nearly-naked female suspects 
by a group of doctors.  (Usually, the patient was placed on a revolving 
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platform so that the doctors could examine him or her from all 
angles.)  If the examiners agreed by a specified plurality that the 
individual was genuinely infected, he or she would be “declared a 
leper” under the law, assigned a Board of Health number, and then 
have a mug-shot taken for the files. 
 
An adult leprosy patient would later remember this experience, 
saying: 
My father came to take me home from school.  But instead of  
taking me to the Kalihi Receiving Station immediately like the  
principal said they should, my parents took me home....  The  
whole family cried, including my father.  The next day my father  
took me downtown and brought me a new suit.  It was my first  
suit of clothes—they were so nice.  I never had clothes like that  
before because we were poor....  So I wore that suit of clothes  
to the Kalihi Receiving Station.  Even though we were poor,  
my father said he wanted me to be dressed nicely when I was  
taken to Kalihi to be declared a leper.  They took my picture for  
the official record of the Board of Health wearing that new set  
of clothes.  When the picture was taken, my father broke down  
again and cried.  So, I became a leper.  
 
(Cahill E, Yesterday at Kalaupapa [Honolulu:  Bess Press, 1994].) 
 
 
Although leprosy patients and suspects might be retained for 
awhile in the Receiving Station, many would eventually be led through 
the streets of Honolulu to the harbor, where, in front of their wailing 
families (who would often be crying “Auwe! Auwe!” [“alas! alas!”]), 
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they would be forced aboard a Board of Health contract ship for a one-
way voyage to Kalaupapa.  In the early years of the system, the 
leprosy victims were imprisoned in a cattle pen on the deck of the 
boat, surrounded by farm animals, but sharply segregated from the 
ship’s crew and other passengers.  During the journey, the infected 
persons would be washed over by waves and by each others’ vomit, 
urine, foeces, and skin discharges.  Sometimes, they would arrive on 
the far shore at night, where the earlier exiles would await them (with 
varying motives), their own deformities highlighted by wavering kukui 
nut torches in the darkness and wind.  Initially, there would be no 
other reception committee; later, Father Damien or his associates 
would try to meet the landing craft, and eventually the settlement 
administrators would fulfill this function.           
 
Among the transported persons would be leprosy-infected 
children, whom the Papa Ole (Board of Health) would often send to the 
far shore alone.  (By the late 1880s, Kalawao-Kalaupapa would have 
simple boarding houses for youngsters, usually staffed by clerical or 
lay volunteers).  Under the leprosy-quarantine system, families were 
generally separated for life, with most of the leprosy patients finally 
filling up the ample graveyards on the Kalaupapa Peninsula.  In 
general, these procedures ran against the cultures of Native Hawaiians 
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and Asians, who traditionally prized their family groups (“’ohana”).  
Among leprosy’s multiple names in Hawaiian was the term “ma'i- 
ho'oka'awale 'ohana”—which meant “the-sickness-that-tears-families-
apart….”           
 
Only the wild and choppy Kaiwa Channel separated Kalaupapa 
from the island of ‘Oahu and the burgeoning city of Honolulu, but it 
would always be a world apart.  For several years after the death of St. 
Damien, the little settlement remained a harsh place--with very limited 
food and medical supplies, supplied only grudgingly by a small 
kingdom that could ill-afford to run such a capital-intensive 
lepraphobic program.   
 
Gradually, however, living conditions at Kalaupapa did improve, 
as a succession of self-sacrificing priests, nuns, and laypersons 
provided nursing care in Damien’s tradition.  In later years, the U.S. 
Territory of Hawai’i itself built up the infrastructure of the lazaretto, 
adding better lodgings and introducing medical rehabilitation for the 
ravages of leprosy.  By the mid-20th century, Kalaupapa had become 
culturally and physically like many other small rural Hawaiian 
communities—but it remained one controlled by the Territorial Board of 
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Health, and surrounded by oceanic moats, high cliff walls, and border 
fences.   
 
Kalaupapa would also be continuingly marked by a set of 
distinctive quarantine laws, rules, and practices, some more wrenching 
than others:  For example, territorial health law eventually required 
that all non-leprous children be taken away from their leprous parents 
at birth, and placed in special Honolulu facilities or adopting homes.  
(There were also some less painful, but still demeaning, indicia of 
infectiousness and “otherness,” including the ancient practice of 
fumigating all outgoing mail, plus a system of internal boundary fences 
and barriers to separate the “clean” staff from the patients.  For a long 
time, too, any cars brought to the Kalaupapa settlement would have to 
stay there, exiled like their owners, lest they somehow infect the rest 
of society upon return.)      
 
 
Through a series of bureaucratic misadventures, the Hawaiian 
leprosy settlement never became a major center for HD research (as 
the National Leprosarium at Carville would become), but it eventually 
benefited from discoveries made at that distant institution.  In the 
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1930s and 1940s, the sulfa drugs—notably dapsone—and later 
pharmacotherapies as well, finally and dramatically proved effective in 
killing Mycobacterium leprae in most patients, remedying their disease 
and rendering them virtually non-infectious.  However, public attitudes 
and territorial laws did not catch up very quickly with those medical 
changes, and Hawai’i’s leprosy-segregation program continued in a 
moderated form all the way until 1969—over a century after it had 
been started.   
 
((b)) Analysis of the Hawai’i leprosy segregation program 
 The Hawaiian leprosy-segregation program raised in unusually 
stark relief some of the basic issues posed by all quarantines and other 
contagion-controls:  Were the restrictions based on sound biomedical 
and scientific grounds?  Was this system justified at an ethical, legal, 
and social level? 
  
 
Fundamentally, it is submitted, the leprosy-segregation 
program’s underlying scientific premises were flawed, and this will be 
explored a little further in the next chapter of this Dissertation.  
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Even if this were not the case, however, it could be argued that 
the system was still problematic at an ethical, legal, and social level.  
In general, lawmakers and administrators have a perennial duty to 
balance the equities at one equilibrium point or another on the policy 
scales between the collective good and the individual good (which may 
overlap to some extent, but are usually to a large degree in conflict).  
With regards to the control of communicable diseases, however, the 
collectivity has usually prevailed in such trade-offs historically (under 
an implicit or explicit utilitarian premise of “the greatest good for the 
greatest number”).  This was certainly the case during most of the 
history of Hawai’i’s leprosy-segregation program, as the following 
judicial ruling showed:   
 
In 1884, the Royal Hawaiian Legislative Assembly asked the 
Kingdom’s Supreme Court for an advisory opinion on the legitimacy of 
the Leprosy Act of 1865 and the PH system it had established.  The 
justices replied:   
It has been truly said that self-preservation is the first 
law of nature.  This is equally true of a State.  “Salus  
populi suprema est lex.”  
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
[T]he police power of the State is called “the law of  
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overruling necessity.”  No State could exist without it.   
If it did not exist in this Kingdom, our population would  
be liable to be swept away by any and every contagious  
disease that might come to our shores, and no measures  
of quarantine or restriction could be taken against it. 
         ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  [W]e are of the opinion that the law authorizing the 
  segregating and isolating of lepers is not only a  
wholesome law and constitutional, but that without  
such a law the result would eventually be that much  
of our useful population would leave these islands,  
ships would cease to touch here, our products would  
fail to find a market abroad, and these fair islands  
would become a pest-house to be avoided by the  
whole civilized world 
“Segregation of Lepers,” 5 Haw. 162, 164 (Hawai’i King.).  The 
perspective and priorities expressed in this opinion would implicitly 
ground the whole Hawaiian leprosy-quarantine program for the next 
eighty-five years.   
 
Since that time, however, this court’s views may have been 
bypassed to some degree by evolving constitutional and ethical 
thinking about individual rights and liberties, which would weigh them 
more deeply on the scales of policy.  The rarity of quarantines since 
the start of the “Window Era” in the 1960s has not widely tested this 
new approach to the equities involved, but it is proposed here that 
future quarantines will have to be approached from this new balancing.  
This will also be noted in the next chapter of this Dissertation.   
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Arguably, a future quarantine program—however solid its 
scientific foundations--would also need to give more consideration to 
the human social and cultural impacts of its actions than Hawai’i did 
during the 100+ years of its leprosy-segregation system.  
 
(ii) Tuberculosis 
 The other major mycobacterial disease, tuberculosis, has been a 
scourge of mankind as long as leprosy has been.  Like M. leprae, the 
acid-fast bacilli of M. tuberculosis co-evolved with their human hosts 
since antiquity.  While these microorganisms did not turn into harmless 
symbionts like some other ancient parasites did, they developed the 
capacity to dwell quietly for years in many of their victims, 
asymptomatic and untroubling under most circumstances.  For their 
part, many human immune systems acquired the ability to quickly 
destroy the pathogens—or at least to encapsulate them in fibrotic 
tubercles, where they would remain latent until some somatic 
disequilibrium favored pathogen growth (e.g., immune dysfunction due 
to stress, increasing age, or HIV infection), allowing them to become 
active-–and communicable--once again (with pulmonary caseation and 
other processes provoking tussis and other behaviors).     
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 M. tuberculosis generally spreads from host to host via airborne 
droplet transmission (see Chapter II).  Since the lungs are usually the 
first anatomical areas affected by TB, the classic form of symptomatic 
human TB involves respiratory and systemic symptomatology, with 
severe tussis, fevers, night-sweats, weight-loss, and eventually 
emaciation--plus the extreme sort of weakness and pallor that earned 
the malady its historic names of “consumption” and “the Great White 
Plague.”  (In the past, it was also called “phthisis,” and its victims were 
labeled “consumptives” or “phthisics.”)  M. tuberculosis can also affect 
many other body systems, so there can be protean forms of the 
disease, including TB of the neck glands (“scrofula”),TB of the 
gastrointestinal tract, TB of the spine (“Pott’s Disease”), and TB of the 
membranes covering the brain (“tuberculous meningitis”)--although 
pre-bacteriological medicine did not always recognize these as being 
different manifestations of the same disease.  When the microbial 
attack overwhelms the host’s immune system, TB can take on the 
form of “miliary tuberculosis,” in which hundreds of small infection foci 
are scattered across the body like grains of wheat.   
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By the time of the Industrial Revolution in the West, M. 
tuberculosis was widespread, even ubiquitous, in European and North 
American societies.  Social conditions, including crowding and squalid 
housing, promoted host exposure to M. tuberculosis, while overwork, 
malnutrition, and lack of sunlight (especially among the laboring 
classes) increased host susceptibility. The “consumption” had become 
one of the major causes of death in those countries by the end of the 
18th century.  
  
However, while classic scourges, such as smallpox and cholera, 
were sweeping through Europe and North America, provoking mass 
terror, little public health attention was usually given to the Great 
White Plague.  In those days, the consumption was just an extremely 
prevalent and slowly progressive “background” disease that caused 
symptoms in individuals, producing pallid coughers on sidewalks and 
horse-trams.  Rather than a call to urgent public health action, it was 
simply considered a bleak part of urban life.  This attitude, of course, 
made it no less destructive in reality.   For instance, the Goncourt 
brothers, who wrote gritty naturalistic novels (“slice-of-life,” or 
“trenche-de-vie”) about lower-class Parisian life in the 1800s, recalled 
visiting a clinic in the city on one bitterly cold and windy night.  As 
they were talking to the head physician there, an emaciated elderly 
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man arrived at the door and pleaded for admission in a high quavering 
voice.  Regretfully, the doctor turned him away into the icy night.  As 
he subsequently explained to the frères Goncourt, “that man was a 
phthisic.  If I admitted all phthisics to my clinic, I would have no room 
for any other patients” (see, e.g., Dubos RJ & Dubos J, The White 
Plague:  Tuberculosis, Man, and Society [New Brunswick, NJ:  Rutgers 
U. Press, 1952], 277 pp.).            
 
However, as social conditions, public health, and biomedicine 
began to reduce the incursions of feared epidemic diseases in the West 
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the less dramatic endemic 
“white plague” of tuberculosis began to emerge from the background 
into sharper relief.  With the gradual abatement of the acute and 
dramatic pestilential diseases (through quarantines, modern sewage 
systems, vaccines, and sera), Western medicine and public health 
began to have the luxury to turn to the chronic background diseases 
like TB.  Thus, a movement arose to create “sanatoria” for 
consumptives.    
 
One goal of the sanatoria was therapeutic—the care of 
consumptives as individuals.  There were no curative drugs in those 
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days (although there was a continuing desperate search for one), but 
good nursing and salubrious conditions were thought to help (which, in 
fact, they probably sometimes did.)  Gradually, this movement became 
one basic motivation for creating TB hospitals in airy country settings.  
The institutions would be located far away from the polluted cities, in 
rural mountains or alongside lakes where the air was thought to be 
best for challenged lungs—and, not coincidentally, where they would 
be far from other people to infect. 
  
For, increasingly, there were also public calls for aggressive civic 
action to control the White Plague—especially after Robert Koch 
isolated its causative bacterium, conclusively establishing its 
communicable nature.  One newspaper editor (among many others) 
denounced consumptives for moving freely about in society, spreading 
their deadly disease to new victims, and he demanded steps to confine 
them—against their will, if necessary.  This objective of protecting 
society became another facet of the emerging “sanatorium” 
movement.  
  
Thus, the new TB hospitals reflected an ambivalent goal—both 
therapeutic and coercive, which ran along a spectrum of emphasis 
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from one objective to the other.  To some extent, the individual 
sanatoria and their differing emphases reflected the differing wealth of 
their patrons:   
 
Prosperous consumptives could go to comfortable private 
hospitals like Saranac Lake in northern New York State (founded by a 
consumptive doctor who believed that the setting had helped cure 
him).  These facilities emphasized the goal of treatment (which 
included cold fresh air, rich diets, and—eventually, when those 
procedures did not work, the use of heroic measures, such as Quenu’s 
thoracoplasty, artificial pneumothorax, and artificial 
pneumoperitoneum).   
 
By contrast, poorer consumptives were often obliged to turn to 
their states for hospital care.  In the laissez-faire American system of 
health care, the public sector entered the picture mainly to promote 
the collective safety (as was the case with mental institutions and 
prisons), and states would set up big hospitals to sequester their 
consumptive populations in not-always-salubrious settings.  (An 
example was the Waverly Hills Sanatorium, which was located in 
Tennessee—an epicenter of TB in the early 20th century.  It was a huge 
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institution that tried to nurse its confinees and develop new 
treatments, but it was also grim and full of misery--with a tunnel in 
the basement for the quiet removal of the tuberculous dead.  Waverly 
Hills Sanatorium still stands, abandoned, on its forested hillside today, 
vast, echo-filled, decaying, and empty). 
     
The TB-containment emphasis of the states (and some counties 
and cities) became increasingly clear as they promulgated TB-control 
laws to compel patients to enter hospitals if they did not go there 
voluntarily.  If tuberculous persons did not comply with the 
confinement orders of health officials, usually backed by courts, they 
could be hauled into sanatoria by police officers (who, in many cases, 
probably dreaded this assignment…).  Once institutionalized, patients 
had to comply with the rules of the facilities, just as if they were 
convicts; otherwise, they could face even further restrictions of 
privileges, or isolation confinements within the walls of the sanatoria 
themselves. Sometimes, recalcitrant patients would even be placed in 
jails for non-compliance with health (which was not a good idea for 
either the patients or the prisons).  (See the cases of Roger Draper, 
below.)  
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((a)) Some illustrative cases of Individual TB confinements:   
Benton v. Reid and State v. Snow 
In the 1956 case of Benton v. Reid, 231 F.2d 780, 98 
U.S.App.D.C. 27, for example, the Washington, DC Director of Public 
Health consigned a chronic TB sufferer to the hospital section of the 
city jail to keep him off the streets.  Upon receiving Francis A. Benton’s 
writ of habeas corpus, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia wrote that “we cannot lightly infer that Congress 
intended that a person like appellant, neither indicted for nor convicted 
of any crime, is to be confined in a penal institution to suffer the social 
stigma and bad associations resulting therefrom,” since such a 
confinement could be violating his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights 
(Id., at 783).  Accordingly, the court granted Benton’s writ.    
 
It might be noted, however, that some TB patients and their 
families were even less cooperative than Benton.  In a 1959 case 
(State v. Snow, 240 Ark. 746, 324 S.W.2d 532 (Ark. Sup. Ct.), for 
example, the court record recounts how a health department worker 
arrived at the cabin of a tuberculous Ozark mountaineer with 
directions to seek his commitment to a state institution.  The patient 
himself was courteous enough—but his daughter ordered the employee 
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to leave their home immediately, “and to attend to [her] … own 
business, and not to do any snooping around” afterwards, and the 
patient’s son reinforced these requests by pointing a double-barreled 
shotgun at the worker’s face until she left the premises…. 
 
During the “Window Era” of the late 20th century, as TB incidence 
declined, forcible TB quarantines became decreasingly common, 
though they were never fully discontinued at the state and local levels.  
The laws have remained on the books in virtually all U.S. states and 
territories.  In recent years, moreover, the appearance of multi-drug-
resistant TB (“MDR-TB”) and even extremely-drug-resistant TB (“XDR-
TB”) has raised major concerns about an increasing public health 
threat from the old “white plague.”   
 
((b)) A modern-day TB quarantine--The Speaker episode 
In 2007, a 31-year-old Atlanta man, Andrew Speaker, was 
diagnosed as having a strain of TB thought to be XDR.  (It is unclear 
how Speaker contracted it, as he hardly seemed to be in a high-risk 
group:  Ironically, he was an attorney, whose father-in-law was doing 
TB research for the CDC—though this was probably just a very odd 
coincidence.)  Speaker was asked to stay close to home, but, for 
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reasons best known to himself, he decided to follow through on a 
planned wedding trip to Europe.  This act set off a mad scramble by 
the authorities in several countries to grab him and return him to the 
United States.  Eventually, Speaker came back to the U.S. on his own 
and drove to New York City, where he was promptly seized and put 
into Federal quarantine in Denver.  (Reportedly, it was the first use of a 
Federal quarantine for human beings since 1963.)  Once Speaker was 
isolated, doctors concluded that he probably had MDR-TB, rather than 
XDR-TB.  Thus, while his disorder was still worrisome, it was still 
amenable to some medications, and he was put on the relevant 
regimens.  
 
At last report, the young lawyer was (perhaps not surprisingly) 
planning to sue the U.S. government for allegedly violating his civil 
rights.      
 
(iii) Syphilis and gonorrhoea 
There has been intense scholarly controversy over the historic 
and geographic origins of syphilis and gonorrhoea, including a debate 
over whether syphilis was present in the Old World disease during pre-
Columbian times (e.g., Morton RS & Rashid S, “’The syphilis enigma’: 
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The riddle resolved?” Sexually Transmitted Infections, 77(5):322-324 
[Oct. 2001]).  For example, it has been noted that Mediaeval and post-
Mediaeval England maintained some closed institutions--called “Lock 
Hospitals”—initially for the confinement of individuals who carried 
leprosy, and later for carriers of some form of STDs, but the specific 
nature of those diseases remains obscure.  It seems likely that 
gonorrhoea, at least, was one of them; however, it is also likely that 
the inmate population of the Lock Hospitals was conflated through 
misdiagnosis, with numerous individuals among them having non-
leprous and non-venereal disorders.   
 
In any case, it can be posited that the major STDs date at least 
as far back as the late 15th century in the Old World.  Whether or not 
syphilis was imported to Europe from the Americas at that time (as 
some historians contend), it certainly became violently pandemic 
during the 16th century.  Only with the passage of time did Treponema 
pallidum ameliorate its impact on most human hosts, turning syphilis 
into a chronic disease with an extensive latency period between its 
primary and secondary infectious stages and its individually 
destructive tertiary stage. 
 
108 
 
It would be parenthetical here to discuss the complex biological 
and socio-cultural interplay of the venereal diseases.  The primary 
concern in this Dissertation is how these diseases helped shape 
present American quarantine law.   
 
To a major extent, the VDs were closely enmeshed with the 
complicated and ambivalent approach of governments to the control of 
prostitution.  Generally, many jurisdictions maintained strict laws 
against this activity, but the enforcement of those laws tended to vary 
between places and times depending on multiple factors.   
 
One major factor affecting enforcement was the presence of 
national conflict:  During wartime, federal and state authorities would 
become concerned over the threat to the fighting forces posed by 
sexually transmitted infections (particularly during the First and 
Second World Wars).  This led them to impose cordons sanitaires 
against prostitutes around many military bases and training camps 
(which were probably evaded by numerous enterprising servicemen).  
Furthermore, during the time periods around the two major wars of 
the 20th century, American health authorities established a number of  
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special quarantine camps for the confinement of individuals who 
carried venereal diseases.   
 
During World War I and the immediate post-war years, the main 
activity of some of the foregoing camps was simple confinement to 
keep the inmates from transmitting their contagion to others.  In 
1917, for example, the state of Kansas authorized its Board of Health 
to designate communicable  diseases justifying “isolation and 
quarantine” (1917 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 205); subsequently, the Board 
became concerned about VD in military camps within its borders, so it 
declared that syphilis, gonorrhea, and chancroid were among the 
diseases that merited such controls, and it ordered county and local 
health officers to routinely examine VD suspects such as pimps and 
prostitutes (Kansas State Board of Health, Rule XXXVI, sec. 2(a)).  
Lacking other intrastate options, Kansas authorities set up detention 
facilities for infected men and women within the grounds of the state 
penitentiary at Lansing.  Furthermore (as a reviewing court would 
remark), “[e]xperience demonstrated that the men sent to the 
quarantine camp were, generally speaking, a bad lot, and the [state] 
board of administration provided that they should be subject to such 
rules for the discipline and control of the institution as the warden, 
with the approval of the board, might adopt.”  Ex parte McGee, 105 
110 
 
Kan. 574, 185 P. 14 (1919).  (See also Ex parte Hardcastle, 84 
Tex.Crim. 463, 208 S.W. 531 [Cr.App. 1919].)           
 
By the World War II years, venereology had advanced enough 
that the control function of quarantine centers was (as in TB) mixed 
with a major treatment motivation (although it should be noted that 
the longstanding attitudes towards sexual promiscuity carried an 
aspect of opprobrium that did not apply to TB controls).  By this time, 
physicians had gained enough experience with the arsphenamine 
drugs against syphilis (including neosalvarsan), which Paul Ehrlich and 
his team had developed before World War I, that they had developed 
some standardized protocols for administering them to cure the 
disease.  Of course, the fact that treatment regimens could be 
effective in many cases did not mean that they were either free of 
risks or pleasant to undergo.  For a long time, neo-arsphenamine 
therapy often required weekly injections for a year or more, and these 
arsenical agents retained high toxicity for hosts that could produce 
serious side effects.  This led many patients to discontinue treatment 
early, which could threaten their own health and the public’s health.  
Consequently, scientists developed accelerated treatment protocols, 
which involved multiple injections or intravenous drip administration  
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that could be completed in a period of weeks, albeit with some 
increased hazards.   
 
In cooperation with some state and local governments, the US 
Public Health Service eventually set up a system of some 58 “Rapid 
Treatment Centers” (“RTCs”) (in some 41 states and territories), with 
some 6,100 beds, where VD suspects would be detained and treated.  
In 1944, the confinement stays would average 22 days.  Later, when 
the faster and safer penicillin family of drugs was developed, 
treatment regimens became even quicker.  The patient/confinees of 
the RTCs were mostly female (often described in terms of the day as 
“women of easy virtue” or “promiscuous women”), though later some 
men were sent to the centers as well.  (See, e.g., Parascandola J, 
“Quarantining women: Venereal disease rapid treatment centers in 
World War II America,” Bulletin Hist. Med., 83(3):1-15 [Fall 2009], 
www.muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/journals/bulletin_of_the_histor
y_of     medicine, accessed 10/25/11; Cates W, Rothenberg RB, & 
Blount JH, “Syphilis control:  The Historic context and epidemiologic 
basis for interrupting sexual transmission of Treponema pallidum,” 
Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 23(1):68-75 [Jan./Feb. 1996].)   
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During the years around the Second World War (like the First 
World War before it), various law courts would hear a number of 
habeas corpus motions from confinees alleging unlawful quarantines 
for VDs.  As before, a number of the plaintiffs were supposedly 
“women of easy virtue” (and sometimes men from the “bad lot,” to use 
the McGee court’s wording, above); in a number of instances, they 
were contesting their continued confinement for mandatory VD 
treatment after their jail sentences for moral offenses were over.  (The 
petitioners usually lost.)  (See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Smith, 204 
Ark. 692, 163 S.W.2d 705 [1942]; Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 
So.2d 267 1943]). 
 
(b) Some Present-day U.S. Individual Quarantine Laws for TB 
and VD 
 While most U.S. jurisdictions have repealed their old leprosy 
quarantine and social-restriction laws (some of them in relatively 
recent times), almost all American states and territories continue to 
make special provisions for the compulsory treatment and control of 
tuberculosis and the venereal diseases (usually distinct from their 
general quarantine provisions). 
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(i) Maryland 
 In typical provisions, the state of Maryland empowers its health 
officers to order the physical examination of TB suspects.  If the 
officers conclude from the examinations that the examined individuals’ 
condition may endanger the public health, they can require them to 
undergo outpatient care.  Should the tuberculous persons fail to 
comply, the state authorizes its officers to quarantine them in situ at 
home or in public facilities (MD Code, Health - General, § 18-324; see 
also, e.g., Ariz. Rev. St. s 36-714). 
  
  (ii) Tennessee 
 Also typically, the state of Tennessee still directs state, district, 
county, and municipal health officials to examine STD suspects and to 
compel infected examinees to submit to treatment until they become 
noninfectious.  It also orders these officers to “isolate and quarantine 
the person[s] infected with an STD,” if they determine that this is 
”necessary to protect the public health” (Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-10-
104). 
 
    Area Quarantines 
 Beyond quarantines of individuals is the large set of quarantines 
that are thrown over wider population groups and geographic areas, 
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ranging from households or individual structures, to neighborhoods or 
districts, to whole cities, to partial counties and counties, to 
states/provinces/territories, to entire countries or even groups of 
countries.  It should be acknowledged here that this set of group and 
“area quarantines” constitute more of a continuum of sizes than a 
hierarchy of discrete entities—with some vast households/structures 
approaching neighborhoods in size, and some large cities being legally 
counties as well.   
         
 
a. Household and Workplace Quarantines 
(1) Household Quarantines 
 The next wider breadth of quarantines have been imposed over 
households, which consist of the immediate close contacts of overtly 
infected persons (usually, family members and/or fellow residents of a 
single building).  In modern PH parlance (see discussion above), this 
procedure would generally involve a combination of “isolating” the 
clearly sick persons in situ and “quarantining” the probably-exposed 
persons who have been dwelling in close physical proximity to them. 
(2) Workplace Quarantines 
 A variant of household quarantines, approximately equal in size, 
would be the quarantining of a single non-residential facility, such as a 
115 
 
hospital or other workplace setting (see “institutional quarantines,” 
below).    
 
(a) Some Historical Examples of Household Quarantines 
 For centuries, polities have resorted to household quarantines in 
desperate response to dangerous contagions.  During the years that 
Yersinia pestis plague swept through Europe (either in its 1340s-
1350s pandemic strain or in its later epidemic strains), for example, 
officials might mark stricken homes with special insignia.  (In the 
1664 “Great Plague of London,” for instance, the doorways might bear 
crosses, with the mournful statement “May God Have Mercy On Us.”)  
Then, the authorities sometimes nailed those doors and windows shut, 
trapping the terrified sick and their relatives inside to die of disease or 
starvation. 
 
 In Colonial North America, infectious diseases made early 
appearances, and the governments of both towns and colonies soon 
began using various kinds of quarantines to try to stop them, with 
household quarantines being a major control tactic.   
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(i) Smallpox as a provocateur of Household Quarantines 
Smallpox, or variola, was a particular scourge that provoked 
household quarantines.  For example: 
 
On Long Island, Easthampton Township ordered anti-smallpox 
quarantines as early as 1662 (see, e.g., Neslund, Goodman, & Hadler, 
in Goodman et al., 2007, at 229).   
 
In 1667, the Colonel and Commander of Virginia’s Northampton 
County forbad any members of smallpox-stricken families from  
 
go[ing] forth their doors until their full cleansing, that 
is to say, thirtie days after their receiving the sd. smallpox, 
least the sd. disease shoulde spreade by infection like the 
plague of leprosy.…  [Those persons ] such as shall no-things  
[take] notice of this premonition and charge, but beast like  
shall p[re]sume to act and doe contrarily, may expect to be  
severely punished according to the Statute of King James  
in such case provided for their contempt herein;  
God save the King 
  
(Northampton County Records, 1655-1668, cited by Duffy J, Epidemics 
in Colonial America, [Baton Rouge, La.:  Louisiana St. Press, 1953]).  
Some nine years later, the Virginia House of Burgesses passed a 
statute imposing strict home isolation on smallpox victims throughout 
the Old Dominion (Id.).   
 
117 
 
As a major center of trade, the Massachusetts Bay Colony was 
hit by variola early and often, and it took some vigorous steps against 
the disease.  In 1701, the colony’s government empowered the 
selectmen of its towns to isolate and quarantine smallpox victims and 
suspects; thirty years later, it ordered the heads of households to 
report to local authorities when the disease had stricken their families, 
and it directed those householders to fly the dreaded banner of the 
quarantine from their homes (in this case, the flag was red—signifying 
that these families had been visited by “the red death”) (Neslund, 
Goodman & Hadler 2007, at 227; Duffy 1954, at 102).   
 
Well into modern times, in fact, Massachusetts still carried some 
of the strict household quarantine laws from those years on its 
codebooks.  As of the date of this Dissertation, for example, the 
Commonwealth retains a statute in effect (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 111 s 
95) that authorizes a town’s board of health to confine a disease victim 
to his home if he can not be safely moved, in which circumstances “the 
house or place in which he remains shall be considered as a hospital, 
and all persons residing in or in any way connected therewith shall be 
subject to the regulations of the board….”  In some form or another, 
this provision of law dates back over three hundred years (St. 1701-
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02, ch. 9, ss 1, 2).  Out of consideration for its quarantinees, the 
existing law does add that 
[w]hen the board of health of a town shall deem it necessary 
         in the interest of the public health, to require a resident wage 
earner to remain within such house or place or otherwise to  
interfere with the following of his employment, he shall receive 
from such town during the period of his restraint compensation  
to the extent of three fourths of his regular wages; 
 
Unfortunately, this clearly unrevisited law further specifies 
 
that the amount so received shall not exceed two dollars for  
each working day.  
 
 In the course of time, some features of household quarantines 
acquired a haunting sort of image that remains today as a dim 
recollection of past eras.  These included the use of placards on doors 
and windows proclaiming in strident letters that the board of health 
had placed this residence under quarantine for a contagious disease, 
and forbidding entry to the premises or exit from it without the 
board’s permission.  Sometimes, the signs specified the penalties for 
noncompliance, and sometimes their message was underscored by 
armed guards posted around the dwellings—“vi et armis,” in the old 
legal language. 
  
 During most of American history, the inmates’ fate was not 
usually one of starvation and abandonment, but it remained one of 
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deadly risk from the disease itself, spartan living conditions, and 
estrangement from the community outside.  (During the “Window Era” 
of the late 20th century, a pharmaceutical house ran an advertisement 
that invoked this scene.  It depicted a small child staring in quiet 
despair from behind a blockaded door, next to the yellow placard of 
quarantine.  The message of the ad was that the wonder drugs of the 
age had made this picture obsolete—but, arguably, some 21st century 
conditions could soon render this upbeat message itself out-of-date.)   
          
(b) Some Present-Day U.S. Household Quarantine Laws 
 Explicitly or by implication, virtually all U.S. jurisdictions still 
direct or allow health officers to isolate the communicably-ill in situ 
and to quarantine their entire households when they determine that 
this is required by the public health.  Several of these jurisdictions still 
explicitly describe the authority to place placards on quarantined 
homes.  (For example, Pennsylvania states that “it shall be the duty of 
the health officer to … placard and quarantine all premises upon which 
cases of communicable disease exist...” [53 Pa. Stats. S 56605].  
Guam adds that its health director “may place in a conspicuous 
position on the exterior of the premises where … [a] person is isolated 
or quarantined a placard having printed on it in large letters the name 
of the disease and warning all unauthorized persons to remain off the 
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premises.  Such placard shall be in both English and Chamorro…” (10 
Guam Code An. S 3311.  See also 16 Del. Code An. S 505; Iowa Code 
Ann. s 139A.2; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. s 3707.08;  Tenn. Code Ann. s 
68-5-104; 19 V.I. Code Ann. s 2).  Vermont goes even further, 
allowing private physicians who suspect—even without reaching a 
definitive diagnosis--that they have attended an infectious patient to 
“quarantine the premises temporarily … and post thereon a card upon 
which the word ‘quarantine’ should be plainly written or printed.”   
 
   b.  Institutional Quarantines 
 A special type of area quarantine (usually somewhere in physical 
or population size between a household/building quarantine--as 
described above, and a neighborhood/district quarantine--as described 
below) is an institutional quarantine.  This category would include 
infected worksites and other public places, which can have different 
management impacts depending on the purpose and characteristics of 
the institutions involved.   
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 (1) Nosocomial quarantines 
 A notable type of workplace setting would be a healthcare facility 
in which an infectious disease has spread.  These are distinctive in a 
number of ways:  Among other things, there is clearly a higher risk of 
outbreaks in nosocomial settings; in addition, these events would be 
subject to special controls, such as barrier protection techniques.  
(During the SARS outbreak of 2003 in China, Canada, and elsewhere—
which particularly struck hospitals, PH and institutional authorities 
sometimes imposed a variant of full-hospital quarantines:  They closed 
off the institutions to all but limited entry, and they required the 
dedicated staff members--who were risking their health and lives to 
treat the sick and to manage the facilities--to remain in a sort of 
quarantine “cocoon.”  These employees would have to spend their off-
hours in separate lodgings within the hospital grounds, or they would 
be allowed to go home at night—but required to limit their contact with 
outsiders.)   
  
 (2) Schools and colleges  
 Educational institutions comprise another important type of 
institution that has been historically subjected to quarantine-type 
controls.  These gathering places for young people have been 
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particular sites for the transmission of certain epidemic diseases, 
including forms of pandemic influenza that have particularly affected 
their age group.  Moreover, schoolchildren have frequently brought 
home communicable diseases that have then threatened the health 
and lives of older or younger relatives.  It has already been seen that 
PH officials have frequently tried to abate epidemics by closing down 
such public places and keeping students at home, in order to keep 
possibly infected persons from encountering susceptibles.  (This was a 
frequent device during the Spanish Influenza pandemic of 1918-19.)  
In itself, this has not been a highly intrusive measure for persons 
affected.  However, there is a “strict quarantine” variant of this 
procedure that has been adopted in various times and places.             
 
(a) Some Historical Examples of Institutional 
Quarantines 
 In several instances historically, health authorities have 
responded to severe epidemic diseases—particularly pandemic 
influenza—by “locking down” college campuses, confining the 
students, faculty, and support staff inside in order to protect the larger 
outside communities  from contracting the disease that has appeared 
in the schools.  (Generally, this was not a tactic used for educational 
institutions below the collegiate level.)  
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(i) College quarantines against the Spanish Influenza—U.S., 
1918-1919 
 Several American jurisdictions employed this relatively severe 
tactic during the Spanish Influenza pandemic, although the policy was 
implemented in a somewhat scattershot fashion rather than in a 
planned, inter-jurisdictional, or coordinated way. 
  
 In Hastings, Nebraska, for instance, the town’s mayor placed the 
entire campus of Hastings College under quarantine—enforcing this 
intervention by posting armed soldiers around the perimeters of the 
school (US DHHS, “The great pandemic:  The United States in 1918-
1919,” www.1918.pandemicflu.gov/your_state/nebraska.html).  
Curiously, though, the college itself moderated this stern lock-down to 
some degree by allowing students who lived locally to break 
quarantine by visiting their families; possibly, this compassionate 
“loophole” may have obviated the power of the quarantine, allowing 
flu virus to transit from college to community anyway.  
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 At the University of Chicago, meanwhile, members of the student  
army training corps (the contemporary ROTC) living in two different 
dorms were handled in two divergent ways—one proactive and the 
other not--which created a small, unintended, and semi-controlled 
“natural experiment” on the potential value of institutional 
quarantines:  The leaders of section “A” students closely monitored 
them and instructed them to report illness; if they thought that any of 
their young corpsmen had contracted the flu, they  immediately sent 
those individuals home or isolated them in hospitals.  By contrast, the 
supervisors of section “B” took a more laissez-faire approach to the 
situation, and allowed their young charges to continue their pre-
pandemic activities, including mingling and attending lectures 
regardless of symptoms.  In the end, although the two student groups 
were similar in most demographic respects, their influenza attack 
rates were not:  Between October 17, 1918 and November 8, 1918, 
some 26 of the 685 section A cadets came down with flu (i.e., their 
attack rate was 39/1,000)--but some 93 of the 234 section B cadets 
were stricken by the disease (i.e., their respective attack rate was ten 
times higher, at 398/1,000) (Jordan EO, “Influenza in three Chicago 
groups. J. Infect. Dis., 25:74-95 [1919], cited by Bell DM & WHO 
Writing Group, “Nonpharmaceutical interventions for pandemic  
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influenza, national and community measures,” Emerg. Infect. Dis., 
12(1):88-94 [Jan. 2006], at 89, www.cdc.gov/eid, accessed 12/5/11).    
     
  (ii) College quarantines (“Fengxiao”) against the H1N1 “Swine 
Flu”—Mainland China, 2009 
 A century later, the Peoples’ Republic of China (“PRoC”) 
employed an institutional lock-down procedure like that at Hastings 
College in 1918—though, this time, the disease at issue was the 
relatively mild pandemic strain of A/H1N1influenza that emerged from 
Mexico in 2009.   During this particular pandemic, the centralized and 
authoritarian PRoC government closed colleges in a more widespread 
and systematic way:  Called “Fengxiao,” the Chinese procedure also 
involved barricading campuses, confining the academic community 
inside, coupled with intensive monitoring of outbreak developments 
within the enclosed zones.  In essence, this was a reverse of the 
traditional Western-style “school closure” procedures.  A subsequent 
study of the outcome in Shaanxi Province yielded a somewhat mixed 
picture:  The trapped university population appears to have suffered a 
more intense outbreak, but the community outside seemed to benefit 
from a delayed initial peak incidence of influenza, plus a reduced 
absolute peak incidence of morbidity.  On the other hand, the 
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authorities relaxed Fengxiao after a relatively short period of time for 
a holiday, and the general population became more mobile on this 
occasion; the retrospective researchers believed that this caused 
Shaanxi Province to experience a second, later wave of influenza.  
(They did acknowledge that other factors might have yielded this 
outcome.)  Their inference was that the stern college Fengxiao would 
best protect an outside community--yielding a smaller, unimodal 
outbreak--if it was even stricter, with an earlier date of 
commencement and a longer duration.  (See, e.g., Tang S, et al., 
“Campus quarantines (Fengxiao) for curbing emergent infectious 
diseases:  Lessons from mitigating A/H1N1 in Xi’an, China,” J. 
Theoret. Biol., [in press], 
www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/science/article/pii/S00225
19311005583, accessed 11/29/11; Tang S, et al., “Community based 
measures for mitigating the 2009 H1N1 pandemic in China,” PloS 
ONE, 5:1-11 (e10911) (2010), doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010911.)                
 
c. Neighborhood/District Quarantines 
 Next wider in concentric size are quarantines placed over whole 
neighborhoods or districts within a municipality where a contagious  
 
127 
 
disease has broken out.  The precise definition of such quarantine 
zone can vary with the individual episodes, as can their sizes. 
 
(1) Policy Concerns in Neighborhood/District Quarantines 
 All quarantines can potentially raise major epidemiological and 
socio-legal issues, but certain types of area quarantines may pose 
some distinctive concerns for policy-makers and administrators.   
  
 Some fundamental problems relate to the grounds for taking 
such broad scale measures, the definitions of the covered persons and 
areas, and the perimeters of the quarantine zones themselves.  It is 
partly a matter of political geography:  There is a distinction between 
area quarantines that track formal jurisdictional boundaries (e.g., 
municipalities, counties, states/provinces/territories, and even 
countries)--and those that do not (e.g., households, neighborhoods, 
city districts, and partial counties). 
  
 From an epidemiological perspective, there can be value to area 
quarantines that do not follow official boundary lines--if they can be 
set up on the basis of sensitive up-to-date information from the field 
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about how widely an outbreak has spread.  If they are thus tailored to 
the stages and dimensions of an epidemic, it is possible to justify them 
as a rational means of containing the contagion as tightly as possible, 
without roping in too many unaffected persons and areas.  For 
example, an especially unsanitary neighborhood (which might have 
substandard tenement housing, deficient sewage systems, and/or 
major rodent infestations) might deserve particular PH attention to 
keep it from becoming the nidus of an exponentially expanding 
outbreak.   
  
 However, the above argument presupposes that there is ongoing 
quality surveillance information about an epidemic’s pattern, as well as 
an official capacity to change the quarantine’s dimensions in response 
to such developments.  Epidemics are by nature fluid and dynamic 
events, and the reality one day may become obsolete the next day.  
There is a frequent danger that legal and procedural actions will be 
slow to reflect this dynamic epidemic reality “on the ground.”  
Moreover, there can be serious problems with infected persons living 
and acting beyond the quarantine zone without showing external 
symptoms and signs (these asymptomatic people will be further 
discussed below).  With such considerations in mind, would it be 
appropriate, for example, to set the boundaries of a quarantined 
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neighborhood at certain streets—declaring that there is dangerous 
infection on one side of the line, and safety on the other?  
     
 Moreover, all area quarantines can also have special socio-legal 
implications, which again differ somewhat for jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional zones:  All such quarantines are likely to provoke some 
intense protests and legal challenges by quarantinees and other 
interests (including merchants), with seemingly-well people objecting 
to being trapped in a zone with the overtly ill.  The most vociferous 
protests are likely to involve the peripheries of the zones.   However, it 
might be harder to demonstrate the “rational grounds” that many legal 
systems require for the dimensions of non-jurisdictional area 
quarantines.  In these cases, the premises for the quarantine zones 
could sometimes be more questionable, and even, in a legal sense, 
more suspect of ”arbitrariness.”     
  
 In part, this may reflect the social milieus and attitudinal 
environments in which some historic neighborhood/district quarantines 
were implemented:  Sometimes, as shall be shown below, public 
health authorities imposed them on neighborhoods where certain 
ethnic, religious, and/or socio-economic groups primarily resided—
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groups that had long been socially-stigmatized by the majority 
societies.  In such circumstances, the variegated set of official 
quarantiners themselves may have acted out of a wide range of 
attitudes, beliefs, and motives—which might have included promotion 
of the greater good, assumptions about minority propensities to carry 
disease, and sometimes actual antagonism towards the quarantined 
sub-populations.  This would not be surprising, given that the socio-
legal situations in such area quarantines were often highly complex.  
There were often multiple interplays of cause-and-effect in such 
circumstances (only some of which can be suggested here). 
   
(2) Historic Issues in District Quarantines 
 In many countries, for example, socially rejected minorities 
(especially immigrants) might settle in special districts (ghettos, 
“shtetls,” “barrios,” “Chinatowns,” “Japantowns”) because they were 
legally forced to do so, because they suffered social hostility from the 
larger populations, because poverty led them to seek low-rent areas, 
and/or because they sought out people sharing their kinship and 
cultures.  In turn, these clusters would exacerbate the animadversions 
of the majority societies.  Moreover, the neighborhoods in question 
were often squalid places—again, for a host of intertwined reasons:  
The inhabitants were often forced by their penury into accepting 
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substandard dwellings, managed by exploitative landlords, and those 
insalubrious conditions would be exacerbated by crowding.  Adverse 
and low-paying workplaces could also increase exposure to disease by 
crowding, and they often allowed families to suffer malnutrition, 
impairing their resistance to disease.  In addition, immigrant groups 
sometimes did unintentionally import pathogens from their home 
countries, and sometimes they did have cultural practices (such as 
unsanitary poultry markets or methods of garbage disposal) that 
allowed rodent populations to flourish, promoting contagion.  For their 
part, members of the wider societies would often respond to such 
situations with increasing antagonism, exaggerating the “otherness” of 
the minority groups and making questionable assumptions about their 
special biological propensity to catch and spread communicable 
diseases.  In some New World instances, these fears of contagion were 
intricately mixed with xenophobia and economic opposition to 
immigrants.  In contrapuntal response to the perceived hostility of the 
surrounding society (as well as in traditional response to oppressive 
authorities in old countries), residents of the affected districts would 
sometimes flee from health inspectors, hide their infected dead, or 
actively resist official actions.  These reciprocal patterns of majority 
and minority behavior occurred in numerous instances in distant and 
recent centuries.  
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(a) Some Historical Examples of Neighborhood/District Quarantines 
 Historically, Yersinia pestis plague was often the provocation for 
neighborhood/district quarantines, but other contagions also prompted 
such civic actions.  Although there were, of course, numerous case-by-
case differences between these various area quarantines in the course 
of historic time, some of the general themes noted above tended to 
recur in these episodes: 
 
 (i) A district quarantine against plague in 17th century Italy 
 In 1656, for example, the rulers of Rome responded to a 
recrudescent outbreak of plague by blockading the city’s historic 
Jewish ghetto.  Clearly, the assumption here was that this district 
(where Jews were legally compelled to live) was a special hotbed of 
contagion, and the deadly outbreak could be scotched by trapping the 
denizens inside, thereby sparing the outside community.  It did not 
work, however, and it is estimated that some 10,000 Romans—Jewish 
and non-Jewish—died of the plague during that epidemic (Tyson 
2004).  
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 (ii) District quarantines against typhus and cholera in 19th century 
New York City 
 In 1892, New York City PH authorities concluded that 
impoverished Jewish immigrants arriving on ships from Eastern Europe 
and settling in Manhattan’s unsanitary and overcrowded Lower East 
Side were causing sequential epidemics of cholera and typhus.  In 
response, they threw a set of district quarantines around the whole 
Jewish ghetto, and they forcibly transported diseased and allegedly-
exposed émigrés to the city’s quarantine islands.  (These episodes 
were detailed by Markel H, Quarantine! Eastern European Jewish 
Immigrants and the New York City Epidemics of 1892 [Baltimore:  
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999], 262 pp.) 
 
(iii) District quarantines against plague in Honolulu and San 
Francisco, 1900 
 In two classic episodes only eight years after the New York City 
district quarantines, Yersinia pestis plague itself appeared in the 
American cities of Honolulu and San Francisco. (Honolulu was the 
capital of the recently annexed U.S. dependency of Hawai’i.)  These 
outbreaks were part of the third great pandemic of plague that 
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emerged from Asia in the latter part of the 19th century, and 
threatened to follow the trade routes and shipping lanes into Western 
countries (just as the Plague of Justinian and the Black Death had 
probably done so long before).  On these two occasions in 1899-1900, 
the neighborhood/districts at issue were the cities’ respective 
Chinatowns rather than the Jewish ghetto of New York, but many of 
the epidemiological-socio-legal themes described above were replayed 
in these Pacific Ocean settings.  (The series of San Francisco outbreaks 
between 1899-1908 have been recounted by a number of writers, 
including Chase M, The Barbary Plague:  The Black Death in Victorian 
San Francisco [N.Y.:  Random House, 2003], 277pp.; Shah N, 
Contagious Divides:  Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown 
[Berkeley:  U. Calif. Press, 2001], 334 pp.; Kalisch P, “The Black Death 
in Chinatown:  Plague and politics in San Francisco, 1900-1904,” 
Arizona and the West, 14:113-136 [Summer 1972].  The Honolulu 
episode has been less well covered—though it was no less dramatic.  
One major historical book tells its story:  Mohr JC, Plague and Fire:  
Battling Black Death and the 1900 Burning of Honolulu’s Chinatown 
[Oxford, UK:  Oxford U. Press, 2005], 235 pp.)  
  
 In each city, cases of plague began to appear among the ethnic 
Chinese inhabitants of the Chinatown districts.  The universal terror of 
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this lethal disease, which ran so long and so deep, soon set off alarms 
in many quarters.  This understandable fear was associated with 
feelings that the districts themselves were deadly pestholes (which, for 
various complex reasons, they really were); it was less-defensibly 
intertwined with the majority groups’ longstanding cultural suspicions 
and economic resentments of Chinese immigration.  (In the lurid 
words of the San Francisco Examiner,”[t]he plague, black death, or 
bubonic fever seems to develop in long-accumulated filth in the 
densely populated Chinese districts. The Mongolians [i.e., Chinese 
people] die of it by thousands” [Examiner, June 28, 1899, at 3, cited 
by Barde R, “Prelude to the plague:  Public health and politics at 
America’s Pacific gateway, 1899,” J. Hist. Med., 58: 153-186 [Apr. 
2003], at 160 & n. 4.  Some nine years later, the rhetoric would be 
just as florid, as another epidemic began:  W. C. Rucker would declare 
in the Technical World Magazine that the plague was an “Oriental 
dragon operating with the stolid cunning bred of aeon-old experience,” 
and then that “[t]he forces of exotic disease had beached their galleys 
on our shores—the repulsion of the invader was the duty of the 
nation.”  Tech. World Mag., 254-64 [1908], at 255, 265, cited by Risse 
GB, “’A long pull, a strong pull, and all together’:  San Francisco and 
bubonic plague, 1907-1908,” Bull. Hist. Med., 66:260-286 [1992], at  
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262 & n. 10, 11.  See also Mohr, 2005, at 13, 23 [attitudes to the 
Chinese immigrants to Hawai’i].)        
  
 To a certain extent, the stories of these two plague outbreaks 
were similar:  The health authorities in both cities quickly decided that 
they had to stop the outbreaks at their sources, and they literally 
began stringing quarantine ropes (“cordons”) and painting lines across 
the Honolulu and San Francisco streets that historically demarcated 
the respective Chinatowns.  Armed guardsmen enforced the 
emergency ordinances against free passage in and out of the zones.  
(There are photos of the Asian populace of Honolulu standing grimly 
behind the line that separated them from the rest of the city.  See, 
e.g., State of HI Dept. of Land and Nat. Res., Historic Pres. Div., “100 
years ago in Hawai’i:  Honolulu responds to the plague,” 
www.hawaii.gov/dlnr/hpd/centennial/cf_1.htm, accessed 9/16/11; 
also, Mohr 2005, at 75.)   
 
 Special focus will be given here to the Honolulu quarantine, 
whose special characteristics made it emblematic of how a relatively 
unrestrained district quarantine might operate—and what its various 
impacts might be. 
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 ((a)) The Hawaiian district quarantine—A close-up view 
 In Hawai’i, the quarantine authorities quickly acquired virtually 
absolutist powers beyond the reach of appeal:  The transitional 
Hawaiian government (formerly, the Hawaiian Republic of Sanford 
Dole, Lorrin Thurston, and their allies; now, a U.S. territory-in-waiting) 
promptly authorized the three members of the Board of Health (Drs. 
Nathaniel B. Emerson, Clifford B. Wood, and Francis R. Day) to do 
whatever they felt was necessary to curb plague in the archipelago.  
(Their ally in this cause was Honolulu City Bacteriologist Walter 
Hoffman.)  In the course of the district quarantine, there would 
certainly be opposition to the Board members’ actions—particularly 
from the quarantined Asian émigré communities and from some older 
Honolulu doctors, but, for the most part, their freedom to act was 
extraordinarily unfettered.  (As Mohr [2005] noted, “[t]hough they 
were nonelected public health officers, they were empowered—in the 
face of a world pandemic—to destroy private property; to incarcerate 
quarantined individuals in public camps; and ultimately to manage the 
affairs of the entire archipelago, public and private, in an absolute and 
essentially dictatorial fashion.  To implement their decisions, they were 
deploying the militia, the police force, and the fire department” [p. 
96].) 
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 Ultimately, in the course of the four-month district quarantine 
(which lasted, with a brief interruption, from mid-December 1899 to 
the end of April 1900), the Board of Health (called the “Papa Ole” in 
Hawaiian) took such measures as temporarily stopping all shipping 
between the Hawaiian islands, closing down public places and modes 
of transportation for days at time, using teams of employees and 
volunteers to try to clean up and de-rat the very dirty quarantine 
district, confining at least 5,000 people to the barricaded area, 
examining those people for signs of plague on a daily basis, and 
transporting disease-suspects to a special isolation hospital at 
Kakaako….  And then there was the burning policy:  
  
 By early 1900, as grisly plague mortality continued to climb, the 
Papa Ole and its advisors concluded that they had to constrain the 
deadly outbreak by condemning and deliberately burning down any 
buildings where sick or dead persons had been found and removed.  
The now-homeless householders would be sent to special detention 
camps at the outskirts of Honolulu.  Some members of the press and 
larger public urged the Board to incinerate the whole pestilential 
district, but its members apparently resisted this proposal, insisting on 
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site-specific bacteriological proof of plague before undertaking 
controlled burns.   
  
 On January 20, however, an unusual (kona) wind took hold of a 
single-building fire, and whipped it into a conflagration that quickly 
swept beyond the control of the fire department.  As the flames 
spread, the landmark Christian-Hawaiian church of Kaumakapili at the 
edge of Chinatown soon began to burn along with neighboring 
structures.  In Mohr’s (2005) description of the scene, “Kaumakapili’s 
bells crashed through the church’s burning roof to the sanctuary 
below, sounding ‘their own dirge, like the harmonious death-wail of 
some many-voiced living creature,’ according to an eyewitness (p. 
123).”  This had a visible effect on the watching crowd.  Soon, huge 
clouds of multi-colored smoke rose high into the sky over the district, 
creating an apocalyptic scene.  Through it, volunteers raced through 
the burning buildings, evacuating anyone they could find.  In the florid 
account of one journalist,  
 [t]he frenzy of the Chinese and Japanese residents was 
 pitiful to observe.  They fled to the streets, lugging away  
 at bundles too heavy for a man to ordinarily carry, but the 
 keen excitement of the moment gave them the strength 
 of two men.  Women with strained eyes and tears rolling 
 down their cheeks clung to little children and babes, in 
 wild excitement, searching everywhere to find a place of  
safety.  Few carried more than a change of clothing for 
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their babies…. Every one was making a supreme effort 
to flee from the fire-fiend that destroyed their homes and 
household goods 
 
(Mohr 2005, at 131, quoting Pacific Commercial Advertiser, January 
22, 1900, at 1).  In the course of the day, armed guardsmen and 
paramilitary units marched masses of displaced people out of the fiery 
quarantine zone, and led them (before mostly-unsympathetic 
onlookers) to temporary detention quarters.  In short order, the Papa 
Ole had volunteers erect barracks at the Kalihi quarantine camp, where 
more than 7,000 refugees would be lodged by the end of January.  
Astonishingly, no one was killed by the fire, but many of the homeless 
ex-residents would face three weeks in quarantine camp confinement.    
      
 There had been no planning for such an evacuation, so the Papa 
Ole had to work out ad hoc methods for safely feeding and clothing the 
dispossessed.  To keep the resettlement camps from becoming plague 
incubators in themselves, inmates were publicly fumigated on entry 
and regularly inspected; also, overtly sick persons and their known 
close contacts were segregated from other confinees.  These measures 
were culturally displeasing to some of the Asian and native Hawaiian 
confinees, but Yersinia pestis plague never did break out in the camps 
(Mohr 2005, at 161).   
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 During the first four months of 1900, the epidemic went through 
multiple peaks, with sporadic cases appearing outside the burnt 
quarantine zone.  (These cases were usually addressed with the same 
quarantining and burning policy used in Chinatown, but with somewhat 
less uniformity and vigor.  In general, the Board imposed some plague-
control restrictions on public behavior outside Chinatown--including 
building inspections, school and   theater closures, and limitations on 
business hours and public travel; however, these rules were generally 
much less onerous, and they were much more lightly enforced [see 
Mohr 2005, at 169, 184, et passim].)  A small outbreak of Y. pestis 
plague even appeared in the three-acre Chinatown in Kahului on the 
nearby island of Maui, and the Papa Ole ordered the quarantining--and 
then the razing--of this entire district; reportedly, the whole process in 
Kahului went much more smoothly and quickly than the one in 
Honolulu (Mohr 2005, at 171-72). 
  
 Finally, the incidence of Honolulu plague deaths began to 
decrease, and the Board lifted the state-of-emergency on April 27.  
However, there was a long aftermath, with a protracted, unsystematic, 
and often-painful reparations-claims process, which left many of the 
refugees with inadequate restitution.  On the other hand, the 
governments of Hawai’i and Honolulu did promote better living 
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conditions in Chinatown after the epidemic ended--promulgating new  
laws to reduce population density, and making various improvements 
in the district’s sanitary infrastructure.   
 
((b)) Analysis of the Hawaiian district quarantine 
against plague 
 Generally, the district/neighborhood quarantine of Honolulu’s 
Chinatown was a complicated natural and human-behavioral event, 
which developed at many levels, and it seems fair to conclude that it 
presented a mixed picture of the effectiveness and impact of such 
quarantine-type procedures.  
  
 At the biomedical, epidemiological, and PH policy level, it 
appears that, at least to some extent, the Hawaiian Board of Health 
was acting in accordance with scientific thought at this time in 
scientific history.   
  
 Like many health authorities elsewhere, Hawai’i’s PH leaders 
tended to follow the longstanding medical tradition of seeing epidemics 
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(especially plague epidemics) in spatial terms.  As Dr. Wood put this 
understanding, “plague is predominantly a disease of locality and 
place”—which grounded a spatial, area-quarantine approach to 
combatting it (see Sutphen MP, “Not what, but where:  Bubonic plague 
and the reception of germ theories in Hong Kong and Calcutta, 1894-
1897,” J. Hist. Med. & Allied Sci., 52(1):81-113 [1997], cited by Mohr 
2005, at 57, 197-98).  
  
 To some extent, contemporary scientific theories and discoveries 
and the turn-of-the-20th century seemed to lend some support to this 
spatial approach to plague-fighting:  It was a transitional era in 
biomedical thought on contagions, when the bacterial aetiology of 
plague had just been elucidated, but the contagion’s complex ecology 
was still being untangled (for example, the rodent-reservoir and flea-
vector components of the pathogen’s life-cycle were strongly 
suspected in many circles—but they not yet conclusively confirmed).   
The biomedical community was continuing to debate many aspects of 
plague dynamics.  Some sanitarians maintained a longstanding view 
that human wastes and ordure contributed significantly to contagion. 
(From a PH policy perspective, this was actually a reasonable 
supposition—though it varied in specific degree of appropriateness with 
the specific type of contagion [see Chapter II]:  Human excreta spread 
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foecal-oral [“Type II”] contagions like cholera, but human garbage fed  
rats, so reducing the levels of such waste could in fact help control the 
spread of vector-borne [“Type VI”] bubonic plague.)   
  
 Whatever the limitations in the Papa Ole’s scientific premises, it 
is very possible that some of its steps actually did abate the deadly 
contagion in its city.  There was certainly a rough temporal coincidence 
between the Board’s community interventions and the end of the 
epidemic.  Moreover, Honolulu suffered no more notable plague 
outbreaks in later years.  Of course, it cannot be flatly determined 
whether this was a causative connection, or merely an associational 
one; it will probably never be conclusively established that the 
quarantine-related actions per se attained the fundamental objective 
of stopping Yersinia pestis plague in Hawai’i.  There were too many 
variables, and this episode was not studied in a modern scientific way 
while it was transpiring (or ex post facto, for that matter).  Among 
other things, plague has its own dynamics in nature, which can 
fluctuate due to the interactions of pathogen, host, reservoirs, vectors, 
and environment.  Nevertheless, it is plausible to posit that 
containment of the most-affected population prevented a greater 
transmission of the pestilence—particularly if there were any 
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respiratory-droplet [“Type I-B”] pneumonic plague cases in Chinatown.  
At least as effective would have been the measures that killed rats and 
fleas—directly or indirectly—such as disinfection procedures, and, 
ultimately, the fire itself.  (A similar historical anecdote was the Great 
Fire of London in 1666, which many medical historians assume largely 
ended the severe plague epidemic that had been raging in the British 
capital for several years—though, of course, this assumption is also 
conjectural.)  In fact, some other jurisdictions across the world that 
would confront plague outbreaks in the next decade would adopt 
Honolulu’s policy of burning down infected buildings; these included 
Kobe in Japan and Mazatlan in Mexico (Mohr 2005, at 199-200).   
  
 Thus, it could have been argued from one perspective that the 
Hawaiian Board of Health acted in a harsh but decisive way that was 
justifiable by the deadly disease danger that was menacing the 
archipelago. 
  
 It might also be said of the Papa Ole that it appears to have 
acted in accordance with the activist and civic-minded traditions of PH 
in those years.  The Board members were using their vast powers in a 
resolute and focused way to address the deadly emergency that had 
146 
 
befallen their city.  Certainly, records indicate that they were not 
seeking any private gain from their labors.  (On the contrary, the three 
Board physicians and Hoffman put their own lives at risk on a daily 
basis confronting plague in the city.  Day and Wood also volunteered to 
be the first two persons to try a batch of the Haffkine Prophylactic, a 
supposed anti-plague serum, that the U.S. Marine Hospital Service had 
sent to Hawai’i--it would make them both very sick [Mohr 2005, at 
177-78; also, 195-96].  Later, Day and Wood resumed their private 
medical practices without engaging in further public activities.)    
  
 On the other hand, there were other aspects to the Papa Ole’s 
contagion-control actions during the epidemic that were more 
troubling:  At another level of reality, its contagion-control procedures 
had major socio-cultural and legal impacts that were, on the whole, 
not very favorable.  Arguably, the activist public health of the era—with 
its boldly interventionist approaches to contagion-control--was 
sometimes intermingled with attitudes and actions that would be 
considered highly questionable today in light of other social “goods.”  
(In keeping with this general point, it might be noted that at least one 
member of the triumvirate of plague-fighters--Dr. Emerson--had also 
been a long-time principal architect and advocate of the Papa Ole’s  
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leprosy-segregation program [described in the section on individual 
quarantines, above.])      
  
 While it cannot be assumed that the Board of Health’s members 
acted out of any overt antagonism towards the Asian community (their 
primary goal seems to have been a sincere effort to stop the plague as 
best they understood it), they did hold some implicit beliefs about the 
association between ethnicity and susceptibility to this disease (see 
Mohr 2005, at 201).  Moreover, the Asian-Japanese-Hawaiian peoples’ 
assumptions about the Board’s motives were at least as important as 
its real motives.   
  
 In any case, regardless of the Board’s beliefs, some of its specific 
contagion-control measures seem to have been rather roughshod and 
insensitive culturally:  The district quarantine itself, the fire it 
unintentionally begat, the rough evacuation and detention actions, and 
the sub-optimal restitution process—all reportedly left a cloud of 
resentment and distrust in Honolulu’s Asian communities towards the 
city’s Occidental leadership, which lingered on long after the cloud of 
physical smoke itself had abated.  This communal estrangement had 
been present to some degree before these PH actions, but it seems to 
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have been sharply increased by the measures, and the Asian 
communities’ quiet anger may have persisted for several generations 
(see, e.g., Mohr 2005, at 191-93, 199, 203). 
 
 At the level of law, the operation of the 1899-1900 district 
quarantine on Honolulu’s Chinatown could also have been challenged 
on various grounds.  While the plague epidemic, quarantine, and fire 
took place during a historical interregnum when Hawai’i’s international 
legal status was in something of a limbo, the constitution of the brief 
1894 Hawaiian Republic had been loosely modeled on the U.S. 
Constitution, and in 1899 Hawai’i had just been annexed by the United 
States (and was awaiting the acquisition of territorial status), so it 
could also have been alleged that the U.S. Constitution already applied 
to the island chain.  If such a legal argument could have been made, it 
might have been further averred that the selective quarantining of 
Chinatown violated its residents’ Fourteenth Amendment (U.S.) rights 
to equal protection under the laws. (During the contemporary 
quarantine of San Francisco’s Chinatown, some Chinese-American  
quarantinees did, in fact, successfully raise a similar argument in 
federal court—although there were differences in the legal statuses of 
the governmental entities involved in these two episodes, and the 
technical characteristics of the two district quarantines differed as 
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well.)  Moreover, the protracted and (for many people) ultimately 
unsatisfactory process of restitution for burnt and lost property might 
have been contested legally as an unjustified “taking” of that property 
without due compensation, which would also have contravened the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  In general, the legal 
situation would have been murky in many respects, but a colorable 
case might have been made that the Honolulu district quarantine of 
1899-1900 violated basic human rights in a number of ways. 
  
 By consequence, the possibility that this district quarantine did 
quell the city’s lethal plague epidemic does not necessarily presuppose 
that it was the optimal way to accomplish this end.  As with all 
quarantines, this Dissertation posits that PH contagion-control 
decision-making needs to consider both bio-scientific and socio-legal 
factors.  The “least restrictive alternative” doctrine would urge that PH 
authorities pre-plan future actions that serve such ends with less 
adverse social sequelae. 
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 (iv) A neighborhood-district quarantine against SARS in Hong 
Kong, 2003 
 Approximately a century later, the brief “Window Era” of 
epidemic peace in the West (ca. 1960-2000) may have ended with one 
of the first major “emerging” contagions of the new millennium—SARS.  
Of note here was the archetypal outbreak of SARS at the Amoy 
Gardens apartment complex in Hong Kong.  Despite its bucolic name, 
this development was actually a rather grungy set of residential towers 
located in the relatively-poor Kowloon area of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (“SAR”); it was large enough in both spatial and 
population sizes as to constitute a small district in itself.  Amoy 
Gardens quickly became one infamous epicenter for this new disease, 
with many scores of cases and fatalities occurring among its residents, 
particularly in Tower “E.”  It was one of the exceptional SARS 
outbreaks that was not nosocomial in nature.  (Eventually, 
environmental studies undertaken in the complex suggested that 
SARS—ordinarily a “Type I-B” respiratory syndrome [q.v.]—had spread 
rapidly through the apartments from an index case by means of a sub-
standard sewage-disposal system and an aerosolization of its 
coronavirus.  [Several works have described the SARS epidemic, 
including the Amoy Garden episode and the epidemiological and 
sanitary engineering studies that attempted to trace its development.  
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See, e.g., Abraham T, Twenty-First Century Plague:  The Story of 
SARS (Hong Kong SAR:  Hong Kong U. Press, 2007), 176 pp.; At the 
Epicentre: Hong Kong and the SARS Outbreak (C Loh, et al. [eds.]) 
(Hong Kong, SAR: Civic Exchange, 2004), 176 pp.; Greenfeld, 2006.  
Also see Brookes TA & Khan OA, Behind the Mask:  How the World 
Survived SARS, the First Epidemic of the 21st Century (Washington, 
DC:  APHA Press, 2005), 262 pp.]; McLean AR, SARS:  A Case Study in 
Emerging Infections [London:  Royal Society, 2005], 133 pp.)       
  
 Significantly, the civic authorities of Hong Kong SAR responded 
belatedly to the outbreak at Amoy Gardens by blockading obvious 
access routes into the complex, barring entry, and trapping the 
remaining inhabitants inside.  Several days later, a large number of 
these unfortunates were led out of the buildings under guard, and 
transported by sealed buses to quarantine camps in Hong Kong’s small 
remaining countryside.   
  
 While the Amoy Gardens outbreak and neighborhood/district 
quarantine did not involve a disfavored ethnic minority group (as in the 
cases discussed above), so some historic issues were not involved 
here, it arguably did involve a relatively low-income group of people, 
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who were somewhat distinguishable by their humble socio-economic 
status.  In any event, they soon became stigmatized in the minds of 
the greater Hong Kong public, once they were openly trooped into 
buses before the flashing cameras and newsreels of the press.  Many 
other citizens of the former Crown Colony tried to deal psychologically 
with the disease danger to themselves by emphasizing the special 
“otherness” of the denizens of Amoy Gardens.     
          
(b) Some Present-Day U.S. Neighborhood/District 
Quarantine laws 
 While neighborhood/district quarantines were mainly employed 
in past eras (through the pre-modern period of the early 1900s), and 
they are not usually mentioned in the laws of present-day American 
states and territories, they are not gone as options for policy-makers.   
  
 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Service’s Pandemic 
Influenza Plan of 2005 (“DHHS Flu Plan”) appears to mention a form of 
neighborhood/district quarantines, albeit somewhat vaguely and 
reluctantly:  
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 In extreme circumstances, public health officials may  
 consider the use of widespread or community-wide  
 quarantine….  It may involve a legally enforceable  
 action, and … it restricts travel into or out of an area 
 circumscribed by a real or virtual “sanitary barrier” 
 or “cordon sanitaire” except to authorized persons,  
 such as public health or healthcare workers.  
 …………………………………………………………………………………… 
 Implementation of this measure during a pandemic 
 is unlikely to prevent the introduction or spread of 
 pandemic disease except in uncommon or unique 
 circumstances (such as in a community able to be 
 completely self-sufficient).  
 
(DHHS Flu Plan--Supplement 8:  Community Disease Control and 
Prevention, at 12, www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/sup.8.html, 
accessed 1/19/12).  It should be noted that this Plan is mainly 
prescriptive rather than mandatory for states, territories, and 
communities; it recommends that communities not implement these 
types of area quarantines unless they have planned them in advance, 
in concordance with neighboring jurisdictions.  (Another point to make 
here, however, is that the DHHS Flu Plan’s somewhat imprecise 
wording on these quarantines seems to ignore an important distinction 
relating to their purpose.  This will be further discussed below.)  
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(c)  Summary Note on Neighborhood/District 
Quarantines 
 Arguably, neighborhood/district quarantines should remain as 
arrows- against-contagion in the PH quiver, at least for some 
exceptional situations where epidemic developments and other factors 
justify such action.  As the DHHS Flu Plan notes, however, they would 
have to be planned and administered with much more care and 
balancing of factors than in 1900.  (It has been seen here that the 
rough-and-ready area quarantines of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries carried serious trade-offs and adverse social consequences.)  
There has to be adequate epidemiological evidentiary support for their 
use; there has to be flexibility in their implementation; and PH 
authorities have to foresee—and balance--the many potential 
ramifications of employing them. 
 
d.  Municipal, Partial County, and Countywide Quarantines 
[Dr. Rieux] knew what those jubilant crowds did not know but 
could have learned from books:  that the plague bacillus never 
dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and 
years in furniture and linen-chests; that it bides its time in 
bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves, and that perhaps 
the day would come when, for the bane and the enlightening of 
men, it would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die 
in a happy city. 
    Albert Camus, La Peste  
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 Generally, the next-larger area quarantines are those placed 
over whole municipalities and counties, as well as sections of counties. 
 
(1) Note on the Distinctions between Municipal, Partial-County, and 
Countywide Quarantines 
  While, in the interests of brevity, these particular types of area 
quarantines will be discussed together in this Sub-section, they can 
raise some separate issues, as will be noted below.  
 
(a) Historical (and Literary) Examples of Municipal and County 
Quarantines 
 Here again, the area quarantines of whole cities or American 
counties (or, in a few cases, portions of counties) primarily go back to 
past history.     
  
 (i) Camus and the plague in Oran (fiction)  
 Curiously, one of the most evocative pictures of a city-wide 
quarantine comes from modern fiction:  Albert Camus’ La Peste, which 
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recounted the imaginary but graphic tale of a deadly bubonic plague 
outbreak in his hometown of Oran, Algeria.  Camus’ novel was 
freighted with allegorical and philosophical meaning, but of particular 
interest here was his account of how the national authorities locked 
down the afflicted city, leaving the residents—sick and not-yet sick--to 
face their collective fate. 
 
  (ii) Yellow fever in Philadelphia (reality)  
  A very loose area quarantine was implemented in 1793 when 
the City of Philadelphia was stricken by yellow fever.  (This epidemic 
would cause a mortality of over 4000 cases—some 10% of the total 
city population [Gehlbach SH, American Plagues:  Lessons from Our 
Battles with Disease (NY:  McGraw-Hill, 2005), 273 pp.], at 20.)  In 
those days, this dreaded hepatic disease was thought to be highly 
transmissible, so news of the outbreak frightened people living outside 
the city limits.  Citizens of Baltimore manned roadblocks along the 
pikes between the City of Brotherly Love and their own metropolis, 
seeking to keep Philadelphian refugees from carrying yellow fever 
southward to them.   
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(b) Some Present Day U.S. Municipal, Part-County, and Countywide 
Quarantine Laws 
 Some present-day American jurisdictions still have laws on their 
books empowering health officials to impose area quarantines on 
whole infected cities and counties (as well as in some cases on parts of 
counties).   
 
 For example, the state of Alabama retains a law that allows the 
mayor or chief executive officer of an incorporated city or town to 
proclaim a municipal quarantine.  It also authorizes a county’s chief 
probate judge or the presiding officer of the county’s commission to 
quarantine that whole county (as recommended by the county board 
of health, and subject to state health board approval) (Ala. Code 1975 
s 22-12-12).   
  
 Alabama stands out for also authorizing portions of counties, or 
cities and towns therein, to declare other portions of those counties to 
be infected with a contagious disease, and to quarantine off those 
areas (“[w]hen a contagious or infectious disease of quarantinable 
nature exists in a part of a county, the remainder of the county, and 
any incorporated city or town therein, may establish quarantine 
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against the infected portion or portions of the county…” [Code of Ala. s 
22-12-14 (2011)]).  The procedures for proclaiming such an area 
quarantine are quite complicated:  Ab initio, a committee of public 
health, acting on behalf of the usual county board of health, could take 
this action if its majority comes from the supposedly uninfected part of 
the county.  However, if the majority of that committee comes from 
the allegedly diseased county area, the process gets messier still:  In 
this case, the general county can declare the partial quarantine if the 
county probate judge, or the presiding officer of the county 
commission, or any two members of the county commission (or at 
least one of the latter) live in the presumably uninfected area—so long 
as the county health officer recommends this action and he also lives 
in that uninfected part (although it can still be done without the 
officer’s recommendation if he does live in the allegedly stricken area, 
or if he is currently absent from the county).  Such action is subject to 
approval or modification by the Alabama State Board of Health.  
Assuming that the county’s committee of public health cannot get its 
uninfected-area majority, there is another procedural alternative:  The 
mayor or chief executive officer of an incorporated city or town in the 
supposedly uninfected zone can quarantine the unfortunate infected 
area of the county, so long as his own health officer recommends it 
(but he can so act even without such a recommendation if his 
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municipality has no officer of this sort).  This mayoral proclamation, 
too, would be subject to approval or modification by the Alabama State 
Health Board. 
 
(i) Analysis of Alabama’s partial-county quarantine 
statute 
 It can be readily seen that Alabama’s partial-county quarantine 
process could be a recipe for operational chaos in an emergency--
raising an abundance of substantive and procedural problems at a time 
when a clear line of command and speed of action would be vital.  Just 
to cite a few such difficulties:  As a matter of epidemiological 
substance, administrators would need to ask where they would draw 
the lines of infection/non-infection within the borders of the county.  
How confident could they feel about the accuracy of the incidence 
picture, and the consequential “thumbs-up/thumbs-down” for the 
allegedly uninfected/infected areas of the county?  (If, for example, 
disease-carriers were often infectious without showing signs or 
symptoms, could the supposedly “clean” portion of the county 
necessarily be considered infection-free in a true sense for 
quarantining purposes)?  Can a system this cumbersome respond to 
fast-moving epidemic events?  Political realities would likely come in to 
the picture, too:  While quarantines are usually controversial to some 
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extent or another, the Alabama system seems to virtually guarantee 
intra-county donnybrooks over the epidemiological loci of an epidemic 
and the legal correctness of the quarantine-imposition process.   
  
 It would seem that this state has not recently revisited or 
rethought its quarantine laws.  (This is further suggested by Section 
22-3-8 of the Code of Alabama, which fixes the salaries of all county 
quarantine officers at no more than $125.00 a month, to be paid in 
monthly installments…. This would hardly seem to be a great 
inducement for present-day physicians to take on the potentially 
stressful, controversial, and dangerous job of county quarantine officer 
in a time of coming epidemics.)    
 
 Ultimately, however, the fundamental point here is that the 
Alabama statutes on quarantines may arguably constitute the reductio 
ad absurdum of a disaggregated PH system. When looked at from a 
nation-scale aerial view, it seems to create a potential for a mass of 
fragmented polities imposing controls at different levels of authority 
and geographic breadth—with multiple quarantines that would 
sometimes overlap and contradict one another.  In fairness, this 
decentralized approach might conceivably be useful for certain kinds of 
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outbreaks of contagious diseases—particularly slower-moving ones 
that can be effectively scotched at a local level, at least at the 
beginning of their development; in such circumstances, laws that 
promote greater local autonomy might permit quicker and more 
flexible responses at an outbreak site.  On the other hand, it seems 
hard to argue that such a system would respond well to a fast-moving 
national epidemic or pandemic, where broadscale coordination of 
contagion-control interventions would be crucial.   The events of the 
1918-19 Spanish Influenza pandemic showed this very starkly.  
      
 e. State, Provincial, and Territorial Quarantines 
 The next broadest set of area quarantines have been thrown 
over entire states, provinces, and territories in order to combat large 
scale epidemics and pandemics.  Once again, imposing quarantines 
arguably becomes increasingly difficult as the targeted jurisdictions 
become ever larger in size and more autonomous in legal and cultural 
terms.  
 
(1) Centralism vs. Regionalism as Tensions in Contagion-Control 
 In general, the states, provinces, and territories of sovereign 
countries are just one step below countries themselves in size, cultural 
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self-identity, and power, although their autonomy can vary 
considerably across the spectrum of world governance systems:    
  
 In highly centralized nation-states, the powers of regional 
governments can be greatly diminished relative to those of national 
governments (as in historical France), or they might even be no more 
than administrative subdivisions of the central government (examples 
might include the small republican city-state of Singapore or the 
totalitarian state of North Korea).   
  
 However, in countries with federalized systems, the states or 
provinces often have distinctive histories, cultures, and jealously 
retained autonomies, and they can resist the centripetal flow of power 
towards the central authorities—as well as sometimes conflict with 
each other.  (The classic examples would be Australia, Canada, and the 
United States, where the provinces, territories, and states developed 
originally as disarticulated entities, at most loosely confederated, only 
eventually joining into national unions that surrendered some powers 
to new central governments.  The tensions and the tugs-of-war 
between the multiple regional entities, and between them and the 
center, have continued--albeit at fluctuating levels of intensity--from 
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their times of origin to the present-day, as current U.S. politics show.)   
 
 Finally, some nations have very weak central governments, with 
multiple centers of decentralized power—often operating as rivals 
(such as Sun-Yat-Sen’s Republic of China during the warlord period, or 
modern Afghanistan). 
  
 From the perspective of public health, the different forms of 
governance can either help or hinder efforts to control contagions, 
depending on numerous variables (which would include the rapidity, 
stages, and sizes of the disease outbreaks--as well as the degrees of 
effective cooperation and coordination between the participating 
regional and national loci of power).  In general, centralized and 
decentralized systems can have their respective pathologies—and 
widespread outbreaks of disease can accentuate these pathologies.                       
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(a) Some Historical Examples of State, Provincial, and Territorial 
Quarantines 
 At the dawn of the modern era, area quarantines of this spatial 
size were uncommon, but they did occur, or they were at least 
threatened--on a number of occasions:   
 
 (i) A threatened quarantine against California, 1900 
 During the San Francisco plague outbreaks at the turn of the 
20th century—particularly the deadly episode in 1900 described above, 
the City by the Bay gained an unhappy national reputation as a plague 
port, and the state of California itself became increasingly viewed as 
unsafe.  This image was heightened by the convoluted politics of the 
outbreak--the battling interest groups, the taint of paralyzing 
governmental corruption, and the jockeying of jurisdictions for 
supremacy all gave the national press and public a sense that no one 
had a good grip on the crisis.  Other states and localities grew 
especially disturbed by the efforts of California’s Governor Henry Gage 
and his local allies to deny that plague had arrived in the city and 
state.  In response, they threatened to bar all interstate traffic 
between the Golden State and the rest of the country.  Very 
reluctantly, the city of San Francisco and the State of California had to 
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take some actions against the plague in order to stave off this 
commercial cataclysm.   
 
 (ii) Texas’s state quarantine against Louisiana, 1899-1900 
 Just around the same time, the State of Texas quarantined off 
the entire neighboring State of Louisiana, supposedly to stop yellow 
fever from crossing their mutual border:  On March 1, 1899, the Texan 
governor proclaimed a quarantine against all persons and conveyances 
coming from places where the disease had appeared, and a few 
months later his Health Officer determined that the existence of 
several cases in New Orleans justified an embargo of all interstate 
commerce between Louisiana and Texas.  This meant the interdiction 
of all Louisianan trains entering Texas (later slightly modified to allow 
travelers to enter Texas if they spent ten days in quarantine camps 
located at the state lines, and had their baggage fumigated).  Texas 
would even bar the entry of various industrial goods from Louisiana, 
including barrels of sulphuric acid—an admittedly very implausible type 
of yellow fever fomite.  Reportedly, too, the health authorities of 
certain Texan counties and towns situated alongside the interstate 
railroad tracks planned to put their state’s embargo into effect.  
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 Aggrieved Louisiana went to the U.S. Supreme Court for an 
injunction against her sister state for impeding interstate commerce.  
In its decision, however, the Court refused to get involved, asserting 
that, on various technical grounds, it had no jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of this case (inter alia, because the situation did not 
involve a true controversy between the two states as entities).  Chief 
Justice Fuller added piously that “[p]ublic policy forbids the imputation 
to authorized official action of any other than legitimate motives.”  
Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 20 S.Ct. 251, 44 L.Ed. 347 (1900).  
However, it is submitted here that the Court was being willfully obtuse.            
  
 Historically, as has been seen above, quarantines have 
sometimes been used to further a variety of goals—some of which 
were decidedly not public health-related.  The Lone Star State’s 
actions against the Pelican State in this case had a definite stench of 
commercial mischief, hidden below the flapping yellow flags of 
quarantine.  In the U.S. Supreme Court’s discussion of the background 
to Louisiana v. Texas, one can readily see the likely real underpinnings 
of Texas’s actions:  There was evidently an active commercial war 
going on between the fellow states, with Texas seeking to grab New 
Orleans’ lucrative trade in cotton and other goods for its own up-and-
coming Gulf ports, including Galveston.  In all probability, the 
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epidemiologically-dubious statewide quarantine was a pretext for this 
objective.  Arguably, this case was another illustration of the potential 
pathologies of federalism in the public health sphere.  (This is not to 
say that an interstate quarantine might not be justified in some 
circumstances to impede a major epidemic, but it is certainly a drastic 
move constitutionally and economically—it should be evidence-based, 
and it should not be attempted for ulterior motives, whether or not the 
state quarantiners can find a Court that will look the other way.)             
  
 (iii) New South Wales’ quarantine against Victoria, 1919 
 In 1918-19, an Australian national maritime quarantine probably 
helped delay the arrival of the Spanish Influenza pandemic to the 
southern continent by several months.  During 1919, however, 
scattered cases of the disease did begin to appear in various parts of 
the country.  Now, the pathologies of federalism began to appear in 
Australian contagion-control as well:  The deadly global event 
highlighted the weaknesses in the internal seams that held the 
Australian nation-state together.  As the stress of the pandemic 
increased, it accentuated the fault lines in the national union, and 
individual states and localities began to act discordantly in efforts to 
protect their respective publics from the new scourge.  This led to 
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lateral conflicts between Australian sister states, and to hierarchic 
conflicts between the states and the federal government in Canberra. 
 
 Notably, the first-afflicted Australian state—Victoria—waited 
before reporting its cases of influenza; soon afterwards, however, a 
traveler from Victoria brought the disease to the coterminous state of 
New South Wales.  In response, the latter essentially cordoned off 
Victoria by land and sea, stopping incoming traffic at the state lines, 
holding arrivals from Victoria in quarantine detention camps for days, 
and even detaining Victoria’s sea vessels in Sydney Harbor.  The 
Spanish flu soon saturated Sydney anyway (Bell DM & WHO Writing 
Group, “Nonpharmaceutical interventions for pandemic influenza, 
national and community measures,” Emerg. Infect. Dis., 12(1): 88-94 
[Jan. 2006], at 90, citing McQueen H, “’Spanish ‘flu”—1919: Political, 
medical, and social aspects,” Med. J. Aust., 1:565-570 [1975]).     
  
 f.  International Quarantines 
 Historically, the broadest form of area quarantine has been 
thrown over entire countries or even groups of countries.   
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(1) The Issue of National Sovereignty vs. Globalism in International 
Quarantines 
 This level of public health action clearly enters a vast and 
separate socio-political arena that has its own dynamics and set of 
distinctive issues:  Here is not a conflict between central governments 
and their component entities (with centripetal and centrifugal 
tendencies oscillating in strength over time), but a historically 
anarchic field of interaction between sovereign nation-players often 
acting out of self-interest (increasingly joined by international 
agencies, non-governmental organizations, and even sometimes 
individuals).  Over the centuries, it may be submitted that the 
international arena has been particularly dominated by power politics, 
although it has been slightly ameliorated by a body of international 
law that has tried to tame them and impose some supervening 
principles of conduct.  In the last one hundred-fifty years, there has 
been an increasing tension between nationalism and internationalism.  
Without a doubt, the first “ism” has usually prevailed (most extremely 
during the two world wars and their preludes), but the latter has 
become a rising counter-force since 1945.  This has been true in many 
subject areas (including war-making and peace-making; trade, 
finance, and economics; human rights; and environmentalism, to 
name just a few).  While this vastly complex international arena of 
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human affairs is not central to the instant discussion, it is worth noting 
here to the extent that international public health and contagion-
control have followed some of these “macro” trends over time.  It 
would be a loss of information to ignore this vast context in which 
international contagion-control has developed in the past and is still 
developing.                  
 
 (a) Some Historical Examples of Contagions that Helped Shape 
International Quarantine law 
 Several pandemic diseases helped to shape the somewhat 
haphazard and chaotic system of international quarantines over the 
centuries.  
 
  (i) Plague 
 Unquestionably, however, Yersinia pestis plague has been the 
dominant goad for such area quarantines.  In its 14th century 
pandemic form, this devastating disease left a profound chill in 
Western thought and culture that lingered for hundreds of years, and 
this chill was repeatedly renewed by recurrences of plague in more 
regional settings:  For almost half a millennium after the “Black Death” 
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of the 1340s-50s, new strains of this pestilence would reappear in 
different parts of Europe, responding to the complex and dynamic 
ecology of its environment (including climatic variations), its pathogen, 
its rodent and flea reservoirs, and its human hosts.  For example, Y. 
pestis levels would rise and fall in regional European rat populations, 
and it also remained highly endemic in areas such as Central Asia, the 
Levant, and North Africa.  Trade would sometimes bring Y. pestis back 
into areas where it had been absent for decades, and it would once 
more strike (and usually kill) susceptible human hosts.  This 
continuing, though variable, threat provoked many European polities 
to develop elaborate systems of quarantine to prevent reinfection by 
“foreign” plague.                     
 
  In particular, the European city-states and nation-states that 
fronted the Mediterranean Sea, and used it as a watery highway for 
trade, were repeatedly stricken by ship-borne plague.  Consequently, a 
number of them gradually built up defensive practices and structures 
to keep disease-ridden vessels from starting new epidemics in their 
populations.  Among other measures, these included the development 
of a rudimentary epidemic intelligence system, in which consuls and 
agents would be stationed in Middle Eastern or North African trading 
ports with long histories of plague endemicity; they would report back 
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to their superiors if the disease broke out there again in epidemic 
form.  Eventually, some advanced European city-states would start 
cooperating with each other to a certain degree, trading information 
about new outbreaks—sometimes even when these were occurring in 
their own harbors.  Over time, too, a hodgepodge system of maritime 
laws was also developed—with considerable variation between 
countries, which would compel ships to present “bills of health” 
asserting that they had departed from a port, and landed at ports of 
call, that were presently plague-free. (See, e.g., the extensive 
historical account of maritime quarantines—mainly from the 
commercial perspective of England—in Booker, Maritime Quarantine:  
The British Experience, ca. 1650 to 1900 [Aldershot, UK:  Ashgate, 
2007], 624 pp.; see also Schepin OP & Yermakov WV, International 
Quarantine [Madison, CT:  International Universities Press, 1991], 344 
pp.)  
 
 The most vigorous practitioners of this international maritime 
quarantine system—which included the Italian city-states of Venizia 
(Venice), Livorno (Leghorn), Genoa, and Messina, and the French port 
city of Marseilles—eventually built up a complex of lazarettos, often 
associated with coastal walls and watchtowers, plus anchorages for the 
detention of ships that could not present clean bills of health.  Much 
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attention was devoted to the alleged purification (sciorino or 
depuration) of cargoes that were traditionally believed to be frequent 
plague-fomites.  Ships, passengers, and crews were also detained in 
the lazarettos and observed closely.  (During most of those centuries, 
though, shipboard rats were generally not detained.)  Only after 
meeting the elaborate rituals of marine quarantine would ships receive 
the coveted “pratique” (or clean bill of health) to dock and unload their 
passengers and cargo.  (Descriptions of the Italian system of 
quarantine walls, watchtowers, and coastal guards can be found in Cliff 
AD, Smallman-Raynor MR, & Stevens PM, “Controlling the geographical 
spread of infectious disease:  Plague in Italy, 1347-1851,” Acta. med-
hist. Adriat., 7(1):197-236 [2009].) 
 
 In some times and places, vessels that were notoriously infected 
would be driven away from the country’s shores.  Some stark 
examples of this panicky reaction occurred during Messina’s plague 
outbreak of 1743 (see Booker 2007, at 157):  First, polities along the 
boot of Italy quarantined off the whole plague-ridden island of Sicily, 
posting troops on the mainland Italian coast to keep Sicilian refugees 
from landing anywhere on shore.  Ships carrying plague-stricken crews 
were left to drift all across the Tyrrhenian Sea, speckling its surface 
like pock marks on an infected face.  For the most part, this flotilla of 
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the damned remained at sea till the sailors died.  In one episode, 
sixteen Sicilian plague victims got hold of a small boat, and 
somehow—despite their symptoms—managed to sail it to the famous 
lazaretto at Leghorn on the Italian mainland, hoping to get treatment 
or at least refuge there.  --However, the lazaretto would not admit 
them, and instead towed their little craft to the island of Corsica, 
where it abandoned them.  Furious at this official action, the Corsicans 
had no more wish to play Good Samaritan than did the authorities at 
Leghorn—and they promptly set the little plague ship ablaze with all on 
board….     
 
  (ii) Cholera 
 Like most of the pestilential diseases mentioned in this 
Dissertation, cholera as it is now defined has probably been a disease 
of man since ancient times—at least in certain parts of the world.  
However, its usual signs and symptoms in clinical cases make its 
specific historic points of origin and early extremity of spread 
somewhat debatable (see, e.g., Barua D & Greenough WB, Cholera 
[Google e-Books, 1992], 372 pp.):  To a certain extent, cholera is one 
of many enteric diseases that present a similar syndromic pattern, 
with variable degrees of diarrhea and vomiting often inducing 
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adverse—and sometimes deadly—dehydration, electrolyte imbalances, 
acidosis, and other systemic effects (it is a classic “type II” contagion 
[see Chapter II]).  Thus, it is hard to say whether “modern” cholera 
per se was actually present in various  regions of the world 
historically—at least until the 19th  century science of bacteriology 
enabled isolation of its causative agents (pathogenic serogroups of 
vibrio bacteria, which secrete enterotoxins [e.g., CCDM, 2008]).  
Nevertheless, it is likely that one of the disease’s prime early foci was 
the Indian sub-continent--where rising human populations and poor 
sanitation, as well as possible pathogen mutations, may have 
increased its epidemic propensities by the early 1800s (exacerbated by 
various environmental conditions such as seasonal monsoons, which 
would contaminate drinking water with human sewage). 
   
 Whatever cholera’s origins, many social, economic, political, and 
technological features of the 19th century certainly helped make it into 
a pandemic disease:  Notably, the European conquest of India (and 
other warfare) was accompanied by exponentially-expanded 
commercial shipping, which gave Vibrio cholera a global human enteric 
environment to infect.  Clinical cholera appears to have emerged from 
India around 1817; in the course of the next two centuries, there were 
at least seven great cholera pandemics.  While it was sometimes 
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difficult to determine when one pandemic ended and another began 
(Barua & Greenough, 1992), there is little doubt about cholera’s 
impacts on 19th century life and its fearsome psychological shadow.   
 
 One of cholera’s few felicitous effects for mankind was its role as 
a prod to public health:  For example, it is now well-known that 
English cholera epidemics in 1849 and 1855 led anaesthesiologist John 
Snow to investigate the water-borne spread of disease, and motivated 
him to develop pioneering epidemiological techniques--even before the 
pathogen itself was identified in the lab.  Cholera was also a strong 
impetus for urban sanitation movements throughout the industrialized 
world, and it eventually spurred many polities to develop modern 
sewage systems.  (During the pandemic of 1892, for example, the 
effectiveness of such a sand-filtration system proved itself in an 
unplanned “natural experiment”:  The Prussian city of Altona on the 
River Elbe had installed such a treatment system a short time before, 
while just kilometers away the autonomous city of Hamburg had 
resisted this innovation.  In the course of the ensuing epidemic, 
Hamburg lost about 1% of its population to cholera--some 8,500 
citizens, while Altona’s mortality rate was 85% lower.) 
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 ((a)) Cholera as a spur for international public health law 
 Of special import here, however, the specter of cholera began to 
push historically-hostile nations into seeking a modus vivendi against 
the common disease enemy:  From 1855 onwards, scientific and 
political representatives of Western nations started meeting to try to 
draft international covenants for the regulation of shipping, and for the 
control of contagions like cholera through quarantines and other 
measures.  (Altogether, some fourteen such conventions would be 
held.)   
 
 As has often been the case in human affairs, though, the 
motives for the international conclaves were very mixed, and the 
conflicts between participants continued for decades.  (For example, 
Britain and some of the other northern European commercial powers 
mainly wanted to “rationalize” the heterogeneous set of national 
maritime quarantine laws, which they considered a stranglehold on 
their burgeoning global commerce.  However, they were opposed by 
European nations that faced the Mediterranean and had historically 
encountered the worst plague-threats from Africa, the Levant, and 
Asia [see, e.g., Booker, 2007; Schepin & Yermakov, 1999].)  Another 
problem was that the initial sanitary conferences were not well-
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informed by a modern scientific understanding of contagion—the first 
ones even preceded a wide acceptance of the Germ Theory.  Thus, the 
early sanitary and quarantine conventions accomplished little.   
 
(2) The Evolution of Public Health Internationalism (Globalism) and Its 
Continuing Conflict with Nationalism (Sovereignty Claims)  
 In the course of time, however, a certain degree of concordance 
did develop and the underlying science improved, so participant 
nations were able to generate a limited set of international disease-
control concordats, treaties, and practices affecting land and maritime 
commerce (and, later, aeronautical commerce as well).  During the 
late 1800s and early 1900s, too, signatory states ceded some very 
constrained powers to a successive set of international sanitary bodies.  
Mainly, these aimed to monitor disease outbreaks:  In 1903, for 
example, the participant nations agreed to inform each other about 
new epidemics of cholera and other dangerous contagions arising 
within their territories.  Four years later, the first official international 
sanitary agency—the Office Internationale d’Hygiene—was set up in 
Paris, and it was accorded the formal function of international disease 
surveillance (albeit in a relatively limited and passive way).  After the 
intervening international war, the new League of Nations renewed this 
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function in 1920--and twenty-eight storm-tossed and violent years 
later, its successor the World Health Organization did so as well 
(Schepin & Yermakov, 1997, passim; Barua & Greenough, 1992, at 11-
12). 
 
 Like the United Nations itself, WHO was founded with a greater 
vision of promoting world health than had its predecessor agencies, 
and its Charter enunciated some high-minded ideals about world 
health that went far beyond those of the earlier bodies.  Articulating 
this vision was surely an important first step in the pursuit of 
transcendent global health; nevertheless, it is clear that there long 
remained a considerable gap between these ideals and the reality on 
the ground.  During the 19th and 20th centuries, internationalism and a 
global perspective on contagion-control (and in many other human 
matters) had been struggling for breathing space against the immense 
powers of nationalism, which had helped to motivate two world wars.  
(Arguably, the trench warfare of World War I and the ideologies of the 
Axis Powers in the following war were the reductio ad absurdum of 
national chauvinism.)  While a global perspective on world health 
increased during the years of the Cold War and during the years that 
followed, it was surely heavily counter-balanced by the continuing 
proud sovereignty of nation-states.  For example, long after 
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international concordats had directed signatories to report to the world 
when they had suffered disease outbreaks within their frontiers, many 
countries still hid such events in the interest of national pride, tourism, 
and commerce.  (As recently as the SARS outbreak of 2002-2003, 
Mainland China hid its exploding incidence of the contagion from the 
outside world for months, dissembling to its public and the foreign 
press, and blocking WHO investigators until the severe epidemic nearly 
became a pandemic. [This episode has been recounted by numerous 
authors.  E.g., see, generally, Fidler DP, SARS: Governance and the 
Globalization of Disease (London:  Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 219 
pp.])  State bio-warfare programs were other extreme manifestations 
of the continuing claims of national sovereignty as against the global 
public health.  (The Soviet Union’s Biopreparat was a major example; 
Iraq’s pre-Gulf War program was a smaller-scale one.  There are no 
doubt others currently in secret operation.)          
 
(3) The International Health Regulations Over Time 
 During the 20th century, the League of Nations and later WHO 
periodically issued revised International Sanitary Regulations (later 
called “International Health Regulations,” or “IHR”), which, inter alia, 
specified what contagions member states were to report, and what 
181 
 
actions such as air/maritime quarantines were to be taken to prevent 
and control them.  During WHO’s early decades, though, the world 
health agency’s powers remained relatively weak vis-à-vis its 
sovereign member states:  WHO’s mandatory regulations had a very 
limited purview in many respects.  For example, the agency’s authority 
extended only to the immediate environs of seaports and airports; the 
agency had no regulatory power to require the reporting of intra-
national outbreaks. Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s would be the 
decades of the “Window Era” (see discussions above), when 
complacency about pestilence was widespread in the developed world.  
Consequently, the enumerated diseases were limited to the ancient 
bogeys of plague, yellow fever, cholera, and smallpox.  Nations did not 
have to report the vast array of other deadly contagions that afflict 
man (and, indeed, there were many nationalistic reasons for them not 
to do so).  (In fact, WHO actually shrank its list of reportable scourges 
when it dropped smallpox to reflect the triumphant eradication of the 
disease in the early 1970s; at that point in time, agency attention was 
not turned to the possibility of weaponized variola.) 
  
 However, by the last decade of the 20th century (as was noted 
previously), fears of pestilential disease were rising again in the West, 
and WHO began to respond with some tentative revisions to the IHR.  
182 
 
These were moving their tortuous way through executive drafting 
committees until HPAI H5N1 influenza appeared in Hong Kong in 1997 
and then the SARS crisis struck the Far East and Canada in 2003.  
(Among other components to these events, as noted above, the PRoC 
hid its SARS morbidity and mortality rates from WHO until it was 
almost too late.  To a considerable extent, WHO had to learn about 
SARS by informally monitoring international internet traffic.)  These 
events galvanized WHO, and it completed the regulatory drafting 
process rapidly; it soon submitted the proposed IHR-2005 to its 
legislative body (the World Health Assembly), which approved the new 
rules.    
         
 (a) Some Present Day U.S. and International Quarantine Laws 
 Elements of the ancient system of international maritime 
quarantines remain in effect throughout much of the world today, 
including the United States.  Many American federal and state laws still 
reflect the procedures once employed to control plague and cholera.  
The yellow flag of quarantine—leit-motif of this Dissertation—has 
remained the universal symbol of quarantine since that time in history.   
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(i) IHR-2005 
   Arguably, however, the most important new body of international 
quarantine laws is WHO’s IHR-2005.  To summarize its innovations 
briefly: 
 
  (a) Expansions of WHO’s Authority 
    ((i)) A new list of reportable diseases 
Another vital step involved expanding the IHR to cover other 
potential communicable diseases besides the few traditional ones.  
Whereas IHR-1983’s set of reportable diseases had dwindled to three 
(plague, cholera, and yellow fever)—in part reflecting the complacency 
of that era, WHO now recognized the potential emergence and re-
emergence of many scourges.  In addition (although it is not central to 
the present discussion), IHR-2005 went beyond the IHR’s historic focus 
on contagions to include non-communicable threats to international 
health:  Reportable threats to health were now defined widely enough 
to encompass non-pathogen hazards that could cross borders (such as 
airborne radioactive particles from a Chernobyl-style nuclear 
meltdown, or pollutants from a Hungarian bauxite storage facility 
entering the Danube River).       
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WHO’s new health regulations focused on  a “public health 
emergency of international concern” (“PHEIC”), which was loosely 
defined as “an extraordinary event which is determined  … (i) to 
constitute a public health risk to other States through the international 
spread of disease and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated 
international response” (Article 1.1).  IHR-2005 established a complex, 
three-track decisional mechanism for determining whether reported 
events were PHEICs (Article 8).  It is essentially hierarchical—reflecting 
WHO’s view of relative disease dangers:   
 
 In a special class of threat were diseases that would be 
intrinsically PHEICs if even one case appeared--requiring immediate 
reporting to WHO:  smallpox, wild-virus poliomyelitis, SARS, and any 
new subtype of human influenza.  
  
A second set of diseases included pneumonic plague, yellow 
fever, dengue fever, and cholera, West Nile virus, Lassa fever, Ebola 
fever, Marburg fever, plus various “diseases of special national or 
regional concern,” such as meningococcal meningitis and Rift Valley 
Fever.  –These were considered potential PHEICs, but they would first 
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have to be evaluated under an algorithmic chart that applied various 
criteria to them.  Notably, decision-makers would have to determine 
whether (1) they would likely have a “serious” public health impact, 
(2) they were “unusual or unexpected” events, (3) they carried “a 
significant risk of international spread,” or (4) they raised “a significant 
risk for international travel or trade restrictions” (Annex 2).  If the 
event in question met at least two of the foregoing criteria, it would be 
a reportable PHEIC.  
 
 Finally, WHO would encourage—but not require—state-parties to 
consult with it over a third class of events that did not constitute 
PHEICs but might still have international PH relevance. 
 
In light of the need for speed in outbreak situations, IHR-2005 
directed national authorities to complete their analyses using the 
decision-making instrument within two days, and to notify the WHO 
Contact Point by the following day (Annex 1, Part A, section 6[a]; 
Articles 6, 7). 
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  ((ii)) WHO’s new purview 
 In addition, IHR-2005 basically changed WHO’s purview:  Now, 
the agency was empowered to inquire into internal epidemics in 
member states, not merely those occurring at borders or in seaports 
and airports.  Signatory states were directed to develop active internal 
monitoring systems for diseases.  They would have the duty to join a 
new outbreak-notification network, in which a “National Focal Point” in 
each country would report directly to a corresponding WHO “Contact 
Point” (which, in principle, would be operating around-the-clock) 
(Articles 4.2,  4.3, 4.4, 4.6).   
 
(A problem here was that WHO did not establish a clear 
mechanism by which poorer countries could finance such new 
surveillance systems).   
 
  ((iii)) A more proactive WHO inquiry role 
 At a procedural level, WHO also gained the international 
authority to independently seek out the existence of emergent 
diseases within member countries; it no longer had to passively wait 
till a state volunteered that information.  As had actually happened de 
facto in the case of SARS, WHO now had the formally sanctioned 
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power to consult non-governmental organizations or even private 
individuals about possible disease outbreaks.   On an on-going basis, 
too, WHO’s agents could now mine the “blogosphere” for extra-official 
reports about a disease outbreak—whether or not an affected state 
was willing to admit to the phenomenon.  A state-member would now 
be held to a timetable for acknowledging that it was experiencing a 
PHEIC. 
 
  ((iv)) International human rights in quarantining? 
 IHR-2005 also invoked quarantine powers over individuals—while 
noting virtually for the first time the need to respect the human rights  
of quarantinees/isolates.  (The rules allude to the principle of imposing 
the “least restrictive alternative.”)  
 
 (b) The Lingering Power of Sovereign States 
 It should be stressed, however, that state sovereignty remains a 
powerful force in many spheres of human affairs (from high finance to 
environmental protection to human rights law)—and international 
contagion-control law is no exception to this reality.  On several points, 
the IHR-2005 seemed to buckle before the pressure of powerful WHO 
member states:   
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((i)) For WHO, a continuing  paucity of clout? 
Arguably, the new regulations had some profound procedural 
weakness that might deprive the new system of some of its clout: To 
placate State-Parties and their sovereignty demands, IHR-2005 did not 
confer on WHO any special punitive enforcement powers.  Mainly, WHO 
gained the “power of the pulpit” to embarrass miscreant countries in 
the eyes of the world, the authority to recommend temporary and 
standing (but non-binding) contagion-control actions, and the right to 
issue travel advisories regarding afflicted areas (Articles 15-18).  While 
these particular powers should not be gainsaid—they helped force 
open the Bamboo Curtain during the SARS epidemic, and they led to a 
major conflict and compromise with Canada during the same epidemic, 
they should not be overplayed either.  Certainly, bad publicity can 
scare governments, but rulers may reckon that honestly admitting 
outbreaks can lead to trade embargoes and adverse travel advisories 
just as easily as being caught in the act of hiding those outbreaks.   
            
 Nor did IHR-2005 set up any mechanism for binding arbitration 
of disagreements between state-participants.  
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   (ii) Confidentiality:  For countries-- but not for persons? 
 Surprisingly, IHR-2005—with its new emphasis on human rights, 
on the privacy of medical records, and on the tapping of non-
governmental sources for information—provided only vague and 
discretionary protections of confidentiality to such information sources 
(whether they be NGOs or simply “whistle-blowing” individuals)  (see, 
e.g., Fidler & Gostin, J. Law, Medicine & Ethics [2006], at 90).  The 
2003 SARS story showed how crucial such organizations and people 
could be in blowing open the Chinese government’s efforts to cover-up 
the disease:  Under the angry eyes of an authoritarian state, one 
brave Chinese doctor told the Western press, and thus the world, 
about the masses of SARS cases being hidden in military hospitals 
around Beijing.  Yet, IHR-2005 requires WHO to tell all state-parties 
the identity of organizations or persons who had reported information 
to it. “[O]nly where it is duly justified may WHO maintain the 
confidentiality of the source” (Article 9.1; emphasis added).            
 
Clearly here, WHO had yielded to State assertions of sovereignty.  
It offered whistle-blowers only the most grudging possibility of 
confidentiality—without articulating what criteria it would use in 
agreeing to hide their identities.  Perhaps the agency could argue that 
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this would be a check on “malicious gossip” at the global level, which 
might be aimed at harming a country’s international standing and 
trade.  But, by and large, the reality is that the power equation 
squarely favors the nation-state that wants to know who reported 
pestilence.  This is particularly true of totalitarian regimes, of course, 
but all governments are well-positioned to punish whistle-blowers.  
Even well-heeled news organizations could suffer badly from 
subsequent denial of access—or even prosecution, or expulsion from a 
country.  When WHO’s informant is a lone individual—it is very easy to 
see how much harm could be done to him.   
  
For less than the most courageous, the chill on reporting here is 
manifest.       
 
  ((iii)) Willfully ignoring Taiwan 
 As happened during the SARS epidemic itself, WHO largely caved 
in to Mainland China’s political demand that it not recognize the 
sovereignty of Taiwan, which the PRoC considers to be no more than a 
“renegade province.”  (During the 2003 epidemic, this effectively 
meant that WHO declined to deal directly with the Republic of China 
(“RoC”) on Taiwan—and the little country suffered its own severe SARS 
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epidemic without direct WHO information or input.  If this exclusion of 
Taiwan from ordinary WHO communications recurs in the time of a 
faster-moving future epidemic --such as HPAI H5N1, the 
consequences could prove dire for both the RoC and the world. 
 
((iv)) The Minefield of CBW 
Another contentious area in the drafting of IHR-2005 was the 
deadly subject of international terrorism and biological-chemical-
radiological warfare  (see, e.g., the discussion in Fidler & Gostin 
[2006], at 91-92; also see Pearson GS, The UN Secretary-General’s 
High Level Panel:  Biological Weapons Related Issues [Strengthening 
the Biological Weapons Convention, Review Conference Paper No. 14] 
[May 2005]).  The claims of national sovereignty were high in this 
field, as were the treaties and military/police-level interactions 
between countries.  Some member states did not want public health 
people intruding into their own responses to suspicious outbreaks 
within their borders.  (More sinisterly, perhaps, other states did not 
want international observation of their own chem-bio-radio-warfare 
programs—and the possibility that they would be found in violation of 
arms treaties or UN resolutions.)   
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Thus, in this area (as in some others), the WHO drafters were 
walking in a land-mine field at night.  Lest they wind up with an array 
of rejected and broken regulations at their feet, they had to craft 
generic language that would let WHO address such potential severe 
dangers to world health—while backing off from the hair-trigger issues 
of sovereignty.  The final wording in the IHR was necessarily vague (as 
the language of legislative compromise often is):  “If a State Party has 
evidence of an unexpected or unusual public health event within its 
territory, irrespective of origin or source, which may constitute a public 
health emergency of international concern, it shall provide WHO with 
all relevant public health information” (Article 7).  These words could 
encompass bio-terror or bio-warfare events, but Article 1.1 of IHR-
2005 defined the “health measures” that WHO could take as excluding 
any law enforcement or security-related actions.   
 
In this way, the WHO draughtsmen tried to reassure a world of 
suspicious states that they were staying carefully within their own 
sphere of PH disease-control, and not presuming to intrude into areas 
so tensely guarded.  … However, modern reality does not make such 
clear distinctions between the realms of PH, politics, and warfare—and, 
in an actual bio-warfare event, the shoe-leather epidemiologists will 
probably cross paths with the gumshoes and the combat boots.        
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g.  Vehicle and Vessel Quarantines 
 
(1) Quarantining Vessels Can Transcend Several Levels of 
Quarantine “Breadth”  
Another quarantine variant relates in a general way to several of 
the foregoing types—it involves the quarantining of land vehicles, sea 
vessels, and aircraft.  In a sense, this category of area quarantine cuts 
through several of the foregoing ones, since the issues it raises vary 
somewhat with the length of the vehicle or vessel’s journey and with 
the jurisdiction(s) that impose it.  For instance, if an American state 
stops and quarantines a train that is trying to pass through it on a 
voyage through multiple states, this could potentially raise U.S. 
Constitutional issues relating to interference with interstate commerce.   
 
At a wider level of breadth, when whole countries or American 
states, counties, or towns interdict and quarantine land vehicles, ships, 
or aircraft arriving from foreign countries, as discussed above, this can 
run headlong into controversies of international law, with its 
concordats, treaties, and traditions.         
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(a) Some Historical Examples of Vehicle/Vessel 
Quarantines 
 This Dissertation has briefly discussed the history of vessel 
quarantines in the above section on international quarantines.   
  
 Ships consigned to quarantine could undergo considerable 
privation during the centuries when the system was being developed.  
During the long periods of delay, passengers would experience the 
continuing miseries of shipboard conditions on the rough vessels of the 
time, while the ships’ cargoes would rot on decks nearby.  In England, 
repeated petitions for release were often sent to the Royal Privy 
Council without receiving its response for long periods of time (since 
administrative and postal systems could be very slow and inefficient).  
In one early case, the master of a vessel forcibly anchored off Scotland 
beseeched the peers to release his ship and passengers, since they 
were slowly freezing in the cold offshore winds of November (it is not 
certain if their lordships ever responded to this entreaty).  On another 
occasion—this one in the early 19th century, passengers on board a 
small quarantined boat had to share it for weeks with the corpse of a 
fellow-passenger who had died of cholera (Booker, 2007).   
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 While lengthy detention in a quarantine dockage was the usual 
fate of vessels conceding “foul bills” (i.e., acknowledging that they had 
left infected ports, were carrying traditionally-suspect cargoes, and/or 
had cases of illness aboard), they occasionally suffered worse 
outcomes.  On several occasions during British history, for example, 
the Privy Council or Admiralty ordered ships that had violated 
quarantine laws to be burned at sea.  Sometimes, British laws also 
ordered the execution of seamen or passengers who had tried to 
escape quarantine.  (Although such sentences were not often imposed 
in England, southern European states that were far less ambivalent 
about the importance of quarantining often did execute quarantine-
violators [Cliff, Smallman-Raynor & Stevens 2009, at 205; also, 
Booker 2007].)  
 
(b) Some Present-Day U.S. Vehicle-Vessel Quarantine 
Laws 
 A number of American states retain laws that allow their 
authorities to impose quarantines on vehicles or vessels that are 
attempting to enter or cross their territories.    
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  (i) Minnesota 
 At the interstate level, Minnesota law still includes an old 
provision that empowers its health commissioner to interdict 
conveyances that may be carrying communicable diseases into its 
territory. (“[T]he commissioner may establish and enforce a system of 
quarantine against the introduction into the state of any plague or 
other communicable disease by common carriers doing business 
across its borders” [Minn. Stats. Ann. s 144.14].  State health officers 
are authorized to board and inspect such conveyances, and if they find 
infection, they may detain the vehicle “and isolate and quarantine any 
or all persons found thereon, with their luggage, until all danger of 
communication of disease therefrom is removed” [Id.].  However, the 
statute does not make clear what grounds health inspectors would 
need to have in order to suspect contamination or carriage of disease 
in the first place.)   
 
  (ii) Rhode Island  
 Curiously, the New England state of Rhode Island retains some 
ship quarantine laws on its books that hark back to the 19th century 
(suggesting that these laws, too, are not often reviewed or re-
examined (Gen. L. R.I. Ann. ss 23-9-1 to 23-9-20).  The statutes’ 
terms are redolent of a different age, when American states and even 
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towns were autonomous entities protecting themselves from foreign 
epidemics (almost irrespective of the federal government):   
  
 These Rhode Island laws still authorize each of the little state’s 
seaports, except Providence, to appoint a human sentinel, who must 
“hail all ships or vessels which may arrive in [its] … river, bay, or 
harbor…” (Gen. L. R.I. Ann. s 23-9-5).   
  
 If the ship is arriving from a port, place, or country that has 
been declared diseased, its master must go to a designated quarantine 
anchorage off the Rhode Island seaport, and “place a signal in the  
shrouds of the vessel in a manner as to be seen at a proper distance” 
(Gen. L. R.I. Ann.  ss 23-9-5, 23-9-14).   
  
 Just as in post-Medieval Italy, no one aboard the boat that is 
trapped in the Rhode Island seaport’s quarantine area may break that 
quarantine without facing a penalty (though, fortunately for any 
modern Rhode Island escapees, they would only be charged a fine of 
$20 or less—rather than being beheaded, as they would have been in 
17th century Italy [Gen. L. R.I. Ann. ss 23-9-8, 23-9-9; also, Cliff, 
Smallman-Raynor & Stevens 2009, at 205; Booker 2007]).   
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 In any case, the Rhode Island seaport’s town council must hold 
the now-probably-desperate travelers aboard their shipboard prison, or 
in a land-based quarantine facility, until they have “passed a suitable 
quarantine” period (Gen. L. R.I. Ann. s 23-9-17).  This last statutory 
provision particularly shows its age:  The state of Rhode Island adds 
that they must be confined “until those of them that have, or are likely 
to have, the smallpox or other infectious or contagious distemper are 
perfectly recovered and cleansed from that distemper…” (Id.).  
Meanwhile, their ship’s cargo must undergo the ancient process of 
“airing and cleansing” (Gen L. R.I. Ann. ss 23-9-1, 23-9-19).     
 
  (iii) Alabama 
Despite having a relatively small seacoast (centered primarily on 
the Port of Mobile), Alabama also retains some maritime quarantine 
laws that include concepts and language from far back in history:  
Notably, Section 22-12-10 of the state’s code (which descends from a 
law originally passed in 1896) charges a ship captain with a 
misdemeanor if he removes his vessel from quarantine before 
receiving pratique.  Under Section 22-12-11, violators of county or 
municipal vessel regulations (as posted in a newspaper or in some 
public place, rather than on the Internet) would face the not-very-
fearsome threat of paying at least $50 (which might have influenced 
199 
 
captains’ behavior more when the law’s first version was passed in 
1852).  Here again, a state’s maritime quarantine laws square 
curiously with the modern-day need for a unified national system of 
seaport laws. 
_________________________________________________ 
3.  Duration of Quarantines 
This “Dimension” of quarantines and other socio-behavioral 
contagion-controls addresses their duration in Time:  At one end of 
this temporal spectrum, people and/or areas may be quarantined or 
isolated for a mere period of days.  This would be an appropriate 
response to contagions that have a relatively brief period of 
infectiousness, such as measles, influenza, or even pneumonic plague.  
At the other end of this spectrum of time, however, quarantines could 
sometimes extend for the lifetime of infectious (or allegedly infectious) 
people; some major disease examples were cited earlier, viz., historical 
leprosy, TB, syphilis, and asymptomatic typhoid--and the phenomenon 
of antibiotic-resistance may raise anew this possibility for some of 
these contagions.   It is evident that the temporal duration of a 
quarantine (or other freedom-restricting contagion-control measures) 
is positively correlated with its burdensomeness, thus steadily raising 
the bar of justification that policy-makers must meet before they 
impose it. 
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________________________________________________________ 
4.  Purpose of Quarantines 
The next major “Dimension” of quarantines focuses on the 
purpose of those procedures:  Whom do they propose to protect? Like 
the other major Dimensions proposed here, this Dimension may 
overlap some of the others—but it is fundamentally tangent to their 
plane.  The issue here is not the severity of a quarantine, its 
geographic breadth, or its duration—it could be mild or severe, narrow 
or broad, brief or long; the question is whether that quarantine aims to 
protect society from infected quarantinees (as is usually the case), or  
to protect the presumably-uninfected quarantinees themselves from 
contracting a contagious disease.     
 
The discussion of the prior Dimensions has mainly addressed the 
classic situation where an authority determines or believes that some 
persons or places have been exposed to infection and must thus be 
sequestered from the greater (presumably unexposed) society for its 
safety, rather than for theirs.  Sometimes, however, contagion-control 
measures aim to isolate or even remove a set of vulnerable people 
from contact with pathogens.  These will be considered here. 
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It should be noted here, of course, that the lines of distinction in 
PH purposes are not always clear:  Complex contagion-control actions 
can have multiple goals and operate simultaneously in multi-pronged 
ways, both benefitting and imposing on individuals at once.  The 
Dimension of quarantine “Purpose” remains an important one in policy-
making, however. (It is submitted that there was a failure to highlight 
this “Purpose” distinction in the passage from the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services’ Pandemic Influenza Plan discussed above, 
which was describing neighborhood/district quarantines.  For 
numerous reasons, however, it is important to distinguish between 
quarantines that surround people or areas to protect the world from 
their alleged infection—as in the cases of Hawai’i’s old leprosy 
quarantine and its 1900 plague quarantine—and quarantines that aim 
to protect the quarantinees inside a zone from infected outsiders.   
Among other things, the threshold of justifications for quarantines that 
aim to protect may not have to be as high as those that are arguably 
“adversarial” to the quarantinees.) 
 
               a. Some Types of Protective Quarantines 
Ranging across the several spectra of depth and breadth, 
protective quarantines can include some of the following actions: 
removing allegedly uninfected--but susceptible--individuals from an 
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area under epidemic threat; confining susceptibles to their homes to 
prevent them from encountering pathogens; throwing protective 
cordons around susceptibles and nominally untouched areas to keep 
possibly-infected outsiders from coming into contact with the 
immunologically-innocent inside the zone. 
 
(1)  Evacuations 
 The first type of contagion-control measure listed above might 
be more specifically labeled an “evacuation.”  It has some features in 
common with emergency evacuations of people from areas that are 
threatened by other hazardous conditions besides epidemics (such as 
earthquakes, fires, hurricanes, and floods), but a public health 
evacuation clearly raises its own operational considerations.  (For 
example, it can legitimately be asked whether moving groups of 
people out of the path of an epidemic might actually spread the 
disease, unless some quick and effective diagnostic tests can identify 
asymptomatic pathogen-carriers in the set of potential evacuees.)         
 
(a) Some Historical U.S. Evacuation Laws 
 Historically, some jurisdictions have employed evacuations in 
conjunction with classic household quarantines (see above), in order to 
keep neighbors from contracting the diseases that have stricken the 
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houses next door.  Massachusetts practiced such PH actions during 
outbreaks of smallpox in colonial and early republican times. 
 
(b) Some Present-Day U.S. Evacuation Laws 
  (i) Massachusetts 
A current Massachusetts statute (descended from the 1700s) still 
provides for such removals of neighbors (M.G.L.A. [Ann. Laws Mass., 
GL ch.] 111, s 95).  Similarly, a North Dakota law (which originated in 
1883) still allows local health boards to quarantine persons in their 
homes if their health does not permit removal to an isolation hospital--
and in such circumstances the boards “may cause persons in the 
neighborhood to be removed, and may take such other measures as it 
deems necessary for the safety of the inhabitants within its 
jurisdiction” (No. Dak. Cent. Code Ann. s 23-07-06; emphasis added).  
Hawai’i has an analogous old law still in effect (Haw. Rev. Stats. s 325-
9).  (Incidentally, these old statutory provisions run somewhat counter 
to modern thinking in the way they approach strict quarantines:  They 
favor the more invasive measure of quarantining/isolating infected 
persons in non-home facilities as a first option, reserving home 
isolation only for special cases where the individuals’ health precludes 
removal.  Nowadays, by contrast, many official policies often favor the 
less-intrusive “L.R.A.” [least-restrictive-alternative] approach of 
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leaving ill people in situ unless public safety considerations require 
their institutionalization.)  
      
  (ii) Other states 
 Some state public health emergency statutes that track the more 
modern model of disaster planning also provide for evacuating persons 
from disaster-stricken areas.  For example, Section 24-32-2104 (7)(e) 
of Colorado’s laws specifically empowers that state’s governor to 
“[d]irect and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population 
from any stricken or threatened area within the state if the governor 
deems this action necessary for the preservation of life or other 
disaster mitigation, response, or recovery” (Colo. Rev. Stats. Ann. s 
24-32-2104(7)(e)).  Numerous other “state-of-emergency” laws also 
authorize such mass evacuations, particularly in response to place-
contamination by bioterrorists.  (See, e.g., Com. of No. Mariana Isl. 
Pub. L. No. 13-63; Colo. Rev. Stats. 24-32-2104(7)(e); 20 Del. Code 
Ann. 3142; Off. Code of Ga. Ann. 38-3-51(d), (6); 10 Guam Code Ann. 
19501; Idaho Code 56-1003(7)(a); La. Rev. Stats. 29:766; Md. Pub. 
Safety Code Ann. 14-3A-03(d); N.C. Gen. Stats. 130A-2(7a), 130A-
475(3); R.I. Gen. Laws 30-15-9(e)(5).)   
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Generally, these are not quarantines of people, but they are 
quarantines of places.  They could sometimes be onerous to the 
evacuees and to persons barred from entering an area, especially if 
the evacuation requires people to travel on short notice with few 
possessions to safer areas, and one can readily expect that they would 
be very difficult to administer (especially with a people as 
individualistic as Americans).  The 2005 evacuation of New Orleans in 
the face of Hurricane Katrina showed how disastrous such procedures 
can become when planning is inadequate and “a perfect storm” of 
situational factors are involved. 
 
Nevertheless, these evacuation actions do not intensely restrict 
the freedom of the affected individuals and groups.  The world remains 
essentially available to them except for the blockaded locale.   
         
(2)  Confining or Limiting Susceptibles to Their Homes for Their Own 
Protection 
 Some present-day public health emergency laws also allow 
governments to order their citizens to stay at home as much as 
possible during epidemics.  For example, Maryland’s Emergency 
Management statute code specifically accords the state’s governor the 
power to order the public to remain indoors on such occasions (Md. 
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Code, Pub. Safety, s 14-3A-03(d)(2)).  (Of course, this would be a 
mixed-motive measure—it mainly serves to protect the uninfected, but 
it would also, ipso facto, prevent the incipiently-infected from 
spreading their diseases to others.) 
  
 A less stringent variant of this kind of PH measure would include 
jobsite or travel restrictions:  Health authorities might direct 
employees not to go to work in person to avoid the potential for 
encountering pathogens in the workplace; nowadays, telecommuting is 
an option for some kinds of occupations.  Alternatively, PH officials 
may address the hazards of epidemic spread in public transportation, 
limiting occupancy in public transport or ordering a staggering of 
commuting times to limit contacts between the infected and the 
susceptible.     
 
(3)  “Quarantines-Against-the-World” 
 Finally, there is a classic type of protective quarantine that was 
used periodically in the past:  Using it, health officials would try to 
protect still-unexposed persons by cordoning off their so-far-
untouched community from a whole infected world.  Essentially, this 
creates a “hedgehog defense” of a limited area and its citizens, 
keeping out commerce and visitations by potentially infected outsiders.  
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This dramatic maneuver might be termed a “quarantine-against-the-
world.” 
 
(a) Some Historical Examples of “Quarantines-Against-
the-World” 
 The desire for collective self-defense is almost as old as mankind 
itself, and in the course of time some communities have taken 
unilateral actions to protect themselves from the incursions of outside 
epidemics.   
 
 (i) European villages’ self-protective quarantines against plague  
 In the Middle Ages, for example, some villages reportedly sealed 
themselves off from contact with outsiders in the hope that they could 
avoid contracting the plague that was killing the rest of Europe.  (Bell 
DM & World Health Organization Writing Group, “Nonpharmaceutical 
interventions for pandemic influenza, national and community 
measures,” Emerg.  Infect. Dis., 12(1):88-94 [1/06], at 90, 
www.cdc.gov, accessed 11/15/11.)  
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 (ii) North American villages’ self-protective quarantines against 
Spanish Influenza 
 Following this atavistic path in the 20st century, many small and 
isolated towns in the Canadian and American West tried to save 
themselves from the rampant pandemic of Spanish Influenza by 
stopping highway traffic and interdicting arriving trains.  In some of 
the U.S. towns, gun-wielding vigilantes allegedly forced passengers to 
remain aboard the trains, and then ordered the conveyances out of 
town (Id.; also, www.1918pandemicflu.gov/your_state, accessed 
2/1/12).  (While these events were mostly conducted by townspeople 
on their own, a few official agencies did assist in some of the local 
efforts.  For example, the provincial police of Alberta helped man 
roadblocks around three prairie hamlets.)  Retrospectively, the 
outcomes of these interventions were said to have been mixed:  Some 
historians maintained that several of the American “quarantines-
against-the-world” did keep the pandemic out of some of these self-
protective towns.  (Barry JM, The Great Epidemic: The Epic Story of 
the Deadliest Plague in History [NY:  Viking Penguin, 2004]; Jordan 
EO, Epidemic Influenza:  A Survey [Chicago:  Amer. Med. Assn., 
1927].)  However, another report later claimed that the Canadian 
actions were “’lamentably inefficient in checking the spread of the 
disease.’  Quite simply, isolating individuals and families or 
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quarantining entire communities did not work” (Id., citing Whitelaw 
TH, “The practical aspects of quarantine for influenza,” Can. Med. 
Assoc. J., 9:1070-74 [1919]; McGinnis JP, “The impact of epidemic 
influenza, Canada, 1918-1919,” Hist. Pap. Can. Hist. Assoc., 19:120-
41 [1977]; see also Sattenspiel L & Herring DA, “Simulating the effect 
of quarantine on the spread of the 1918-19 flu in central Canada,” Bull. 
Math. Biol., 65:1-26 [2003]).      
  
 (iii) Chinese villages’ self-protective quarantines against SARS 
 Almost a century later, some rural Chinese communities also 
resorted to the ancient tactic of communal self-quarantining to protect 
their villages from the deadly SARS outbreak of 2003, erecting 
barricades and keeping out travelers from infected cities. 
 
     Of particular policy relevance here, however, are those historical 
cases where “quarantines-against-the-world” were not informal actions 
taken by citizens acting on their own behalf but official actions taken 
by government leaders:   
 
 (iv) New Caledonian protective quarantine against influenza 
 In 1921, an Australian outbreak of seasonal influenza was 
carried by ship to the French colony of Nouvelle Caledonie (New 
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Caledonia) in the Western Pacific.  While the capital city of Noumea 
and the southern two-thirds of the island were quickly saturated with 
influenza cases, the French colonial administrators did manage to take 
some belated actions to prevent the disease from reaching its northern 
third.  They used the paucity of roads into the region to this end, 
stopping overland passage to it, and they placed a two-day maritime 
quarantine on all ships in Noumea that were heading for the north 
(Bell DM & WHO Writing Group 2006, citing Peltier L, “L’epidemie 
d’influenzie qui a sevie a Nouvelle Caledonie en 1921,” Bulletin de 
l’Office International d’Hygiene Publique, 14:676-685 [1921]).    
 
  (v) Spanish Influenza meets a “quarantine-against-the-world” in       
 American Samoa 
 However, the most striking recent instance of a “quarantine-
against-the-world” occurred during the Spanish Influenza pandemic of 
1918-1919 itself in the Samoan archipelago in the South Pacific.  This 
episode was particularly informative because its specific circumstances 
created a virtual natural experiment in the potential power of such 
quarantines.  (It was vividly told by Crosby AW, America’s Forgotten 
Pandemic:  The Influenza of 1918   [2d ed. 2003] [Cambridge, UK:  
Cambridge U. Press], 337 pp.   See also http.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS 
Talune, accessed 3/7/12, citing Rice, G, “Black November – the 1918 
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influenza pandemic in New Zealand,” [2nd ed.] [Christchurch, NZ:  
Canterbury University Press, 2005], ISBN 1-877257-35-4.) 
 
 The culturally and geographically homogeneous Samoan island 
chain had been artificially bisected in 1899 by two colonial powers—
Germany (later replaced by New Zealand) and the United States.  Both 
sets of colonial islands were run by autonomous and authoritarian 
military governments, and social and medical conditions were very 
similar on both sides of the artificial border (health infrastructures 
were rudimentary on both sides, and any healthcare came mainly from 
extended families).  Nor were there any effective vaccines or 
treatments for flu anywhere on earth.  The only fundamental 
difference in the flu preparation between Eastern (American) Samoa 
and Western (New Zealand) Samoa would prove to be a quarantine-
against-the-world. 
 
 As World War I was drawing to a close, the vast movements of 
soldiers across the globe probably helped to spread a new mutation of 
the influenza-A H1N1 virus.  A fundamental shift in the virus’s primary 
antigens of neuraminidase and haemagluttinin had made it 
unrecognizable to the immune systems of large percentages of the 
world’s population, and the virus began spreading exponentially among 
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its human hosts.  (Ironically, this new appearance of flu became 
popularly dubbed the “Spanish Influenza” mainly because neutral 
Spain was willing to report its morbidity and mortality rates, while the 
belligerent powers feared to do so, lest they give aid and comfort to 
their enemies.)  Within the course of no more than six to nine months, 
there would be somewhere between 20 million and 100 million deaths 
from this manifestation of flu (even at this stage in biostatistical 
history, the death rate for such a pandemic event was only 
guesswork—but it almost certainly far exceeded the combat deaths in 
the world war, and its human impact was unmistakable). 
   
 While the U.S. government was not keeping its military governor 
of Samoa, Navy Commander John Martin Poyer, very closely advised 
about the movement of Spanish Influenza across the planet (the war 
was a major distraction, and distant dependencies were rarely high 
priorities), he followed events on the radio, and he made his own 
plans.  Poyer began to seal off his set of islands from the entire flu-
stricken planet, tightly quarantining all ships arriving in the main port 
of Pago Pago.  He also utilized existing alliances with native chieftains 
(matai) to blockade any small-boat traffic traversing the international 
boundary channel from Western Samoa. 
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 Meanwhile, a ship—the SS. Talune--had left Auckland, New 
Zealand in the last months of 1918, which soon proved to be carrying 
multiple cases of severe influenza aboard.  In the ensuing weeks, this 
vessel seeded outbreaks in all its ports of call in the Southwest Pacific. 
In early November, it arrived at Western Samoa’s capital city of Apia 
on the island of Upolu.  The Talune was only subjected to a 
rudimentary marine quarantine in Apia Harbour (its captain may have 
downplayed the incidence of influenza aboard, and the harbour’s 
quarantine officer only asked the passengers a few perfunctory health 
questions).  In short order, the routine yellow banner of the quarantine  
was lowered from the ship’s mast, and the steamer Talune received 
pratique to offload its crew, passengers, and cargo.   
 
 Within a short time, a violent epidemic of influenza had broken 
out across the port city of Apia, then quickly spread through Upolu and 
surrounding islands.  Like many other Pacific Islanders, Samoan native 
people lacked a long historic experience with pathogens from the 
“world-island” (Asia-Africa-Europe) and the Americas, and they were 
singularly vulnerable to this strain of A/H1N1 influenza.  Consequently, 
their death rate climbed to levels that were even extraordinary in that 
disastrous flu year:  Within just a few months, some 8,500 people--
22% of the entire population of Western Samoa—were dead, with 
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profound and lasting impacts on their familial (“fono”) and kinship-
based culture.  Many deceased young adults left behind orphans, and, 
with some 45% of the matai having died, many village societies broke 
down.  The New Zealand administrator of Western Samoa, Lieutenant 
Colonel Robert Logan, took few effective steps to try to stop the 
spread of influenza across the islands under his command.  He also 
took umbrage at the self-isolation of American Samoa--which he 
regarded as an unfriendly act by an allied power, and he cut off 
communications with Poyer’s government across the channel (Munro  
D, “Logan, Robert--Biography.” In Dictionary of New  Zealand 
Biography, www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/biographies/3112/1,  accessed 
4/26/11). 
 
        Poyer’s actions were indeed unrelenting.  At one point, he 
personally stood in a small boat in Pago Pago Harbor with a 
megaphone, and ordered the regular mail packet from Apia not to land 
unless it first underwent a rigorous quarantine.  The ship turned away 
without unloading its cargo or passengers.   For their part, native 
matai on American Samoa were aware of the influenza threat to their 
islands, and they helped Poyer by even turning away small craft 
carrying their own kinfolk from stricken Western Samoa. 
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 In the end, classic Spanish Influenza never did reach American 
Samoa. Although a strain of flu finally entered the islands in 1920 
(after Poyer had retired), it may have only been a mutated form of the 
deadly 1918 strain, and it killed no one.  In fact, American Samoa 
attained an outcome that was virtually unique on earth in those plague 
years:  Not a single member of the small colony’s population died of 
Spanish Influenza.  Thus, the comparative flu deaths on the two 
Samoas in the relevant time period were approximately 8,500 to 0. 
   
On June 10, 1919, John Martin Poyer left Samoa forever, 
honored with the Navy Cross and bidden farewell with a 21-gun salute.  
After a year of so many events--and so much misery--across the 
globe, world history soon forgot his name…. However, his highest 
tribute may have been a Samoan song overheard at the time of his 
departure (sung to the tune of the “Star-Spangled Banner”).  It began 
“Oi ai le motu i le Pasifika sauté Tutuila ma Upolu/A o Tutuila oi ai fu’a 
Meleke, a o Upolu le o Niusilani….,” and in translation: 
  
    There are two islands in the South Pacific, Tutuila and Upolu, 
 Tutuila under the American flag, Upolu that of New Zealand. 
 God has sent down a sickness on the world, 
 And all the lands are filled with suffering. 
 The two Islands are forty miles apart, 
 But in Upolu, the Island of New Zealand, many are dead, 
 While in Tutuila, the American Island, not a one is dead. 
 Why? In Tutuila they love the men of their villages; 
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 In Upolu they are doomed to punishment and to death. 
 God in Heaven bless the American Governor and Flag. 
 
((a)) Analysis of the American Samoan “quarantine-against-the-
world” 
 A “natural experiment” such as occurred unplanned on the 
Samoan Islands cannot be conclusive in a causational sense on the 
value of a protective quarantine; in such a population, after all, there 
might have been confounder variables that could have explained at 
least some of the differences between the de facto “treatment” group 
and the de facto “control” group.  Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to 
submit that this episode provided strong suggestive evidence for the 
postulate that quarantines-against-the-world can sometimes be highly 
effective containment tools against epidemic disease.     
  
 However, the generalizability of this conclusion must be hedged 
by some epidemiological and socio-political-legal realities.  Inter alia, 
the Samoan episode involved an unusual combination of 
circumstances, which included exceptional geographic isolation, a 
benevolently autocratic naval authority, and a cooperative native 
public:   
 
 
217 
 
 First, it should be remembered that these events occurred at the 
dawn of the modern world, when nations like Samoa were still 
connected to other peoples of their planet and their infectious 
commerce only by seacraft.  Technologically, airplanes had appeared 
by that time, and they were certainly on the verge of bracketing vast 
global distances—but they had not yet made that leap to the south 
Pacific.  This brought valuable time for an alert and aggressive 
contagion-fighter.  Those simple technological circumstances are no 
longer present, of course, and modern aircraft can transport the  
carriers of numerous contagions (including flu itself) almost anywhere 
before they manifest any symptoms.   
  
 Moreover, the governance conditions and leadership 
circumstances of American Samoa in 1918-19 were hardly typical of 
American governments in general:  They involved a benignant, well-
informed, and proactive military ruler vested with autonomy from 
Washington and virtually despotic local powers, who was not beholden 
to respected local rulers but still consulted with them and had their 
support.   
  
  Finally, as has been seen elsewhere in this Dissertation, the 
press of competing goals in many modern places (including those of 
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commerce and individual freedoms) usually starts cracking quarantines 
relatively early in their operational history.  In this respect, the 
experience of American Samoa in 1918-18 was rather exceptional 
politically, to say the least. 
  
 In the end, the picture is, as always, complex, but it might be 
posited that quarantines-against-the-world will rarely carry the full 
impact they had in that time and place.  Even in circumscribed form, 
however, they may still be valuable PH policy instruments for attaining 
some ends, such as gaining a limited amount of time for the 
development of anti-pathogen technologies.  This potential biomedical 
value will need to be weighed in the balance with other social 
desirables arising in particular situations.          
 
(b) Some Present-Day American Protective Quarantine 
Laws  
Some state laws provide for some degree of cordon sanitaire 
around their states (e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws 23-8-18; So. Dak. Cod. Laws 
34-22-1; W.Va. Code Ann. 16-3-2, 16-3-3). 
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(i) Louisiana 
 In a curious twist, Louisiana extends the above practices on a 
wider scale, allowing the state health officer to prevent “persons 
acclimated, unacclimated or said to be immune” from entering “any 
infected portion of the state … when, in his judgment, the introduction 
of those persons would increase the prevalence of the disease” (La. 
Rev. Stats. 40:7).  This statute appears to express the notion that new 
persons entering an infected area (whether or not they are immune) 
could increase the disease’s prevalence for everybody.  Thus, the 
individuals’ own safety is only part of the goal here; overall disease 
control is the main purpose. 
 
______________________________________________________ 
5.  Quarantines of Individuals for Society’s Benefit—The 
 Culpability Dimension 
 A final “Dimension” of quarantines (and some other socio-
behavioral contagion-controls) addresses a different facet of these PH 
measures:  It focuses on the issue of the “culpability” of quarantinee 
conduct from the perspective of the law of a legal jurisdiction.  This 
Dimension asks the jurisprudential question—have the quarantined 
person(s) violated any statutes, ordinances, or regulations in 
connection with the carriage of pathogens?  If so, how severely have 
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they transgressed?  As with the other Dimensions, the present one 
ranges along a spectrum from least to most (culpable, in this case):  
At one end of this continuum, quarantined persons are essentially 
innocent of misconduct in the eyes of a jurisdiction’s criminal law; at 
the other end of the continuum, however, the disease carriers are 
intentional transgressors, who use pathogens as weapons in a 
deliberate way, as shall be illustrated in more detail below.   
 
 Often, it will be seen, some quarantinees might move over time 
down a sequential “path of misconduct” into ever-more legally culpable 
actions.  In such circumstances, this Dimension might constitute a 
procedural hierarchy that occurs over time, with increasingly severe 
constraints imposed for violations occurring at successive stages of the 
legal process.       
  
   Here again, there may be a little overlap between this 
Dimension and the others, but they remain conceptually and 
operationally independent.  While, in some ways, this Dimension might 
seem to parallel the Dimension of  
quarantine “Depth,” or severity (discussed above), they are actually 
different in some very basic operational ways:  Notably, in quarantine 
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law, a lack of culpability does not necessarily betoken milder societal 
treatment, as shall be seen below.     
 
a. Quarantines for the Mere “Status” of Carrying Pathogens 
(1) Simple Quarantine Laws as Non-Criminal Statutes 
 As was just indicated, one end of the “culpability” Dimension 
involves no culpability whatever.  Individuals are quarantined—
sometimes strictly and harshly—because of the elemental fact that 
they have the “status” of “infectiousness” and are thus dangerous to 
others (even if they never wished this to happen--and may not even 
have not known that they were asymptomatic carriers).  Quarantines 
of this kind reveal the fundamental character of this whole body of law 
in its starkest form:  It is intrinsically a law of raw communal self-
preservation, which does not require that any crime have been 
committed at all; in principle, it has no punitive, retributive, or 
deterrent goal.   
  
 (2) Background Analysis of Quarantining for Having the “Status” of 
Infectiousness:  Doctrines of the State’s “Police Power” and Parens 
Patriae 
 Under the Anglo-Saxon common law, the nation-state gradually 
developed two jurisprudential doctrines that empowered it to act in 
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basic quarantine circumstances:  The state was said to have a “police 
power” to preserve the public health, safety, and morals, and it also 
had the role of parens patriae.   
 
 Over the centuries, the reach of the English central government 
expanded ever more widely to encompass distant parts of the realm.  
This expansion of royal power was justified by various legal fictions (of 
which English jurisprudential culture was inordinately fond):  One 
concept was the “king’s peace”—in principle, interpersonal violence 
near the monarch disturbed his calm, so his agents could properly 
enforce civil peace in the area around him, and this area of law 
expanded more and more widely.  With this doctrine came the 
widening concept of the state’s “police power” to impose calm and 
order for the general good of society—also, in an ever-increasing 
scope.  (Often, the criminal laws that enforced this calm and order 
would be considered highly draconian today.) 
 
 Separately, English law also developed the notion of the “parens 
patriae” (literally, “father of his country”), which maintained that the 
ruler would stand in as a sort of national parent over impaired people, 
taking care of their needs because they could not do so themselves.  
This provided doctrinal underpinnings for some civil laws—including 
223 
 
laws for institutionalizing the “insane” or the infectious.  (In harsh 
reality, of course, this doctrine claimed a governmental solicitude that 
did not really exist in the kingdom at that time:  Pre-20th century 
England was not a society that provided an excessive amount of 
tender care for its poor, “insane,” or ill--but the legal fiction asserted 
that it did do this, or at least that it could do it.) 
  
 When the American Revolution separated the thirteen colonies 
from their mother country, the new state governments acquired the 
legal authorities of police power and parens patriae over their 
respective publics that the English sovereign had once held.  This 
included the power to protect American communities from 
communicable diseases, as well as the power to care for some sick 
residents of the states.  (For a long time, though, most of the 
American states did not really expand very much on the English 
Crown’s minimal care for the afflicted.)   
 
 As was noted in the discussion above on the “Depth” Dimension 
(particularly in connection with HD and TB), there has been a 
longstanding tension in PH governance between the “pole” of 
protecting society from infectious persons and the “pole” of providing 
individual care to the infected.  While these policy “poles” are not 
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totally incompatible, they certainly differ in emphasis.  In numerous 
polities across the world—including the United States, much priority 
was long given to preserving the public’s health from infectious 
individuals (in the model of the Anglo-American common law, this was 
roughly like emphasizing the “police-power” aspects of a state’s PH 
function).  As bio-medicine became increasingly effective in the last 
century, however, the therapeutic purpose increased (in a rough sense, 
it was increasingly stressed the state’s PH role as “parent of its 
people”).  Thus, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
leprosaria at Moloka’i on the kingdom/territory/state of Hawai’i and at 
Carville in Louisiana tried to “protect society” from the scourge of 
leprosy by keeping HD victims confined within deep natural and man-
made moats and walls--but, over time, these institutions became more 
and more dedicated to nursing and then to medical research on cures 
for leprosy.  During that same era, the TB sanatoria exemplified the 
complex intermingling of both goals (with private institutions for 
wealthy patients stressing the therapeutic goal above all, while state 
institutions for poorer patients often aimed to treat them—but also 
retained a strong element of coercive confinement). 
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(a) A Classic Example of Quarantines Without Implying Guilt:  
Hawaiian Leprosy-Segregation Laws 
 A classic example of quarantining without imputation of guilt 
would involve the citizens of Hawai’i who were suspected of having 
leprosy (see the above discussion in this Chapter):  They could be 
dragged from their homes and schools, coldly examined, and then 
transported in a cattle pen on a decrepit ship to lifelong banishment in 
the Kalaupapa leprosarium.  In the course of this whole harsh 
scenario, the subject individuals might never have committed a single 
act of disobedience or criminality.  Even the implacable Hawaiian 
Supreme Court conceded this--while strongly supporting the leprosy 
segregation/quarantine system:  “[L]eprosy is not a crime…. It is a 
disease.  There may be instances where a person having the disease of 
leprosy willfully contaminates others, or transmits it to his offspring, or 
being free from it, recklessly exposes himself to infection, and these 
may be called wrong or criminal acts; but unless these acts are 
prohibited by law, they are not offenses, or punishable as such by law.”  
Segregation of Lepers, 5 Haw. 162 [Hawai’i Kingdom 1884].)                  
 
 In this most elemental form, quarantines are civil-type 
procedures, reminiscent of involuntary-confinement laws for those  
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“mentally-ill” persons who are believed to be dangerous to themselves 
or others. 
 
 (b) Some Present-Day U.S. Quarantine laws for the “Status” of 
Infectiousness 
 Virtually every modern American state and territory (and 
numerous counties and municipalities) authorizes its health officers to 
quarantine infectious people without establishing any culpability or 
misconduct.  To cite a typical example, Alabama’s law states that 
“[w]henever the State Health Officer or his representative, or the 
county health officer or his representative, is notified of any … persons 
afflicted with any of the notifiable diseases or health conditions 
designated by the State Board of Health, he shall, at his discretion, 
isolate or quarantine such … persons as further provided in this 
article…” (Code of Ala. S 22-11A-3).  
                                   
 
b. Quarantines for Non-Compliance with PH Officers 
(1) A First “Criminal” Level of Culpability in the Quarantine Law’s 
“Hierarchy of Culpability” 
 At the first level of culpability, an allegedly infectious person 
might face quarantining because he or she did not cooperate with 
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instructions from health officers.  A classic instance might be an active 
TB patient who was ordered to go to an outpatient clinic to undergo a 
multi-drug protocol, but failed to do so or only complied erratically 
(thereby putting his close contacts at risk of contracting the disease, 
and furthering the wider danger of promoting strains of multi-drug-
resistant M. tuberculosis).   
 
(a) A Historical Example of Quarantining for Non-Compliance with 
Initial PH Orders:  Benton v. Reid 
 Francis A. Benton, the jailed TB patient described previously in 
this chapter, had reportedly gone AWOL from various hospitals before 
the District of Columbia finally incarcerated him.  Benton v. Reid, 231 
F.2d 780, at 782.   
  
(b) Some Present-Day U.S. Quarantine Laws for Non-Compliance with 
Initial PH Orders 
 Most U.S. state and territories (and many smaller jurisdictions) 
will authorize the health authorities to quarantine such recalcitrants, 
with or without a court order.         
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 ((i)) Alaska 
 A typical statute that quarantines people who will not comply 
with outpatient care is Alaska’s Section 18.15.380(c):  It provides, 
inter alia, that “[t]he [state health] department shall notify an 
individual who refuses treatment under this subsection that the refusal 
may result in an indefinite period of quarantine or isolation and that 
the individual may be responsible for payment of the costs of the 
quarantine or isolation.”  Note that this provision does not necessarily 
criminalize the individual’s non-compliance, since it also asserts that 
he or she has the nominal right to refuse treatment.  From the 
individual’s perspective, however, this non-criminal status may be 
rather less important than the fact that he or she may now face an 
indefinite confinement in a closed institution. 
 
c.  Quarantines for Defiance of a Court Order 
 A possibly “later” step in the path of non-compliance—which 
more commonly carries criminal law implications—might be an 
individual’s defiance of a formal court order to get medically examined 
or treated.  Usually, in such instances, PH officials will have gone to a 
magistrate or a court to seek judicial support for their health directions 
to a patient, but the patient still refuses to cooperate.  Some 
jurisdictions may regard this behavior as a legal contempt of court.     
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 (a) Some Present-Day U.S. Quarantine Laws for Non-Compliance 
with Court Orders 
 The power to criminalize and quarantine alleged contagion-
carriers who defy court commands is also virtually universal in 
present-day American statutory law. 
 
d. Quarantines for Non-Cooperation with 
Institutional Rules 
(1) Confinement Centers Within Confinement Facilities 
 Next in a sequence of culpability would be a disease-carrier who 
is committed to a quarantine facility and then refuses to comply with 
the internal rules of that institution.  At this point in a quarantining 
process, the individual will have already lost the right to move freely in 
the community—perhaps after a history of non-compliance on the 
outside--and he or she would now encounter further restrictions in 
degrees of freedom within the facility walls.  The isolation hospital will 
have an interest in maintaining order among its confinees—particularly 
in light of their infectiousness, and it may be a public institution whose 
rules of conduct carry the force of law.  Violation of those rules may 
place a quarantinee in the unenviable status of being confined within 
two layers of isolation. 
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(a) Some Historical Examples of Punitive Confinement Within 
Quarantine Zones 
 To cite two examples of confinement within zones of quarantine: 
  
(i) Jailing within the Kalaupapa Leprosy Settlement  
 By the later phases of the Kalaupapa leprosarium’s history (see 
above), the Kingdom and later the U.S. territory of Hawai’i had created 
a regular police force within the settlement, and they built a small jail 
on the peninsula where miscreants would be placed, thereby further 
ensuring order.    
         
(ii)  Confinement within the Carville Leprosarium 
  The Carville National Leprosarium in Louisiana (see above) also 
developed confinement facilities for recalcitrant residents.  Notably, 
these included patients who had absconded through a popular “hole in 
the fence,” and who then returned voluntarily or were brought back in 
shackles by policemen.  Usually, the penalty consisted of temporary 
lodging in one of the detention buildings, with loss of some privileges.  
(See, e.g., Gaudet M, 1988; Martin B, None Must Ever Know, 1959; 
Martin B, Miracle at Carville, 1950). 
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(iii) A historical example of the culpability continuum:  The cases of 
Donald Moore 
In a series of two Florida court cases from the last years before 
the “Window Era”—Moore v. Draper, 57 So.2d 648 (Fl. Sup. Ct. 1952) 
and Moore v. Armstrong, 149 So.2d 36 (Fl. Sup. Ct. 1963)--one can 
follow the downward path of an unlucky TB patient, who continually 
failed to comply with the directions of the health authorities—and who 
thus saw the circumference of his allotted spatial world and its 
privileges shrinking over time.   
 
In Draper, the court stated generally in the first case that Florida 
had long been alarmed by TB, and the judges themselves agreed with 
this executive/legislative branch feeling, saying in stentorian terms 
that 
[r]ecent history of public health matters showed that 
tuberculosis was recognized as one of the most dreadful diseases 
and one of the greatest killers.  The State has  spent millions of 
dollars prior to 1949 in an attempt to minimize as far as possible 
the spread of this terrible disease.  It had established a few 
hospitals and clinics and had carried on a program of detection, 
education and advice.  It was recognized that those afflicted with 
this disease were a menace to society.  They walked the streets; 
went to public places such as theatres, hotels and restaurants; 
they rode in common carriers; in their homes and other places 
they came in close contact with relatives and friends and the 
general public.  They not only suffered themselves, but left 
disease, misery, sorrow and death in their wake 
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(Id., at 2; emphasis supplied).  Despite this view, Florida’s health 
authorities did not, for a long time, yank the liberties of these people 
they perceived to be menaces to society, not out of any tender feelings 
for their rights, but because the state—then as now—was an under-
capitalized, small-government jurisdiction that simply could not afford 
to build quarantine facilities for them.  Eventually, however, a Cigarette 
Tax Law was passed, providing the needed revenue, and the Sunshine 
State started making up for lost time by quickly building a number of 
confinement sanatoria. 
 
It was during this time that plaintiff Donald Moore fell afoul of 
the system, presumably because he was an active TB patient who was 
wandering around indifferently spreading his disease to others.  On 
December 13, 1948, he wound up in one of the newly-built sanatoria, 
and he soon sued for a writ of habeas corpus to regain his freedom 
(claiming that his quarantine was unconstitutional in various ways).  In 
its Draper decision, however, the court turned Moore down, asserting 
that the state did indeed have the legitimate “police power” to protect 
the public health, which the judiciary would not overturn, absent a 
showing that the rules were “arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable.”  
Since the plaintiff had not established that this was case, he would be  
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staying at the sanatorium until he could prove that he was no longer 
dangerous to others. 
 
Rarely in the law is it possible to find a denouement to a case; 
usually, the plaintiff disappears from the record after the court rules, 
and his fate becomes unknown to later readers of the case.  Such was 
not the case with Moore, however.  Almost a decade later, he was back 
before the same tribunal for a return engagement, seeking another 
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that his civil liberties had been 
violated….  In Moore v. Armstrong (supra), the fact pattern clearly 
shows that this unhappy and uncompliant patient was still in state 
custody at its Southwest Tuberculosis Hospital (“Southwest Hospital”) 
in Tampa after all almost 15 years.  Moreover, he was now complaining 
that he was “being confined in a maximum security cell of the hospital 
for long periods of time” without receiving treatment for his TB.  
According to the court, however, the record showed that plaintiff Moore 
had gone AWOL from Southwest Hospital on at least six occasions, had 
abused drugs five times, and had become intoxicated nine times, 
leading to his isolation within the isolation facility.  The record also 
reportedly showed that Moore had not been denied medication while in 
special isolation.   –Thus, opined the judges, Southwest Hospital had 
complied with state statutes in the way it had treated him, and they 
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once more dismissed his petition (without prejudice to his refilling 
again if he improved, and was no longer “dangerous to society”). 
 
After the Armstrong holding, Moore finally does drop out of the 
written record, and his ultimate fate is unknown.           
 
((a)) Analysis of the Moore TB confinement cases 
 On balance, it is clear that Donald Moore was no model patient, 
and he was obviously an exasperation to officialdom—and possibly a 
genuine threat to the public health as well.  On the other hand, the 
case seems unusual—and a bit troubling—in a number of ways:  First, 
it is somewhat doubtful that the state of Florida locked up all its 
consumptives (even its recalcitrant ones)--which leads to the legal 
problem of inequitable enforcement of the laws.   Moreover, the 
lengthy time periods involved in this case—and its time in history—are 
also puzzling:  Moore was confined against his will for a longer time 
span than many murderers, which seems like a rather excessive 
response to his disease and disorderliness.  In addition, it is most 
curious that all of this took place in the 1950s and 1960s—which was 
well into the modern era therapeutically.  It is also surprising medically 
that Moore’s TB did not seem to respond to anti-TB drugs, but maybe 
this was due to his uncooperativeness.  (Surely, some alternative 
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means of handling Moore could have been tried—nowadays, directly-
observed outpatient therapy would clearly be the first choice [q.v.].)  
 
In general, it should be added that Florida had belatedly set up a 
whole system of TB sanatoria that was headed for obsolescence within 
a few years.  It had already become an outmoded concept by the time 
that Moore filed his second petition.  The creaky state institutions that 
had arisen from the bounty of the Cigarette Tax would soon become 
therapeutic backwaters for a dwindling number of patients--and they 
would be shuttered and padlocked not that many years later. 
 
e. The Knowing and Reckless Spread of Contagious Diseases 
 Next, there is another order of contagion-related criminal 
conduct, which would more closely resemble certain non-quarantine-
related criminal acts:  These would include cases wherein individuals 
who knowingly carry infectious pathogens engage in reckless 
behaviors that could transmit those harmful microorganisms to others.  
A classic example of this would be persons who know that they have 
STDs but continue to have unprotected sexual intercourse with 
susceptible partners--particularly if they have not forewarned the later 
of the risk they face. 
236 
 
 
 Among other issues that criminal prosecutors would face in such 
situations would be establishing the requisite “mens rea” (knowing 
mental intent) as well as the “actus reus” (the actual act of 
unprotected intercourse).  The state would have the burden of proof of 
establishing that the infected person acted with a full awareness of his 
or her infection when performing the act that could transmit the 
disease to the other party.  
  
 Arguably, “Typhoid Mary” Mallon was acting in this manner when 
she became aware of her own status as an asymptomatic carrier of 
typhoid, yet persisted in cooking for susceptible families and 
institutions.  Probably, there could be some debate about her knowing 
recklessness before Soper confronted her in 1907, and before she 
underwent the confirmatory examination at Willard Packer Hospital 
(although even before those dates, Mallon’s repeated flight from 
typhoid-stricken homes suggested that she already realized that she 
might be associated in some way with the outbreaks).  In any event, 
Mallon could no longer claim ignorance of the connection after her first 
time in quarantine, and she broke her formal agreement to refrain  
 
237 
 
from resuming her prior occupation, so her subsequent actions would 
clearly meet this standard of culpability.       
  
 These kinds of criminal acts are somewhat different from the 
quarantine-related behaviors discussed previously in connection with 
this “Dimension,” so they are not central to this discussion.  However, 
they do further illustrate the “continuum of culpability” that is involved 
in this Dimension.  In jurisprudential terms, the laws of most 
jurisdictions would consider these acts to be more than malum 
prohibitum (a mere technical violation of procedural laws); they would 
arguably constitute malum in se (i.e., fundamental wrongs against 
some concept of “universal or natural law,” which most societies would 
condemn as violations of “natural” duties to other persons.) This would 
be even truer of the following category of offenses.       
 
f. The Deliberate Transmission of Contagious Diseases 
 Finally, the “culpability spectrum” would culminate in conduct 
that most people—and most legal systems--would consider of 
maximum reprehensibility:  a deliberate effort to transmit 
communicable disease to others.  Evidently, such an act would come 
under the general rubric of “bio-terror,” whether it is done out of a 
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malign individual motive, in service of some remorseless creed, or on 
behalf of a hostile nation (examples of these acts--so far--would 
include the anthrax letter-mailings of 2001, the Rajneeshee cult’s 
reported spreading of salmonellosis in Oregon in 1984, and the 
Japanese Empire’s use of plague bacilli during its war with China in the 
1940s [see, e.g., Amerithrax Investigative Summary, B. Leonard (ed.) 
(Google eBook, 2011), 92 pp.; Christopher GW, “Biological warfare:  A 
historical perspective,” JAMA, 278(5):412-17 (Aug. 6, 1997)]).   In the 
eyes of most systems of law, acts of this kind would clearly be major 
felonies using pathogens as the weapons.           
________________________________________________________ 
E. Summary Statement for Chapter I 
 The foregoing chapter raised a number of themes.  One salient 
theme has been that the broad range of socio-legal controls over 
contagion are distinguishable along a number of fundamental 
Dimensions.  While these Dimensions are complex, and drawing 
generalizations from them must be done with care, several points are 
worth raising (albeit subject to major exceptions):   
 
 A priori, it is important to state again that all socio-legal 
contagion-controls, including quarantines, need to be grounded on a 
strong and up-to-date bio-scientific evidentiary base—much more than 
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was historically the case (and, in some modern jurisdictions, much 
more than is still the case).  Scientific validity of control-procedures is 
evidently vital for achieving the public-protection goals of contagion-
control (as shall be discussed further in the next chapter of this 
Dissertation).   It is also important on grounds of social justice, since 
scientifically-indefensible procedures could not meet even the 
threshold criterion of “rational official action” under American law.  (In 
reality, however, it is usually not a matter of “all-or-nothing,” since the 
science of contagion-control validation generally does not meet a 
Platonic standard of “perfection,” and critical plans and actions will  
necessarily have to be made on the basis of sub-optimal science and 
information.)     
 
 At the legal level, there is also a need to recognize and address, 
as best as reasonably possible, the inherent tensions between the 
fundamental interests that come to the fore in PH and contagion-
control:  On the one hand, there is an eternal tug-of-war between the 
basic interests of collectivities and those of individuals—while this 
conflict appears in many areas of life and law (such as conscriptions 
and penology), contagion-control has long been a fundamental arena.  
To the best extent possible, lawmakers and PH authorities should 
ground all contagion-control interventions on modern jurisprudential 
240 
 
views of individual and group rights.  There is also a need to recognize 
the inherent power-conflicts between politico-legal jurisdictions 
(including central governments versus provincial/state governments, 
and the international community versus individual nation-states)—
which also appear in the field of contagion-control, among many other 
arenas of human affairs; it is vital to develop and apply contagion-
control procedures in accordance with international law and with a 
vaster vision of global health and safety.  
 
 There is nothing easy about balancing any of these equities.  A 
sensitive and informed understanding of the socio-behavioral aspects 
of contagion-control can certainly help:  To the extent that there are 
some commonalities of interest between entities (for example, all 
humans and their jurisdictions have some interest in not contracting or 
spreading infectious diseases), these can be stressed in making 
policies and laws and in administering them.  For example, some 
degree of contagion-control can be accomplished at the individual level 
by social-marketing techniques, which utilize an exhortatory approach 
to impeding the inter-personal transmission of pathogens (e.g., 
schools and employers can urge children and workers to stay home if 
they feel ill, and they can urge them to cover their sneezes in public 
places).  In the end, however, some degree of conflict between human 
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interests will be inevitable; it is incumbent on policy-makers, 
lawmakers, and administrators to recognize this, and to develop and 
implement contagion-control procedures that soften the grinding 
confrontation between them.  Reality again intrudes here:  Many PH 
policies—and especially PH actions—will have to be set up and 
implemented under epidemic conditions of intense social stress, 
confusion, and urgency, … which leaves only the reasonable 
requirement that governments undertake as much integrated policy- 
making, lawmaking, and practice in advance of crises as possible.  
Some chaos will happen anyway; mitigation of it is the goal.     
  
 All of the fundamental “Dimensions” discussed in this chapter 
have an impact on the foregoing policy considerations.  To some 
extent, of course, considerations of scientific validity, ethical-legal 
justice, and social impact are always present in contagion-controls, 
even if those controls only affect a few people mildly and briefly.  On 
the other hand, the “Deeper” the contagion-controls are (i.e., the 
more intensive or strict their restrictions); the “Broader” the controls 
are (i.e., the larger the groups or jurisdictions they cover); and the 
longer the controls operate “Temporally” (i.e., the lengthier their 
durations), the more socially adverse are the impacts of unconsidered 
and unplanned programs.  “Purpose” and “Culpability” considerations 
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are crucial here, too.  As has been seen, extreme injustice can come 
from quarantining leprosy patients on a barren lava-flow for life to 
protect a broader society from them, when the sufferers are guilty of 
no offense but that of illness.  While area quarantines might be less 
intensive for affected individuals, quarantining a whole district, city, or 
state because of an outbreak within its borders can also wreak obvious 
havoc on a vast scale.  Circumstances of these kinds would clearly 
lower the threshold for tolerable inadequacies in controls.        
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CHAPTER II:  “ON CONTAGION”: 
A WORKING TAXONOMY OF CONTAGIONS 
 
A. Note on Nomenclature—Definitions of “Contagions” and 
Other Terms 
 For purposes of this Dissertation, the terms “contagious disease” 
(or “contagion”), “communicable disease,” and “infectious disease” will 
be used in a roughly synonymous way, although it is recognized that 
some classificatory systems define them to mean different specific 
phenomena.  For example, some schemes regard “contagion” as an old 
term that only referred to tactile contact between primary and 
secondary cases (i.e., “Type III” diseases--see below; also see, e.g., 
Booker 2007, at 510-11); that is not the usage here.  (Because the 
context of history is important in this work, older terms such as 
“plagues,” “pestilences,” and “scourges” will also be used here 
periodically to describe such infectious diseases—especially when they 
were ones that could cause severe symptoms, and could have 
widespread prevalence). 
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One classical medical dictionary (Dorland’s Illustrated Medical 
Dictionary [Philadelphia:  W. B. Saunders, 1994--, 28th-- ed., at 838]) 
defined an “infectious disease” as one that was “caused by or capable 
of being communicated by infection,” and it defined “infection” to 
mean an 
invasion and multiplication of microorganisms in body tissues,  
which may be clinically inapparent or result in local cellular injury  
due to competitive metabolism, toxins, intracellular replication,   
or antigen-antibody response.  The infection may remain 
localized, subclinical, and temporary, if the body’s defense 
mechanisms are effective.  A local infection may persist and 
spread by extension to become an acute, subacute, or chronic 
clinical infection or disease state.  A local infection may also 
become systemic when the microorganisms gain access to the 
lymphatic or vascular system 
 
(Id., at 837-38).  Elsewhere, this source defined “communicable 
diseases” and “contagious diseases” as those that were “capable of 
being transmitted from one individual to another” (Id., at 359, 372).  
These definitions are close to the broadly inclusive one that will be 
used here--though not necessarily identical with the instant usage.  
(For example, the concept of invasion by “microorganisms” per se may 
be a bit limiting for present purposes.  Some important pathogenic 
organisms are macro-parasites—far larger in size than microbes.  For 
example, the historically-destructive guinea worm of Africa could 
become highly visible during the adult phase of its life-cycle—some 
victims would actually pull these worms out of their own skins by 
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hand, twirling them around sticks.  While such parasitic diseases were 
not usually the subject of quarantines, some of them could at least 
theoretically be grounds for some kinds of socio-behavioral controls.)     
  
 Another definition of a “communicable” or “infectious” disease is 
also partly relevant here: 
 [a]n illness due to a specific infectious agent or its toxic products  
that arises through transmission of that agent or its products 
from an infected person, animal or inanimate source to a 
susceptible host; either directly or indirectly through an 
intermediate plant or animal host, through a vector, or through 
contact with the inanimate environment 
 
(Control of Communicable Diseases Manual, Heymann D L [ed.], 19th 
ed. [Washington, D.C.:  Amer. Pub. Hlth. Assn., 2008], at 704; 
emphases supplied; hereinafter, “CCDM”).   In this instance, though, 
the definition is somewhat too expansive for this Dissertation’s 
purposes, since—as shall be shown below—the instant schema will 
only encompass some transmissible diseases that involve animal 
sources or intermediate hosts, and it will generally not include the 
toxic products of pathogens, plant hosts or sources, or inanimate 
sources such as soil (although there are exceptions to this 
generalization, including hookworm disease, which uses soil as a 
vehicle).  As will be seen, these limitations reflect the emphasis in this 
Dissertation on quarantines and other socio-behavioral measures that 
are used to impede human-to-human transmission of pathogens.     
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B.  Caveats 
Before proceeding further, however, it is important to stress 
some qualifying caveats to the proposed model: 
 
1. The Present Taxonomy Is Functional Rather than 
Biologically-Specific 
First, the present model is an operational model rather than a 
scientific taxonomy.  Rather than taking cognizance of all complex 
biological (and societal) aspects of each disease, it aims primarily to 
provide a simple tool to guide legislators and administrators in drafting 
disease-control-statutes, ordinances, and regulations (and to guide the 
implementation of those laws).  Hopefully, it would enable such policy-
makers to stick closer to general scientific thinking in place at the time 
they draft or revise laws, rather than relying on antique lines of 
thinking in medicine and law.  (In too many jurisdictions, as was 
shown in the last Chapter, numerous laws that are still in force—even if 
rarely implemented—enshrine archaic understandings of contagion.) 
 
2. Controversy Is Almost Ubiquitous in Science   
It is crucial to emphasize that much of science is not “revealed 
Truth,” dogmatically accepted by everyone (or, at least, it should not 
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be).  To the extent that it is practiced correctly--and does not fall into 
the hands of authority figures (who can institutionalize dogma by force 
of their political or social status), science is an arena.  In it, there are 
often many rival theories and interpretations of phenomena.  To the 
degree possible (allowing realistically for human and group frailties), 
ideas should be made to compete and seek validation according to 
generally-accepted principles, such as the Scientific Method.  Another 
consideration might be Karl Popper’s proposal that scientific theories 
be intrinsically testable and possibly disprovable.  
 
Thus, the Algorithm to be presented here will allow for 
uncertainty and controversy in many of its premises.  (Historically, for 
example, there was intense disagreement in biomedical circles about 
whether tuberculosis was a communicable or a hereditary disease.  It 
was not till the last decades of the 19th century that the discovery of 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis resolved the issue for the majority of 
scientists.)  It will be accepted that assumptions made about the 
nature of individual diseases are not immutable, but should be 
routinely revised as scientific understanding changes. 
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3.  The Only Certain Generalization Is the Generalization to 
 Be Wary of Rigid Generalizations 
Next, this Model will also acknowledge the complexity of nature:  
It is recognized here that diseases are not uniform in all 
circumstances.  The interplay of pathogens, individual human hosts, 
and their environments can vary greatly from encounter to encounter, 
depending on such variables as host genetics and immunity, pathogen 
viability, and extent of exposure.  Thus, any generalizations made 
about contagions will almost invariably be rife with exceptions.  (For 
example, to say that “the common cold” is generally a mild disease is 
to still acknowledge that, on occasion, it might be a severe illness with 
lasting or even deadly sequelae—especially in immunocompromised 
persons.)  Still, in making policy, generalizations must be made 
(preferably on proper statistical grounds), while allowance should be 
made to the extent reasonable for individual situational variations.  
Similarly, Absolute Dichotomies are rarer than Continua in science.  For 
ease of handling, however, this Model will favor the use of discrete 
categories rather than continua, although it is recognized that they 
may cause a certain loss of information. 
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4.  Nature Is in Continual Flux—and Science Is as Well (or at 
 Least It Should Be) 
Similarly, a good functional system will acknowledge that nature 
and bioscience are not just complex, they are also in constant flux:  
Circumstances will inevitably change with time in both.  –For example, 
even if a particular disease (such as gonorrhoea) is readily treatable at 
present with antibiotics, the causative pathogens might increasingly 
develop resistance to them with the passage of time—till, at some 
unspecific point, those drugs are largely unable to cure it (see, e.g., 
Bolan, Sparling, & Wasserheit, 2012).  Separately, it may be correct at 
one point in time to state that there is no effective vaccine for a 
disease (such as Ebola Haemorrhagic  Fever)—but one may (hopefully) 
be developed at a later date.  In practical policy-making, it will be 
accepted that laws must react to a current state of affairs, which will 
change.  Since, realistically, legislators and administrators do not 
revisit laws on a continuing basis, they should be drafted so that they 
will remain at least reasonably scientifically valid for some period of 
time. 
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5.  Differences between Law and Science—Present, but 
Hopefully Not Irreconcilable 
It is worth pointing out here that science and law have 
fundamentally different perspectives, concepts, methods, languages, 
and pace:  In general (though not invariably), science moves rapidly, 
while law moves slowly.  Science nominally--if not always in practice—
should rely on “objective” evaluation processes for theories about 
natural phenomena.  By contrast, law --or at least the part of law that 
is made by judges--follows the principle of stare decisis (i.e., it seeks 
to conform as much as possible to the force of precedential authority 
from higher and prior courts).  Nevertheless, science and law must 
often meet in modern complex societies, often under conditions of 
import and urgency.  Hence, the goal here is to find ways to surmount 
the intrinsic differences between these fields, and enable them to work 
reasonably well together.  Good science needs to inform good law-
making.  For example, current demonstrated evidence on the hazards 
of a chemical, or of a product, should inform the development of 
standards for acceptable levels of that chemical in the workplace, and 
should inform standards of safety for that product in the marketplace.  
There will probably always be frictions between the disciplines of law 
and science, and between their practitioners, but the goal is to find  
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some modus vivendi that can bridge them—at least for the purposes of 
making effective and just social policies and laws.          
 
 C. An Evidentiary Basis for Contagion-Controls 
 As was stressed above, one of the fundamental objectives of this 
Dissertation is to urge that a system of integrated contagion-control be 
grounded on a solid scientific evidentiary base, at least to the best 
extent that this can be reasonably and practically done.   
  
 This general mission statement would (as noted previously) 
apply to the whole broad spectrum of biomedical and public health 
responses to contagion.  Obviously, this would include such 
technological controls as immunizations and pharmacotherapies, which 
it is now well-recognized must have strong validation—but it should 
also apply to the panoply of socio-behavioral “defenses” against 
contagion, which extend across the “Dimension” of “Depth” (or 
“Severity”) from social education/exhortation to strict and classic 
quarantines.  Arguably, the more intense and intrusive the PH 
intervention, the more crucial is a solid scientific justification. 
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 In keeping with the “Caveats” presented above, it is 
acknowledged again that nature and science are generally not static, 
so policy-makers, law-makers, and administrators can only hope to 
“freeze a moment” in natural and scientific time, basing their 
contagion-control system on conditions and understandings that exist 
at that point in time.  It is hoped that they would build some flexibility 
into their policies, statutes, regulations, and practices to allow for 
some degree of evolution in nature and knowledge, and it is further 
hoped that they would also establish some proactive procedures for 
periodically revisiting the laws—and revising them as needed.  (Of 
course, the cold realities of politics and law come into play here, too, 
and it must be recognized that the multiple distractions of the 
legislative process may not always favor such optimal laws and 
procedures.) 
   
 It would be worthwhile here to briefly consider some of the 
current evidentiary grounds for quarantines and other socio-behavioral 
controls over contagion.  This is not meant to be a totally 
comprehensive recitation of all evidence on the subject, but a sketch 
of some of the present knowledge base that can ground updated laws 
and practices.  
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 In general, it is fair to say that the extant evidentiary basis for 
quarantines and other socio-behavioral contagion-controls is spotty, 
with some of their foundations being stronger than others.  
Realistically, researchers are always recommending a need for more 
research, and there could never be a true limit on the knowledge that 
could optimally be added.  Nevertheless, it would arguably be 
desirable to use the remaining time before the next pandemic to 
expand the knowledge base for contagion-controls.   
 
________________________________________________________ 
D.  A Brief Review of Existing Contagion-Control Evidence 
 The body of evidence validating contagion controls (or not) could 
be generally categorized in three basic ways—in terms of major 
historical formative epidemic diseases, in terms of the contagion-
control measures themselves, or in terms of the analytic methods used 
for describing and evaluating those measures.  In a summary way, this 
Dissertation will review all three categories.    
 
1.  Anecdotal Evidence 
 Much of the historic evidence on the effectiveness of quarantines 
and other controls has been anecdotal in character.  This is not 
surprising, given the very ancient nature of communicable diseases 
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and the human responses to them, which long preceded the Western 
scientific method of validation:  Epidemics threatened human life and 
welfare--and quarantine-type measures were marshaled against them-
-for many centuries before biostatistics and clinical trials were 
developed as the “gold standards” for evaluating such contagion-
controls.  Ironically, by the time that the scientific method had fully 
“come of age” in the mid-20th century, the “Window Era” of freedom-
from-epidemics (see Chapter I, above) had opened in the West, and 
quarantines were increasingly viewed as outdated and not worthy of 
research attention.  Thus, one needs to clearly recognize the 
limitations of this anecdotal body of historic evidence. 
 
  Notwithstanding the above, it still seems appropriate to draw 
from the imperfect-wisdom of mankind’s long battle with pathogens, 
since it can sometimes provide insights that could still be useful in 
practice (at least pending more scientific evaluations).  
 
2.  Independent Variables 
 In assessing the effectiveness of public health interventions 
during an epidemic, the set of socio-behavioral controls (a.k.a., “non-
pharmaceutical interventions,” or “NPIs”) themselves would, of course, 
constitute the independent variables. 
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3.  Dependent Variables 
 Several fundamental aspects of epidemic dynamics could be 
considered as dependent variables.  Inter alia, these would include the 
timing of the peaks of incidence and mortality (in the case of pandemic 
flu, the latter might be “excess death rate” over the population’s 
normative death rate), the mortality rate or excess death rate at the 
peak, and the cumulative mortality rate or excess death rate for the 
entire epidemic. 
  
4.  Historical Analyses, Epidemic Modeling, Observational and 
Clinical Studies 
 In recent years, however, the attention of researchers, policy-
makers, members of the press, and the public has increasingly 
returned to the threat of infectious diseases.   
  
 As was noted previously, a web of circumstances in the 1990s--
natural and human behavioral--combined to promote this re-emerging 
threat (among many other intertwined environmental, host, and 
pathogen variables, these probably included climate change, human 
intrusions into new micro-settings, the burgeoning human population, 
and the movements of human and animal vectors).  As a result, some 
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historic diseases returned to areas and populations where they had 
long been absent or limited in incidence (in the New World, these 
included dengue fever, pertussis, and cholera).  Some of the 
pathogens involved had also acquired resistance to antimicrobial 
agents (among these were Mycobacterium tuberculosis and methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus).  Meanwhile, some new or previously 
unrecognized pathogens appeared, in some cases causing highly lethal 
syndromes (among others, there were the Ebola and Marburg 
flaviviruses, hantavirus, and Nipah virus).  To worsen widespread 
public and professional fears, some governments, groups, and 
individuals acquired the motivation and the means to use pathogens as 
instruments of terror (examples included the USSR/Russia’s 
Biopreparat at least into the 1990s, Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, 
and the American anthrax-letter mailer in 2001).                 
  
 Towards the end of the decade, there was another major 
prospective danger:  In 1997, a highly pathogenic mutation of A 
(“HPAI”) H5N1 influenza virus appeared in the poultry markets of Hong 
Kong, killing many birds and a number of people associated with the 
trade.  As is now widely known, this avian strain of flu proved to have 
an extraordinarily high case-fatality rate in humans (ranging around 
60% in some outbreaks—which can be contrasted with the estimated 
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2.5% case-fatality rate of the deadly 1918-19 pandemic).  The 1997 
Hong Kong outbreak was abated by an aggressive campaign of fowl 
slaughtering, but the virus reappeared widely in wild and domestic 
birds during the early 21st century, and in some 600 human cases that 
presented the same high lethality.   While this strain of influenza virus 
has not yet developed the capacity to spread efficiently between 
people, it has raised alarm bells in the public health world, and it has 
stimulated a degree of proactive thinking and planning against a future 
pandemic. 
  
 Amidst this high degree of scientific and popular attention and 
alarm, two notable epidemic events occurred during the first decade of 
the new millennium that seemed at first to confirm the fears:  the 
outbreak of SARS in China during 2002-03, and the emergence of 
A/H1N1influenza in Mexico during 2009.  As things turned out, the 
SARS epidemic proved to be highly lethal--with an approximately 14% 
general case-fatality rate, but it was relatively limited in geographic 
scope (although this was arguably a close-run thing); and the H1N1 
influenza outbreak rapidly morphed into a WHO-Stage 6 pandemic, but 
it did not provoke mortality rates in most population groups that much 
exceeded those of seasonal influenza.  Nevertheless, both episodes 
further stimulated efforts in some quarters to prepare controls for the 
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anticipated “Big One” to come (probably mutated or reassorted HPAI 
A/H5N1).  While popular and press interest—always transient—
appeared to oscillate somewhat, a number of scientists, governments, 
international agencies, and NGOs continued efforts to draft laws and 
plans for the future.  There continues to be much fragmentation and 
great variability in these plans, however.   
 
 Thus, there has been a rising interest in evaluating various 
counter-measures to contagion, including some socio-behavioral 
interventions.  There is now a relatively limited--but growing—body of 
scientific literature that has sought to validate these procedures.  So 
far, this research has mainly taken two forms:  retrospective analyses 
of historical epidemic controls (particularly backward looks at the 
Spanish Influenza pandemic of 1918-19) and mathematical modelling 
of possible future outbreaks and their controls (especially pandemic 
flu).  In addition, there have been some observational studies 
conducted in “real time” (principally relating to the SARS and A/H1N1-
2009 epidemics), though these have been limited in numbers and 
methodology.          
 
 Even today, some hard realities make it hard to subject a 
number of quarantine-type procedures to rigid scientific testing.  A 
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priori, ethical considerations would certainly restrict the range of 
properly-controlled studies of quarantines that could be performed.  
Funding limitations would exert other hard constraints on such 
research.  It has long been a human reality that most attention is paid 
to threats when they are imminent—and, at that point in epidemic 
developments, conditions may become too chaotic and unclear to allow 
for clear-sighted research assessments that are best done in times of 
quiet. 
 
a.  Retrospective Analyses of Spanish Influenza Control 
 Measures 
 Several researchers have delved into existing records from the 
Spanish Influenza pandemic to try to learn whether any interventions 
were effective in 1918-19 and could be effective again against a future 
pandemic.  In part, they have utilized some natural experiments that 
appeared in various places across the afflicted globe during the plague 
year, allowing a rough sort of comparability between intervention-
groups and non-intervention-groups.  It should be noted, though, that 
the different cases often varied considerably in the available data and 
in the comparability of the examined groups. 
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 Hatcher, Mecher, and Lipsitch (2007) reviewed the data from 
some 17 American cities that suffered major outbreaks of Spanish 
Influenza in late 1918.  They concluded that the ones that aggressively 
and quickly imposed some non-pharmaceutical interventions (from a 
set of 19 possible “NPIs,” i.e., socio-behavioral contagion-controls) 
wound up with peak death rates that were about 50% lower than the 
cities that did not act in this way.  Also, the early-intervening cities 
experienced less-steep epidemic curves than the latter, and they had 
lower cumulative excess mortality than the latter.  While early 
application of the NPIs that closed theaters, schools, and churches 
were correlated with reductions in peak death rates, no single NPI was 
associated with major reductions in epidemic impacts.  Moreover, once 
the cities lifted their NPIs (generally within just two to eight weeks), 
they frequently experienced new epidemic waves of influenza.    
  
 Separately, Markel and his associates examined mortality data 
for 43 American cities (as published in the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Weekly Health Index during the 1918-19 period), and they reached 
some broadly similar conclusions.  These researchers found that there 
was considerable variation between the cities in the anti-flu 
interventions that they used, in the way that the cities implemented 
those measures, and in the influenza-related outcomes that they 
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suffered.  All of the 43 municipalities imposed one or more NPIs--viz., 
school closures, bans on social gatherings, and quarantine/isolation 
measures, with 33 of them ordering the first two of these types of 
interventions and 15 of them employing all of these intervention 
measures, for a median period of four weeks.  While most of the city 
governments responded to the epidemic threat reactively rather than 
proactively, those that started their socio-behavioral controls at earlier 
phases of their outbreaks had later and lower epidemic mortality peaks 
and lower total numbers of deaths; also, those that intervened longer 
had fewer overall deaths.  Moreover, some NPIs seemed to be 
associated with better outcomes than others, and cities that employed 
combined (or “layered”) strategies appeared to fare the best (e.g., 
Markel H, Stern AM, & Cetron MS, “Thomas E. Woodward Award:  Non-
pharmaceutical interventions employed by major American cities 
during the 1918-19 influenza pandemic,” Trans. Am. Climatol. Assoc., 
119:129-142 [2008]; Markel et al., “Nonpharmaceutical interventions 
implemented by US cities during the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic,” 
JAMA, 298(6): 644-654 [8/8/07]).          
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b.  A Tale of Two Cities in the Time of Flu:  Philadelphia and 
 St. Louis 
 The contrast in contagion-control actions and their possible 
impacts appeared most starkly when two particular cities were 
compared:  The municipal governments of Philadelphia and St. Louis 
reacted very differently to the looming danger of Spanish Influenza, 
and the cities suffered relatively different impacts from the disease.  
(Of course, such associations between actions and outcomes do not 
necessarily imply a causative effect.  Moreover, this tale of two cities 
was not a scientifically-controlled situation, and there were many 
potential confounding variables.) (see, e.g., Markel et al., 2007; Smith 
R, “Social measures may control pandemic flu,” Brit. Med. J., 
334[7608]:1341 [6/30/07]; Hatcher, Mecher, and Lipsitch (2007); 
Kalnins I, “The Spanish Influenza of 1918 in St. Louis, Missouri,” Public 
Health Nursing, 23(5): 479-483 [Sep./Oct. 2006], 
onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/doi, at 1-9, accessed 
11/17/11).    
  
 As is typical of influenza pandemics, Spanish flu first broke out in 
scattered parts of the country during a relatively limited springtime 
prodromal wave.  This abated without causing widespread mortality. 
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 However, the next wave of the new pandemic would be different.  
Not surprisingly, perhaps, it first became highly manifest in military 
bases along the eastern seaboard, where sailors and soldiers were 
preparing to sail to the battlefronts, or disembarking after service 
there.  A military doctor at Fort Devens, Massachusetts described the 
new disease’s impact in phenomenological terms: 
This epidemic started about four weeks ago, and has developed 
so rapidly that the camp is demoralized and all ordinary work is 
held up till it has passed…. These men start with what appears to 
be an ordinary case of La Grippe or Influenza, and when brought 
to the Hosp. they very rapidly develop the most viscous [?] type 
of Pneumonia that has ever been seen.  Two hours after 
admission they have the Mahogany spots over the cheek bones, 
and a few hours later you can begin to see the Cyanosis 
extending from their ears and spreading all over the face, until it 
is hard to distinguish the coloured men from the white.  It is only 
a matter of a few hours then until death comes, and it is simply 
a struggle for air until they suffocate.  It is horrible.  One can 
stand it to see one, two or twenty men die, but to see these poor 
devils dropping like flies sort of gets on your nerves.  We have 
been averaging about 100 deaths per day, and still keeping it  
up.  There is no doubt in my mind that there is a new mixed 
infection here, but what I don’t know….  We have lost an 
outrageous number of Nurses and Drs.…  It takes special trains 
to carry away the dead.  For several days there were no coffins 
and the bodies piled up something fierce, we used to go down to 
the morgue (which is just back of my ward) and look at the boys 
laid out in long rows.  It beats any sight they ever had in France 
after a battle.  An extra long barracks has been vacated for the 
use of the Morgue, and it would make any man sit up and take 
notice to walk down the long lines of dead soldiers all dressed 
and laid out in double rows… 
 
(www.1918.pandemicflu.gov, accessed 6/2/11). 
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 In mid-September, the initial reported cases of the deadly 
second wave of Spanish flu appeared in Philadelphia.  A well-prepared 
city administration would have considered such index cases to be 
klaxons in the night, calling for prompt interventions, but Philadelphia’s 
city fathers seem to have missed this opportunity.  (They were hardly 
alone in this respect.)  Instead of closing down public places and 
forbidding collective activities, the city held a patriotic parade on 
September 28.  During the intervening period, influenza virus had the 
opportunity to double its spread almost three to five times.  In any 
event, the pestilence had become barely controllable by the time the 
city’s health authorities did shut down the schools and proscribed 
collective gatherings on October 3.  Eventually, the second wave of flu 
and probably-associated pneumonias claimed, at its peak, the lives of 
some 257 out of every 100,000 Philadelphians (beyond expected 
levels), with a cumulative excess rate of pneumonia and influenza 
deaths of 719 per 100,000 by December 28 (Hatchett , Mecher, & 
Lipsitch, 2007, at 7582)   
         
 Philadelphia’s response to Spanish flu can be contrasted with 
that of St. Louis’s health administration:  At least by his own account, 
Health Commissioner Max C. Starkloff took a number of vigorous steps 
to mitigate the impact of flu in the old Mississippi River port (Annual 
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Report of the Division of Health of the Department of Public Welfare, 
City of St. Louis for the Fiscal Year 1918-1919, cited by Kalnins 2007, 
at 3-7).  These included mandating the reporting of Spanish flu by 
early September (using schoolteachers and others as volunteer data-
tabulators), and incepting an Influenza Advisory Committee comprised 
of major civic and private stakeholders on October 7.  This Committee 
affirmed Starkloff’s authority to shut down schools, entertainment 
places, and even churches, and he promptly did so (although he 
initially allowed other businesses to continue their operations); he also 
limited crowding on elevators and trams.  The St. Louis Health Division 
also imposed strict quarantine/isolations on individuals, generally in 
situ--with the placarding of afflicted homes as in other disease 
epidemics.  City policemen were charged with enforcing these social-
distancing and quarantining directives.  In addition, Starkloff used less 
severe methods of contagion-containment, including public education, 
free vaccination (these early vaccines were actually medically 
ineffective), and intensive public health nursing (nurses conducted 
some 14,359 visits between October 21 and December 15 [Kalnins 
2007, citing Starkloff 1919]).  As a possible consequence of this 
coterie of active interventions, St. Louis wound up with a peak weekly 
excess pneumonia/influenza death rate of 31 per 100,000 and a  
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cumulative excess pneumonia/influenza death rate of 347 per 100,000 
(statistically lower than Philadelphia’s rates, cited above). 
 
 It should be noted, however, that St. Louis’s epidemic was a 
complex episode, with a second peak in mortality appearing in late 
November.  This course of events could be interpreted in various 
alternative ways.  One iconoclastic possibility is that the epidemic’s 
dates of onset and full expression in St. Louis were simply delayed by 
the city’s location, rather than reflecting its civic government’s 
interventions in any way.  According to this argument, St. Louis had a 
geographic advantage over Philadelphia (and some other badly-
stricken cities of the east, such as Boston):  Located deep in the 
American Midwest, St. Louis enjoyed a simple time lag before the 
second wave of the new plague arrived in its city limits (see, e.g., 
Hatchett, Mecher, & Lipsitch 2007, at 7583, who found a correlation 
between cities’ longitudes and their peak excess mortality rates).  The 
first recorded St. Louis victims of Spanish flu did become symptomatic 
some time between September 20 and October 6—three days after 
Philadelphia belatedly implemented its own social-distancing measures 
(and after the Philadelphia epidemic was already almost beyond 
containment).  There might be a degree of validity to this 
supposition—but the contribution of this epidemiological “grace period” 
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should not be over-emphasized.  It would seem unlikely that even in 
1918 western American cities would be very long protected from the 
active rail and early motorized commerce of the day bringing travelers 
from the infected seaport cities of the east (this rapid interconnection 
between cities would be particularly true nowadays, when travel 
between American regions is much faster, and no war effort would 
demand priority of transport over civilian needs). 
 
   In any event, the main difference between the cities in the east 
with higher peak death rates, and the ones in the west with lower 
ones, appears to have been the ability of some western civic 
authorities (including St. Louis’s) to actively monitor events in the 
east, learn from the calamities that were developing there, and take 
some proactive measures (see, e.g., Hatchett, Mecher, & Lipsitch 
2007).  
 
 Another interpretation of the St. Louis story might be that its 
governmental interventions did work—but they were not maintained 
with enough vigor.  In reality, St. Louis’s campaign against Spanish flu 
was not smooth and trouble-free (as such efforts rarely are).  Among 
other things, the history of this city’s intervention program may have 
illustrated the principle (discussed above) that contagion-controls 
268 
 
cannot be safely ceased too soon:  As often happens, social, political, 
and legal pressures began to mount, and the city government 
relented, allowing spontaneous mass gatherings to celebrate the 
Armistice on November 11, and reopening the public schools two days 
later.  However, influenza virus was not yet vanquished like the Central 
Powers—it roared back among the city’s remaining susceptibles two 
weeks later, creating a second peak in deaths, and forcing a hasty 
reclosure of the schools and a renewed ban on gatherings (Kalnins 
2007).   
 
 The latter interpretation of St. Louis’s epidemic seems likelier—
the city’s interventions were somewhat effective, but too brief.  In 
keeping with some recent epidemic models, it appears that the city’s 
active campaign against flu—which was discontinued too soon--helped 
create a bimodal epidemic, with a consequential pushing of the 
epidemic’s peak to a later phase.  There were still enough susceptible 
people in the river city who could be made ill by the virus after its 
worst depredations had abated elsewhere in the country. 
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c.  The Impacts of Delaying the Onset and Peaks of 
Epidemics 
 In any event, it is possible that the length of a delay in an 
epidemic’s first appearance and in its peak could have some important 
impacts due to pathogen and host variables. 
 
 At a pathobiological level, a short delay in the epidemic’s onset 
might not have a major effect on its morbidity and mortality levels.  
However, this can vary with the nature of the pathogen.  Influenza-A 
virus is highly mutable, and its various strains are prone to 
reassortment with other strains, so it is possible that it could evolve 
during a relatively brief period of time.  It has been seen that a delay 
of about a year may have saved the populace of American Samoa from 
mass death due to Spanish Influenza:  the islands’ protective 
quarantine-against-the-world delayed the virus’s arrival on their shores 
until 1920 when it had become highly attenuated and host-adapted.  
Of course, influenza-A virus’s plastic capacity to evolve could cut both 
ways—over time, it could also become more transmissible and/or 
harmful rather than less so. 
  
 On the other hand, a number of flu-modelers have opined that—
for reasons of human bio-medical and social response--NPIs could be 
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vary valuable if they managed to delay an epidemic’s arrival and peak 
in the world or in a community, even for a short time. 
  
 In part, this value has to do with mankind’s biomedical gain from 
such a delay.  This benefit would not have been so great in 1918-19, 
when biomedicine had only a faint understanding of influenza and no 
clear technological pathways for developing effective techniques to 
prevent and/or treat it.  Thus, any time brought by a delay could not 
have gained mankind much technological advantage over the virus.  
Nowadays, by contrast, the time brought by NPIs could be invaluable 
to allow research science to identify the pathogen and to develop 
vaccines and/or drugs against it.  The 2003 story of SARS clearly 
illustrated how fast modern science can sometimes work for identifying 
and isolating a pathogen—in that case, international research efforts 
elucidated the causative SARS-coronavirus within a mere matter of 
weeks.  Of course, the international SARS outbreak ultimately abated 
without necessitating any high-tech responses, so no one made any 
major efforts to develop preventative agents or medications against 
this particular disease.  On the other hand, present-day influenza 
vaccine science would clearly benefit from any time-delay in the 
spread of a new flu virus strain, since this would provide a crucial  
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period of time to engineer a strain-specific vaccine, manufacture it, 
and distribute it widely. 
   
 Even in 1918, however, if NPIs had secured a delay or a 
protraction of an epidemic’s peak morbidity and mortality, they could 
have rendered a valuable service in some localities.  This relates to the 
surge capacity of social responses:  Even with good planning (which 
was rarely practiced in 1918), emergencies will invariably produce a 
certain amount of chaos.  A community can become quickly 
overwhelmed by a sudden mass increase in cases of severe disease.  
Such an event can disrupt the society in multiple ways, including 
impairing its capacity to treat the mass of new patients at once.  Thus, 
effective NPIs at the onset of an outbreak could buy a country or a 
community valuable time to make social and medical responses that 
are more rational, efficient, and tailored to the situation.  
          
  It will be recalled (above, Chapter I) that Tang et al. (2010) 
similarly claimed that—during the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic—the 
Mainland Chinese authorities ran the rather draconian Fengxiao 
university-wide quarantine “too mildly” by starting it late and not 
maintaining it long enough, which these researchers alleged allowed a  
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bimodal epidemic to develop in the non-quarantined community 
outside the campuses.                
 
________________________________________________________  
E.  A Model of Contagions (For Control Purposes) 
 Before any outbreaks of communicable disease, it is vital for 
policy-makers to have a prepared plan.  Among its early components 
when a contagion emerges (especially if it appears to be new in 
character), will be to develop a standardized case-definition.  Such a 
definition will collect all the known variables—including the apparent 
common symptoms (subjective reports of discomfort and illness 
behaviors) and signs (more objective overt indicators, such as skin 
lesions in measles, or laboratory test findings--if available, such as 
polymerase chain reaction testing in chlamydial infections [e.g., CCDM 
2008, at 117]). 
  
 Perhaps consideration of the following “Dimensions” will help:            
 
Under this schema, the normative character of contagions in 
nature will first be assessed to determine if they meet certain 
enumerated criteria for the appropriate use of quarantine-type control  
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measures (“Quarantine-Deciding Dimensions”). These factors 
would be:  
(1)   Degree of Clinical Severity (in the majority of cases)  
(2)      Modes of Transmission (usual); 
 (3)     Intensivity of Contagiosity--and Other Characteristics 
in Epidemic Circumstances (normative);  
(4)    Duration of Infectiousness and Clinical Manifestation 
(in the majority of cases). 
 
        In addition, each contagion would be assessed in light of present 
bio-medical circumstances to determine whether these PH conditions 
would underscore a need for quarantining to control the disease.  In 
other words, quarantines could always be used in the case of such 
contagions (legal and socio-cultural conditions permitting), at least as 
part of a multi-pronged control strategy—but some circumstances 
would make quarantines particularly crucial in helping to bring 
outbreaks under control (“Quarantine-Supporting Factors”).  These 
factors would include the following six Dimensions: 
(5)   Virulence Factors—Pathogen Survival in the External and 
Internal Environments (in usual circumstances); 
(6)   Host Susceptibility Variables—notably, whether any 
Human Groups Are Exceptionally Susceptible to the Disease (and 
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whether those susceptibilities—or even merely perceived 
susceptibilities--have socially stigmatizing impacts).   
        Biomedical Variables, including notably the following 
four Dimensions, which relate to the existing state of disease-control 
technology:  
(7)   Whether or Not the Causative Agent Has Been 
Identified (and with what degree of scientific assurance);  
(8)   Whether or Not There Is Currently an Effective 
Diagnostic Method or Methods (and how reliable and valid 
they may be);  
(9)   Whether or Not There Is Currently an Effective 
Prophylactic Method or Methods (and their degree of 
effectiveness);  
(10)   Whether or Not There Is Currently an Effective 
Treatment Method or Methods (and their degree of 
effectiveness); 
 
Related to the above are questions of whether or not there are 
any animal reservoirs for the causative pathogen--and their known 
importance in human disease spread, and, particularly importantly, 
whether or not there has been an identified human asymptomatic 
carrier state--and its known importance in human disease spread.  
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(These factors will be considered in connection with the various above 
Dimensions.) 
 
No doubt, other variables could be added to this model, but 
these will form its operational basis.  (While some of the concepts to 
be presented in this model have some commonalities with 
categorizations of disease in standard use, this model will present 
taxonomies that differ from standard usages in their specifics, 
combinations, and applications.)                 
 
 1.  “Severity” Dimension of Contagions 
 
First, communicable diseases can be generally distinguished 
along a Dimension of potential “Severity.”  This is a crucial threshold 
issue in deciding whether or not to impose quarantines, and—if so—
what kinds:  There would be little justification for imposing restrictive 
controls over behavior in order to curb diseases that do not generally 
have severe effects.   
 
It should be stressed, however, that the terms “Severity of 
Contagions” need to be defined more specifically for operational 
purposes, since they could reflect many aspects of a disease.  (In 
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jurisprudence, the law favors specificity over vagueness, since it tends 
to give citizens clearer expectations of what official control behaviors 
to expect; judges will sometimes overturn laws as constitutionally 
“void for vagueness.”   Of course, there is a tension here, since leaving 
flexibility of options is in itself desirable in the area where science 
interfaces with law, allowing officials fighting epidemics some leeway 
to respond appropriately to events.   Ultimately, legislative drafters will 
need to work within this perennial tension between desirables, and 
provide as much specificity of principles as is reasonable, while 
allowing for a measure of operational flexibility.)  
 
a.  Severity as Case-Fatality Rate 
Simplicity might justify defining a disease’s “Severity” by 
focusing mainly on its overall mortality rate in a population, or on its 
case-fatality rate among those stricken by the disease  (i.e., of all the 
individuals who demonstrably contract the illness within a specified 
period of time, how many will die from it within that period of time).  
For the most part, this criterion is readily quantifiable, and it is 
certainly an important aspect of a disease:  From the perspective of a 
patient and his/her significant others, this variable will surely be of 
more than academic interest.  If the first symptoms of this disease 
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appear, what are his/her prospects of emerging alive from the ensuing 
bout of sickness?  
 
There can be great variability in this spectrum of possible 
lethalities:  For example, the case-fatality rate for simple viral rhinitis 
or coryza (i.e., the so-called “common cold”) is barely above [0%] for 
the general set of immunologically intact persons in most countries.  
Several other contagions are at the other end of this spectrum, 
however:  The case-fatality rate for Ebola-Zaire Haemorrhagic Fever 
has risen to about 83% in some outbreaks.  Untreated pneumonic or 
septicemic plague has a virtually 100% case-fatality rate.  Under the 
current state of medicine, too, the first symptoms of unprevented 
clinical rabies guarantee death as much as any disease in nature.  (In 
all of recorded medical history, the human survivors of this particular 
malady can be counted on the fingers of one or two hands.) 
 
b.  Severity as Morbidity Variables 
 Beyond mortality itself, of course, there can be numerous 
“Severity” variables that relate to the general morbidity of the disease 
in a population:  For example, a disease of relatively low lethality could 
still cause high levels of disability in the set of symptomatic persons, 
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with major consequences for the sick individuals and for their society.  
(For example, leprosy [see Chapter I] is not in general a rapidly deadly 
disease--but the amount of impairment that it has caused over the 
centuries is incalculable.  Similarly, acute symptomatic poliomyelitis 
kills only about 5% of children who develop it, but it, too, can leave 
large numbers of lifelong impairments in its wake.)  In general, the 
disabling features of a disease’s “Severity” would also be reasonably 
quantifiable. 
 
It might even be arguable that the term “Severity” should also 
take into account the sheer physical discomfort that a disease usually 
causes—irrespective of its lethality or its capacity to permanently 
impair.  (For example, a bout of uncomplicated dengue fever rarely 
kills or leaves permanent physical damage, although it can make 
sufferers vulnerable to deadly complications if they encounter another 
strain of the causative virus.  Most of all, though, dengue fever is just 
a thoroughly miserable disease for most people who contact it; it is 
called “breakbone fever” in the vernacular because of the arthralgias 
and myalgias it causes, and many convalescents curse the agonizing 
retro-orbital headaches that it gave them.)  However, it would be hard 
to develop a quantifiable “misery” quotient for most diseases.      
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c. The Subjectivity, Subtlety, and Variability of Symptoms 
 Another problem in identifying the “Severity” of diseases 
involves the wide possible variety of impacts that they can have on 
different victims:  A disease that is very harmful to one victim might 
go virtually unnoticed by another.  (For instance, TB, yellow fever, 
meningitis, polio, and typhoid can be deadly or extremely impairing to 
some patients—but there are many asymptomatic cases for every 
overt one.)  
 
A further qualification to note is that symptoms themselves can 
be subjective and subtle, as well as variable across hosts.  Pathogens 
can affect a victim’s bodily functioning to various degrees.  There can 
be pathological disruption and even permanent damage at sub-clinical 
levels that individuals do not detect.  Moreover, people will vary greatly 
in how aware they are of dysfunction in themselves or others—there 
can be a wide psychological spectrum from stoic and unaware to 
hypersensitive.  For instance, “malaise” is often described as an early 
symptom of systemic illness—but the subjectivity and imprecision of 
such a sensation can be readily recognized.  Alternatively, it can be 
asked whether a solitary sneeze represents an ordinary, non-
pathological response to a transient irritant in the air—or the first 
manifestation of an infectious disease.  Even “signs”—which are 
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nominally more objective than “symptoms”—can be subtle and run a 
continuous gamut rather than being “either/or” dichotomous.  (For 
example, a core body temperature of 99 degrees F. can be regarded as 
within the normal range, or as a low-grade fever, depending on the 
tested individual—and on the clinician who observes it.)   
  
The foregoing Severity-variability problem might be addressed in 
different ways:  One approach might be to have public health policy 
focus on the worst potential impact of a disease; out of an abundance 
of caution, it would stress vigorous policy prevention of a disease that 
could have a very harmful impact.  However, this approach might not 
be reasonable from a socio-economic risk-benefit perspective:  
Arguably, given the variability of pathogens, human hosts, and their 
interactions, almost every disease can probably cause severe harm to 
someone.  Strict quarantine-type measures would certainly have social 
and economic costs that might outweigh their benefits, so it may not 
be prudent to throw too wide a quarantine net to avoid occasional 
highly severe impacts.  Perhaps, then, it would be preferable to assess 
the “Severity” of a contagion by referring to a rough normal curve of 
its impact on a population.  Alternatively, legal policy-makers might 
rely on a scientific advisory committee to provide them with an opinion  
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on the overall scientific community’s consensus view of a disease’s 
severity. 
d. Severity Put on a Discrete Spectrum 
Finally, it is recognized that, in addition to the above issues, 
“Severity” is probably a continuum rather than a discrete variable.  For 
ease of management, however, it might be appropriate here to impose 
a somewhat arbitrary discrete schema on this variable, which would 
distinguish three levels of “Severity”:  “Non-Severe” (e.g., the 
“common cold”); “Moderately Severe” (e.g., Hepatitis A infection, 
measles); and “Highly Severe” (e.g., the Yersinia pestis plague).  
__________________________________________________ 
2.  “Modes of Contagion Transmission” Dimension 
 
Strictly for present purposes, it is next proposed that 
communicable diseases be characterized by their usual modes of 
transmission from one human host to another (the “Contagion-
Transmission” Dimension).  
 
In a very rough sense, this model is hierarchic, with the modes 
of transmission at the start of this scale being most efficient for 
pathogens, and the degree of efficiency decreasing downward on this 
scale (i.e., inversely with the transmission typology).  
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 It is fully recognized that many pathogens can propagate 
themselves in the human environment by a wide range of modalities, 
including some relatively uncommon ones.  The critical modality for 
any one disease would be its most efficient common mode.  Pathogens 
will have also greater efficiency when they can use multiple modalities 
to spread between hosts (and a number of the contagions at the top of 
this scale tend to have this capacity).  The efficiency of pathogen 
propagation is clearly important for public health purposes, and will 
affect the selection of contagion controls.       
 
 (This discussion was informed in part by the Control of 
Communicable Diseases Manual, Heymann D L (ed.), 19th ed.,  
[Washington, DC:  Amer. Pub. Hlth. Assn., 2008], [hereinafter, 
“CCDM”], although it diverges from that manual on a number of 
points.  Generally, the instant Model has some individual features that 
appear to be in common use, but it differs from the set of traditional 
usages in a variety of ways, including its applications.)   
 
a.  “Type I-A” Contagions:  Respiratory Airborne 
 Transmission— Small Droplet Aerosols 
In the “Type I-A” modality, agents of disease transit from the 
respiratory tract of one host to that of another via aerosolized particles 
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in the air.  This is probably the most efficient means of spread in 
nature:  The relatively small particles (one- to five-micrometers in 
size) that carry the pathogens can persist in an airspace for hours, and 
they can move through a relatively wide area—such as numerous rows 
of seats aboard an airplane.  Moreover, contamination of fomites and 
surfaces—such as elevator knobs--can remain viable for days; this 
allows continued infection of new hosts even when the index case has 
left the area.  Pathogens that have evolved this capability can move 
very quickly through host populations. 
   
(A classic user of this mode of transmission is the measles virus.  
Its infectiousness is proverbial, with a reported attack rate of some 
90% of secondary cases.) 
 
b. ”Type I-B” Contagions:  Respiratory Airborne Transmission—
Large Droplets 
In “Type I-B” contagions, pathogens move from host to host via 
larger droplets (usually, they use the cough or sneeze of a 
symptomatic person).  This means of spread is almost—but not quite—
as efficient as the foregoing one:  While this modality also allows the 
microbes to use air as a medium for transmission, the larger sizes of 
the drops does not allow them to travel as far within a particular 
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spatial area, or to linger as long in the ambient air.  Contamination of 
surfaces also lasts for a briefer time period.   
 
The SARS coronavirus is one agent that uses the “Type I-B” 
pathway.  Surprisingly, epidemiologists associated with the Campaign 
to Eradicate Smallpox in the 1960s and 1970s also found that the 
violent variola virus was a heavy-droplet-borne pathogen, requiring 
more intense close contact between hosts to spread than was 
previously thought.  Separately, influenza virus certainly uses heavy 
droplets to move from host to host, although there is also a possibility 
that it can spread via small-droplet aerosols--i.e., that it can cause a 
“Type I-A” contagion, as well as by manual/fomite transmission; this is 
still an empirical question. 
 
There is a well-known story in public health that, in 1979, an 
airplane sat on a tarmac in Homer, Alaska for four hours with a 
defective air-circulation system, and one passenger with active 
influenza transmitted the disease to 72% of the other 53 passengers 
on the plane.  (See, e.g., Goldmann, DA, “Pediatric viral respiratory 
infections:  Influenza,” Emerg. Infect. Dis., 7(2):  2 (2001), 
www.medscape.com/view_article/414339_3, accessed 2/8/12, citing 
Moser MR, et al., “An outbreak of influenza aboard a commercial 
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airliner,” Am. J. Epidemiol., 110:1-6 (1979).)  The circumstances of 
this case might have been somewhat exceptional, but it suggested the 
potential airborne nuclei droplet transmissibility of some strains of 
influenza under certain host and environmental conditions.  
 
c.  “Type II” Contagions:  Foecal-Oral or Urinary 
 Transmission       
 Pathogens using the “Type II” means of spread pass from the 
gastro-intestinal tract of an infected individual to secondary hosts via 
the foecal-oral pathway (or via the urinary tract-oral pathway):  
Basically, the first host expels contaminated foeces or urine, and the 
second host ingests them.  This can happen in various ways:  
Foodstuffs, water, or other objects can be the physical media for 
transmission.  For example, an infected cook can retain diarrhoeal 
fluids on her hands, and then apply them to meals that she prepares.  
Alternatively, an infected child in a daycare center might contaminate 
surfaces that a classmate will pick up and unwittingly swallow.  
Another classical means would be waterborne spread---for example, a 
plume of excreta travels from a leaking cesspool to a shallow well, 
infecting the persons who drink from that well.  Sometimes, 
community swimming pools will be the environment of spread, when a 
child incubating enteric pathogens in his gut transmits them into the 
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water, and another youngster swims in that medium with his mouth 
open.    
 
 (Archetypal “Type II” contagions would be typhoid, caused by 
the bacterium Salmonella typhi; cholera, caused by Vibrio cholerae 
bacteria; amoebic dysentery, caused by Entamoeba histolytica; and 
poliomyelitis—caused by the poliovirus.) 
 
(1) Exclusion of “Food Intoxications” from the Schema 
 It should be noted that “food intoxications,” in which individuals 
are harmed by the toxins generated by pathogens that are present or 
multiply in foodstuffs--but wherein humans do not transmit the 
pathogens themselves to one another--would not be covered by this 
schema.  (These would include cases of botulism or Bacillus cereus 
“food poisoning,” among many others.)  While these diseases are 
certainly serious PH problems that call for legal controls in many 
cases, quarantines and other forms of social distancing would not be 
among the appropriate methods.  (Of course, the use of food poisons 
in bio-warfare or bio-terror brings up a host of separate legal issues….) 
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d. “Type III” Contagions:  Tactile Dermic Transmission 
 In “Type III” transmission, pathogens in a primary host’s open 
skin sore or ulcer would be directly contracted by a second host 
through touch.  Fluids from the lesion itself would carry the organisms.  
In addition, fomites such as contaminated towels might act as 
intermediate vehicles of spread.  Usually (though not invariably), the 
pathogens’ portal of entry into the secondary host would occur through 
breaks in the skin, since an intact integumentary system is ordinarily a 
good host-protective barrier against entry.)   
  
 (The bacterial disease impetigo neonatorum would be one “Type 
III” contagion; athlete’s foot or Tinea pedis--caused by dermatophytic 
fungi such as Trichophyton rubrum—would be another; and the viral 
disorder molluscum contagiosum would be a third.  See, e.g., CCDM 
2008, at 176-78, 426-27; Handbook of Infectious Diseases 2000, at 
141-42.)  
  
As in almost all natural phenomena, there is complexity here:  
some parasites such as hookworms (notably, Necator americanus and 
Ancylostoma duodenalis) are defecated in ovum form from the human 
anus, but they do not enter the next host through the mouth--in larval 
form, they burrow through the skin of his toes when he walks on that 
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excreta.  (Before outhouses were widely used in the U.S. South, 
hookworm infection used to be familiarly called “ground itch,” or “the 
disease of the barefoot boy.”)  In a more complex pattern of 
transmission, the eggs of parasites that cause schistosomiasis (a.k.a. 
“bilharziasis”) emerge in urine from the bladders of infected humans, 
and in foeces from other reservoir animal species, and they 
contaminate pools of water.  There, they are consumed by certain 
species of snails; the snails then emit a larval stage of the parasite into 
that water, and those parasites enter a new human victim intra-
dermally when he swims in it.  Under the present schema, however, a 
pathogen’s portal of exit from the primary human host is more 
important than its portal of entry into the secondary host.  This is 
because legal interventions to compel actions that would decrease 
disease transmission—which is the primary concern in this model--
would focus on the infected human carrier (in the instant situation, the 
excreting person).  While public health would also try to protect the 
susceptible recipient of infection (in this case, the barefoot boy), it 
would most likely use educational and exhortatory means to 
accomplish this protective goal (e.g., social marketing urging children 
to wear shoes or sandals in hookworm-endemic areas).  Thus, the 
present model would operationally identify hookworm disease as a 
“Type II” (foecal-transmission) contagion.    
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e.  “Type IV” Contagions:  Blood-Borne or Tissue-Borne 
 Transmission 
 “Type IV Contagions” are humorally transmitted infections; 
blood is a particularly important modality for transmission.  A 
variegated set of pathogens exploit humans’ biomedical technologies--
or their addictions—to move from victim to victim:  They are present 
in human blood, which has historically enabled them to benefit from 
blood-banking before technological means are found to detect and 
eliminate them.   For similar mechanical reasons, “Type IV” pathogens 
have been able to use contaminated needles from medical blood 
transfusions—and from intravenous drug addicts—to move from 
bloodstream to bloodstream.   
 
(As is widely known, the classic exemplars of “Type IV” 
contagions include hepatitis B and C viruses and the human 
immunodeficiency virus that causes AIDS.  Less widely-known, 
perhaps, are the cases of malaria that have also been transmitted by 
contaminated serological products—the plasmodium parasite that 
causes this disease emerges into the human bloodstream during the 
merozoite and other stages of its life-cycle, so malaria can occasionally  
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operate as a “Type IV” [humoral] contagion, as well as spreading 
through its more common modes [q.v.].) 
 
Although they are less common vehicles than blood, certain 
other biological fluids can also transmit pathogens.  These include 
pericardial, pleural, and synovial fluids, for example.                 
 
A special variation of this “Type IV” modality has arisen in 
response to technical advances in biomedicine during recent decades: 
the process of tissue transplantation has sometimes transmitted 
pathogens as well as life-saving organs.  (One curious example has 
been Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease, which causes lethal spongiform 
damage to the brain; in several instances, its probable agent—the 
infectious protein called a “prion”—was passed from person to person 
via corneal transplants, or through the stereotaxic needles that hold 
the head immobile during neurosurgery.  See, e.g., CCDM 2008, at 
219.) 
  
f.  “Type V” Contagions:  Venereal Transmission 
 Classed together as “Type V” contagions are the many 
otherwise-heterogeneous diseases that spread by venereal means.  
They are worth considering together as much because of the social 
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impact of their transmission method as because of any pathobiological 
similarities.   
  
 The sexual mechanism of transmission here can sometimes 
overlap “Type III” tactile transmission.  For example, the strains of 
human papillomaviruses that can cause venereal warts—and, 
ultimately, cervical cancer in some women—can spread through skin-
to-skin contact, although the more usual mode of spread is sexual in 
nature.  (Hence, a claim of simple tactile contact is probably not a 
valid excuse for having contracted VDs in most cases.)   
 
(Pathogens exploiting this particular set of human behaviors can 
be as varied as the spirochaetal treponeme of syphilis, the herpes 
simplex Type II virus, the AIDS virus, the trichomonas parasite, and 
the Chlamydia that are bacteria-like obligate intracellular parasites.) 
 
Being this far down the “hierarchy” of efficient transmissibility, 
“Type V” VDs spread far more slowly than diseases that use “higher-
efficiency” modalities, so they should be theoretically more 
manageable for public health.  (Sexual interaction requires conscious 
and purposive actions by at least one participant; this contrasts with 
the almost reflexive actions of sneezing and coughing in “Type I” 
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contagions.)  On the other hand, the socio-behavioral complexities of 
human sexual activities and attitudes have long made the STDs 
particularly difficult for public health law.  As was noted in the last 
chapter of this Dissertation, many American states and cities address 
STD-controls--with their social complexities--in separate sections of 
their health codes. 
 
g.  “Type VI” Contagions—Arthropod Vector Transmission 
 “Type VI” contagions are vector-borne:  A major class of 
pathogenic organisms go through complex life-cycles that involve 
arthropods--with insects usually acting as flying syringes to spread 
them, and other arthropods (such as ticks) acting as jumping and 
biting intermediate transmitters.  Although this would seem to be an 
inefficient and even chancy means of propagating a parasite species, it 
can clearly confer some advantages to them as well:  The millions of 
cases of malaria across the globe, and the tremendous difficulty in 
fully eradicating the various species of plasmodia and their anopheline 
mosquito vectors, testify to this reality.   
 
The widespread historic impact of epidemic typhus fever on 
mankind is another illustration of the sometime power of this modality:  
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The bacteria-like agent of typhus (Rickettsia prowazekii) requires the 
services of the human body louse (Pediculus humanus corporis) to 
spread from host to host—but collective human behavior over the 
centuries has abetted this method, often through social inequities:  For 
example, R. prowazekii was a major beneficiary of unwashed slum-
dwellers, jailhouse inmates, and armies of soldiers forced to stay in 
close contact under conditions of “lousy” sanitation.  (There is an old 
account—perhaps apocryphal—of a group of closely-shackled, 
odoriferous prisoners being brought into an 18th century courtroom, 
suffering from what was then called “jailhouse fever.”  Whereupon, the 
storyteller claimed, their “miasma” conveyed the disease to almost all 
the high judicial officials in the room—including the judge--and all the 
court officers and jurists soon died.  More modern interpretations of 
the situation have proposed, however, that the confinees had louse-
borne typhus, which they transmitted to the court personnel—although 
one would have to assume here that there was rather close physical 
contact between captives and captors.  Of course, even the sanitary 
practices of heavily peruked officials in those days left much to be 
desired….  More certain were the high rates of typhus among the 
trench-trapped armies of the First World War, and the famous 1944 
outbreak of typhus in war-ruined and starving Naples, which was then 
under Allied control.)      
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 A biological distinction is often made between those vectors that 
serve as crucial components of pathogen life-cycles—in which the 
microbes must go through various stages of their development and 
multiply (e.g., mosquitoes carrying malaria)--and those vectors that 
only mechanically transport pathogens from host to host on their feet 
or probosces (e.g., flies carrying the bacteria that cause typhoid, or 
carrying the chlamydia that cause the blinding eye disease trachoma). 
  
 Other well-known “Type VI” contagions would include the historic 
viral disease yellow fever.  
  
 More complex is the ancient pestilence of Yersinia pestis plague 
(see Chapter I, above) which can be both a “Type I-B” and a “Type VI” 
contagion, depending on its specific modality of transmission in 
individual cases and outbreaks:  When the deadly pathogen is 
conveyed via the vectorship of fleas like Xenopsylla cheopis (which 
feed on rats and other mammalian reservoirs), the bubonic plague 
would be a “Type VI” disease.  When, however, the microbe enters the 
mammalian lung and causes pneumonic plague, it would be a “Type I-
B” disease.  From a PH perspective, these are important distinctions, 
since the tactics of control for the two forms of plague could be very 
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different:  The slower first variant of plague might justify some degree 
of human quarantine, but it would emphasize vermin-control; however, 
the fast-moving latter variant of plague might require aggressive 
socio-behavioral interventions to impede direct person-to-person 
transmission.  (Of course, there would be considerable tactical overlap; 
for example, both variants would also call for modern technological 
interventions, such as antibiotics.)  Because of the major differences 
between these two forms of plague, this Dissertation has carefully 
refrained from using the casual term “bubonic plague” to describe 
historic epidemics of this scourge.  One of the puzzles of human 
history, incidentally, is why Yersinia pestis plague could have crossed 
the world so quickly in pandemic form, when it was supposedly a 
“Type VI” contagion that relied on a relatively slow inter-human 
passage via intermediate mammalian and arthropod hosts.  It is 
suggested here that the Plague of Justinian of the 450’s, and the Black 
Death of the 1340-50’s, might both have had major pneumonic plague 
components, at least in a number of their individual and regional 
manifestations.  Alternatively, the two early pandemic strains of Y. 
pestis might have had some peculiar genetic mutations that promoted 
aggressive inter-human spread, or there may have been some 
distinctive host-susceptibility variables.    
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(1) The Model Excludes Strictly Animal and Plant Contagions--and 
Those Contagions in Which Humans Are Only “Dead-End Hosts” 
It should be emphasized here, however, that the present 
taxonomy has been created to specifically address infectious diseases 
that can spread from human to human (either directly or indirectly).  
Thus, diseases that affect both animals and humans (“zoonoses”) are 
only included here if infected persons can, in their turn, transmit 
pathogens to other people directly or via arthropod involvement.  By 
contrast, this schema does not cover the plethora of disorders that 
only affect animals, or those zoonoses that only spread one-way from 
vertebrates to humans—where, in biological parlance, the infected 
individual humans are “dead-end hosts,” in whom the parasites will die 
without being passed on to others.  This is because the issue here is 
the possible use of quarantine-type controls for humans (not animals 
or plants), and no human quarantines would make even theoretical 
sense when the victims are dead-end hosts.   
 
Hence, SARS and H1N1 influenza are included here—while those 
diseases would initially be conveyed to humans by vertebrate 
reservoirs, such as palm civet cats and domestic pigs or chickens 
respectively, the infected humans could, in their turn, infect other 
humans or vertebrates.  (However, the present taxonomy—and its 
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prescriptions for human quarantines--would only become applicable to 
such a zoonotic pathogen when it had already made its initial leaps 
from animals into primary human hosts, and was now capable of 
spreading from person to person.)  
 
On the other hand, Rocky Mountain spotted fever, anthrax, or 
rickettsialpox (a feverish illness caused by Rickettsia akari, and spread 
by mouse-borne mites) would not be included here-- since humans 
who get these diseases will not transmit them to other human beings.   
 
Nor will this schema include diseases that are caused by free-
living organisms in the environment that can infect humans and induce 
pathology.  One example of such disorders would be Aspergillosis—a 
set of clinical syndromes, including pulmonary fibrosis, that Aspergillus 
flavus and some 180 species of other Aspergillus fungi can induce in 
susceptible humans (e.g. CCDM 2008, at 66-69).  Another example of 
an excluded disease would be naegleriasis (a lethal 
meningoencephalitis caused by the free-living amoeba Naegleria 
fowleri, which can strike swimmers who nose-breathe under water in 
warm southern freshwater pools)--as this disease, too, does not 
spread beyond its few very unlucky human victims.    
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By way of further clarification, it might be added that the instant 
taxonomy would also not include pathogenic diseases such as tetanus, 
caused by the anaerobic bacterium Clostridium tetani, which horse 
manure, ordinary garden soil, or unsterilized birthing instruments can 
convey to humans, but which those hosts generally cannot pass on to 
others (e.g., CCDM 2008, at 202-03).  Diseases of this sort are serious 
PH threats that need attention—but they would not be controlled by 
quarantine-type procedures.  (Of course, any use of tetanus or 
botulism toxins by bioterrorists would raise a host of other issues, and 
certainly bring on the full force of the criminal law.)   
 
h.  “Type VII” Contagions—Maternal-Child Transmission 
 In this schema, “Type VII” pathogenic diseases would be those 
transmitted downward from infected mothers to their offspring, during 
pregnancy, labor and parturition, or breast-feeding.  (Examples of such 
a vertical infection pathway include syphilis and AIDS.)         
 
i. “Type VIII” Contagions—Other Modes of Transmission 
 
 Finally, the “Type VIII” category of transmission-modality is a 
sort of generic category into which more uncommon pathways of 
transmission might be placed.   
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One example might be clinical rabies.  Over centuries, its 
causative rhabdovirus has developed a grisly mechanism for self-
propagation:  As is well-known, it often causes a violent, frenetic 
response in its hosts, marked by blazing fever, hyperexcitability, 
agonizing spasms—and, in animals, it provokes an inclination to bite 
other mammals, thereby injecting the virus into them before the hosts 
themselves inevitably die.  (It is a true contender for the worst-kind-
of-death-in-nature).  Human victims are usually dead-end hosts for 
this virus, since biting other people is a highly unlikely response.  On 
the other hand, terminal rabies patients’ saliva does contain the lethal 
pathogen, so it could theoretically pass the disease on to caregivers 
who are not careful.     
  
 Another exotic mode of transmission was manifested by kuru.  
This neuropathological disease--another spongiform encephalopathy 
that is apparently caused by infectious prions--became a peculiar 
malady of the Fore tribesmen of Papua-New Guinea.  In the mid-20th 
century, women and children of the tribe would eat the brains of their 
dead relatives as a mark of respect—and, a number of years later, they 
would develop the deadly wasting disorder.  However, the Fore have 
reportedly discontinued this ritual practice, and kuru appears to have  
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largely disappeared as a result.  In any case, cannibalism would seem 
to be a relatively uncommon method for pathogen propagation.      
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
3.  “Intensiveness of Contagiousness” Dimension—and Other 
 Epidemic Variables 
 
 Besides spreading from host to host by a variety of modalities, 
communicable diseases can differ on a number of other variables that 
can be quite important for the issues of contagion-control and the 
possible imposition of quarantines.  (The following concepts and terms 
have now become widely known and discussed--although not always in 
a scientific way--but it is worthwhile to state them here because they 
are so relevant to the present subject.)  These issues come up most 
starkly during incipient outbreaks and spreading epidemics (infra).   
  
 As discussed above, Modalities of Transmission can greatly 
influence a contagion’s ease and probability of convection from host to 
host—but they are not always decisive on this point.  Other 
Dimensions such as the Ro of a disease and the immunologic 
susceptibility of hosts can also heavily influence whether even a “Type 
I” disease spreads quickly, widely, and intensively, as shall be noted 
below.   
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a. Incidence and Prevalence of a Communicable Disease in a 
Defined Population 
 In taking evidence-based steps to control a communicable 
disease in a jurisdiction, planners, policy-makers, and implementers 
need to know, as best as possible, its “absolute incidence rate” (the 
number of new cases appearing within the population-at-issue within a 
specified period of time—such as a year) and its “prevalence 
proportion” (the total number of cases—both new and ongoing—that 
are present within that population at a specified point in time, or 
during a specified period of time). 
  
 b “Endemicity,” “Epidemicity,” and Related Concepts 
 Within a particular population, a contagion can be “endemic” 
(occurring commonly or continuously at some level in a given 
population or area), “hyperendemic” (generally high incidence in a 
population or area), or it can be “epidemic.”  (In common usage, the 
latter adjective means that the disease is spreading widely in a 
population within a relatively short time period.  Curiously, though, 
“epidemicity” is also sometimes defined as any level of disease 
incidence that is above the “expected,” “normal,” or “baseline” 
incidence levels for the jurisdiction in question.  Thus, even one case 
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of smallpox—presumably eradicated everywhere on the planet—would, 
in that sense, be considered an “outbreak” of major concern, and two 
cases of it could be regarded as an “epidemic” event in every part of 
the globe--at least in terms of urgent needs for action by policy-
makers and administrators.)  The animal-disease equivalents of these 
concepts are “enzootic” and “epizootic.”  Specialists in the field either 
use the term “outbreaks” synonymously with the word “epidemic,” or 
they use it to refer to an epidemic in a certain area—usually, one in its 
early stages of development.  Finally, as is now generally all-too-well-
known, the term “pandemic” refers to an epidemic than has taken on a 
global scope (or, alternatively, it denotes an increase in disease 
incidence at a global level).  (Cf., e.g., Green MS, et al., “When Is an 
Epidemic an Epidemic,” Israel Med. Assn. J., 4 [Jan. 2004].) 
 
 c. Epidemics as Conceptual “Organisms” 
  At one level of perception, it may not be unreasonable to think of 
epidemics of communicable diseases as resembling organisms in 
themselves.  In part, this is simply a metaphorical usage (and it is 
important to avoid anthropomorphism or teleology)—but it can have 
pragmatic control-value as well:  In many ways, as has been noted 
here, epidemic developments are more than the simple expression of 
pathogen behavior per se—rather, they represent complex and multi-
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factorial interactions between the pathogen, its host(s), and their 
environment.  At their “macro” level, moreover, epidemics have their 
own internal dynamics--which are susceptible to various kinds of 
theoretical modeling and analyses that can be useful in developing 
appropriate controls.  (One standard and very simple descriptive 
model for an epidemic is the “epidemic curve”—which tracks and 
depicts the incidence of cases in a disease outbreak.  It can provide 
some clues for further investigation of such an episode—indicating, for 
example, whether it is spreading interpersonally into secondary human 
cases.)     
 
 d. Ro:  The Infectivity Index 
 In assessing the epidemic threat posed by various contagions, 
many epidemiologists emphasize the “Ro” (the “reproduction” or 
“reproductive” number, sometimes also termed the “infectivity index”) 
and similar characteristics of those diseases.  Ro refers to the average 
number of secondary cases that can be inculcated by each primary 
case of infectious disease (it can range from R1 for some relatively 
slow-moving contagions to R15 for very transmissible “Type I-A” 
contagions like measles).  A Ro of 1 indicates an endemic disease.  
Generally, however, if the contagion cannot reproduce itself at a fast 
enough pace in the target population (i.e., over R1), an outbreak of 
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one or two cases will not spread outward in epidemic form, and it will 
eventually burn itself out in the immediate population.  However, 
diseases that have a Ro above one, can readily become epidemics.  
Moreover, the higher the Ro, the more difficult it will be to contain the 
contagion to a limited area (assuming no countervailing factors such 
as population herd resistance). 
 
 The Ro can be crucial in determining whether quarantine controls 
would be appropriate--at least from a strictly mechanistic PH level.  
Arguably, quarantine/isolations may be optimal contagion-control 
measures at a moderate range of Ro above 1.  Quarantines/isolations 
might not be the containment tactic of choice for contagions with very 
low Ro’s, since (as has been shown in this Dissertation) they can be 
disruptive devices in various social and economic ways--to the point 
that their benefits may not be sufficient to offset their disadvantages in 
some situations.  Leprosy may be an example of this situation (see 
Chapter I):  Notwithstanding its uncertain—and possibly respiratory—
mode of transmission, leprosy’s characteristics under the Ro 
“Dimension,” and under other “Dimensions” such as Duration, may 
make it a less appropriate biomedical/PH candidate for 
quarantine/isolation.)  At the other end of the Ro spectrum, however, 
the rubeola virus that causes measles is so readily transmitted (with 
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its reproductive number of 15) that it can virtually saturate a 
population of susceptibles in a short time period.  Thus, 
quarantine/isolations may be helpful adjuncts in a multi-pronged 
program of measles prevention and containment—but with such a 
rapidity of spread, vaccination would have to be the dominant counter-
strategy. 
  
 To a certain extent, reproduction numbers of diseases can vary 
over time as pathogens evolve, environmental conditions change, and 
epidemics progress, so lawmakers and policymakers developing 
contagion-control systems that incorporate this variable (and related 
ones) need to build in a certain flexibility to reflect such potential 
developments.   
 
 e. Other Relevant Epidemic-Related Variables 
 Related factors that can also affect an epidemic’s viability and 
impact, including its serial interval (which refers to the time from 
inception of infectivity in the index or primary cases to the time of 
infectivity in secondary cases). 
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________________________________________________________ 
4.  “Temporal” Dimension of Contagions 
 The fourth important “Dimension of Contagion” in the present 
schema focuses on the general length of time that a communicable 
disease will last in a human host.  Here, it is important to distinguish 
between the length of time that the pathogen infects its victims, the 
length of time that it causes clinical illness in its victim, and the length 
of time that it makes its victims infectious to others.  --While these 
three time periods may closely approximate each other, and they will 
often overlap, they are by no means isomorphic.  In different ways, all 
of these variables are important in planning public health legal controls 
over contagion—but the third one is more important than the other 
two.   
 
 The length of time that individuals are infected with the 
pathogens and the length of time that they cause them actual clinical 
illness can differ in themselves:  In chronic untreated syphilis, for 
example, there is usually a long latency period (which can start 
between one and four years after infection and can sometimes even 
last for decades) when syphilitics remains quite infected with 
spirochetes and at personal risk of developing impairing pathology, but 
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they often feel no symptoms at all, and they may be unaware of their 
infected condition; most of the time, they are also not infectious to 
their sexual partners during this latent period of time (see, e.g., CCDM 
2008, at 593).  
 
a.  Temporal Duration of Symptomatic Illness 
 Generally, symptomatic diseases are said to be either (1) 
”acute,” (2) “sub-acute,” or (3) “chronic.”  This is a somewhat arbitrary 
breakdown, which makes an apparent trichotomy out of what is really 
a continuum.  However, it is functionally useful for some purposes, 
including contagion-management and control.  It is particularly helpful 
at the extremes of the spectrum:  
 
(1) Acute Diseases 
 An “acute” disease is usually described as one that, in the 
majority of cases, lasts a month or less (whether at a symptomatic 
level, or as an infectious entity) (www.medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com, citing McGraw-Hill Concise Dictionary 
of Modern Medicine [St. Louis:  McGraw-Hill Co, 2002]).   Examples of 
ordinarily acute diseases (varying across the spectrum of severity) 
include plague, smallpox, yellow fever, influenza, mumps, and SARS.    
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 (2) Sub-Acute Diseases 
 A “sub-acute” disease is said, in most manifestations, to last 
between one and three months (U.S. National Center for Health 
Statistics, cited by www.medicine.academic.ru/7840/Subacute, 
accessed 2/6/12).   Examples of such diseases include subacute 
bacterial endocarditis.  (It should be noted that some usages define 
“subacute” in a somewhat vague way to refer to the overtness of 
symptoms—but that is not the usage here, and it is submitted that it is 
important not to blur the Dimensional distinctions between Severity 
and Duration.)    
 
 (3) Chronic Diseases 
 A “chronic” disease is one that normatively persists for over 
three months (e.g., www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?art, 
accessed 2/6/12).  Chronic infectious diseases include leprosy, TB, and 
syphilis.  
 
b. Some Generic Stages in an Individual Host Encounter with 
 Pathogens 
In a very over-simplified way, one can distinguish several generic 
stages in the possible encounters between pathogens and individual 
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hosts.  (This account resembles—but differs in some respects from—
the one presented in Handbook of Infectious Diseases, Holmes HN 
[ed.], [Springhouse, PA:  Springhouse Corp., 2000], 598 pp., at 2-30A.  
See also Chapter I, above.)  These stages need not happen 
sequentially—but they sometimes do:   
 
First, it is possible for pathogens to contaminate the individual—
as when a lab worker spills a beaker of V. cholerae on her arm.  
However, this event in itself does not constitute an infection, and—with 
some luck and appropriate responses—it does not have to lead to one.   
 
At a next “stage” of involvement, microorganisms might colonize 
a human being—again without technically infecting him (such as 
Staphylococcus aureus living on the surface of his skin, or under his 
eyelashes--normally unsymptomatic and unnoticed).  Some even co-
exist with the host in a symbiotic way that is termed mutualism—
beneficial to both (such as those bacteria that dwell in the human 
intestines, enabling their hosts to digest certain foods, and occupying 
a niche that pathogens might otherwise occupy).   
 
In some cases, however, microbes will cross a subtle but crucial 
threshold into infection (in which they will multiply inside the host’s 
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tissues).  In one sense, they have taken on another role in nature—
functionally changing from mutualistic symbionts or commensals (who 
co-exist with the host physically, but do not harm him or take his 
nutrients) … into parasites (which do exploit their host in those ways).  
This transformed role can occur when the micro-environment changes 
in some way or ways—such as a new deficiency in the host’s immunity, 
which had formerly held the microbes back in a sort of microscopic 
détente.  Organisms that coexist with an immunocompetent host 
without causing harm can exploit an immunocompromised state to 
become pathogenic.      
 
However, this is not the end of the Temporal continuum of 
encounters between pathogens and their hosts, as the following 
discussion will indicate: 
 
c.  Duration Periods of Infectiousness Per Se 
In general, from the disease-control policy perspective, the two 
durational variables mentioned above of time of being infected and 
time of being clinically ill are mainly important since they pertain to 
the “Severity” of the disease in general.   However, the foremost 
concern to public health policy-makers would be the victim’s period of 
infectiousness to others—which may be different from the period of 
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clinical illness.  This may not always be known, and communicable 
diseases can vary considerably in the mean and variability of their 
periods of communicability (see, e.g., CCDM 2008, at 711); there can 
even be changes in this factor in different places and phases of the 
same epidemic.  To the extent that it can be identified (perhaps in a 
normalized form), however, the duration of infectiousness is a critical 
variable for contagion-control and its impacts.  Among other things, it 
may have an impact on whether a disease carrier is merely 
quarantined for a few weeks during an acute illness—or whether she 
will be legally confined for the rest of her life, which might last for 
decades.   
 
A specific sub-issue here is the length of time—if any—when an 
individual is asymptomatically infectious to others.  
 
d.  Presence or Absence of a Prolonged Asymptomatic 
 Carrier State 
 In deciding whether a disease merits a quarantine-type control 
response, an associated “Dimension” to consider is whether or not it 
can generally produce an asymptomatic carrier state, particularly one 
that is prolonged.  This is important to contagion-fighters because 
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ambulatory carriers of infectious disease (whether or not they 
recognize their own infection) are particularly capable of spreading it 
widely to other people.  
 
 Some communicable diseases tend not to generate any 
prolonged asymptomatic carriage in most cases.  Their victims are 
only (or mainly) infectious when they have obvious symptoms, such as 
violent coughing or rashes, and then they can be stopped from 
circulating by their own symptoms or by outside intervention.  Oddly 
enough, even smallpox, for all its ferocity in “Severity” terms, does not 
tend to create a prolonged state of asymptomatic carriage; victims do 
not usually start shedding viruses into their environment until they are 
suddenly stricken with the overt—and prostrating—symptoms of 
exanthems in the throat that trigger intense coughing spells.  The 
sufferers are not usually ambulatory at that point.  Similarly, SARS 
does not ordinarily become infectious until individual hosts have 
already been infected and then become symptomatic for a number of 
days (although it should be noted that there can apparently be 
exceptional “super-spreaders” of this disease, who had 
disproportionate impacts on the spread of SARS in 2003; however, the 
mechanisms for the “super-spreading” phenomenon have not been not 
thoroughly investigated, and they remain unclear). 
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In general, there are several types of asymptomatic carriage of 
infections:  incubatory, convalescent, and generally asymptomatic:  
The first two types occur before--and after--an individual suffers 
clinical illness, respectively.  From a control point of view, they can 
certainly be problematic, since the carrier may be quietly shedding 
unseen pathogens into his environment for days before (or after) his 
illness become manifest symptomatically.  This is true of influenza, for 
example.  On the other hand, these particular infectious states are not 
usually prolonged in time.  Moreover, the carrier in such cases may 
have incipient—or lingering—symptoms that can impede his capacity 
to travel and transmit his infection to others.   
 
More worrisome for public health are those individuals who never 
seem to develop any overt disease symptoms at all—or who have no 
more than subtle signs and symptoms that they can innocently or 
indifferently ignore.  Examples include Neisseria meningitides, which 
many people can quietly carry around in their nasal passages, 
exposing their more vulnerable contacts to the potentially fatal CNS 
infection meningococcal meningitis.  Another example would be 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA”).  Even better 
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known is typhoid, which (as recounted in Chapter I) “Typhoid Mary” 
Mallon spread to kitchens all around southern New York State in the 
1900s before she was finally caught and thrown into life-long 
quarantine on an island off New York City. 
   
 While it may be somewhat oversimplified, the instant model will 
treat a disease’s possibility or unlikelihood of generating an 
asymptomatic carrier state as a tri-partite discrete variable:  (1) “no 
notable asymptomatic carriage”; (2) “brief asymptomatic carriage”; 
and (3) “prolonged asymptomatic carriage.”  (The distinction between 
the latter two states can be somewhat arbitrarily set as the difference 
between carriage that lasts for days around an illness—and carriage 
that lasts for longer periods of time….) 
 
By consequence of the above scenario, PH contagion-control 
policies may focus special attention on the quiescent (or latency) 
period—“quarantining” symptom-free persons who were alleged 
“contacts” of the demonstrably ill (who would themselves be isolated). 
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e.   Some Policy Implications of the Temporal Dimension of 
Contagion 
The standard Duration of a contagious disease can have 
profound implications for the running of contagion-control programs—
particularly segregation-and-strict-quarantine systems.   To some 
extent, of course, some of the same issues arise in all strict-quarantine 
confinements, whatever their temporal length.  In practice, however, it 
is one thing to confine and isolate an allegedly infectious individual 
during the month-long span of an acute epidemic contagion—such as 
pneumonic plague or SARS; it is quite another to segregate, banish, 
and quarantine the victim of a five-to-twenty-year chronic contagion, 
such as TB or HD (and, in a few times and places, syphilis or AIDS).  
 
When a jurisdiction adopts the goal of quarantining the 
chronically ill, it can run head-long into a plethora of financial, legal, 
social, and ethical problems that arise from incarcerating a community 
of people for months, years, or decades.  The closest analogues would 
be correctional facilities or mental institutions, but these analogies are 
relatively poor.  Among other things, the standards for hold or release 
would be vastly different among these various kinds of institutions—
rather than criminal guilt, or psychiatric “harmfulness to self or 
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others,” the criteria for retaining people in long-term quarantines 
would be judgments of infectiousness (with perhaps a punitive overlay 
for disobedient or “absconding” inmates [see Chapter I, above]).  
               
Here, policy-makers would have to confront issues of ethics, law, 
and social desirables—and weigh them against the collective interest in 
avoiding contagion.   At a jurisprudential level, it might well be argued 
that the State’s and Community’s showings of necessity would increase 
commensurate with the length of isolation that they propose to 
impose.  It might be arguable that public health law should seek the 
briefest quarantining period that would be consistent with the goal of 
stopping disease spread.   (See the discussions below.) 
 
__________________________________________________
Other Dimensions of Contagion—Including Technological 
Contagion Controls:  “Quarantine Supporting or Intensifying 
Factors” 
To some extent, the following five “Dimensions of Contagion” are 
less crucial to the quarantine decision-making process than the 
preceding ones.  In addition, the final three of these Dimensions relate 
to the technological responses of biomedical science to communicable 
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diseases, and they are thus more subject to change with scientific 
developments.  Often, in fact, these particular Dimensions can change 
with the sometimes-frantic pace of science in the face of a desperate 
PH emergency.  Hence, they can be entirely fluid—altering on an 
almost day-to-day basis during some crises and some hotly 
competitive scientific races-to-discovery. As a result, those 
Dimensional criteria might, in a sense, wind up being simple “snap-
shots” of a kinetic process.  Nevertheless, they are factors to be 
considered in making general and specific decisions about quarantines, 
including the degree of quarantine urgency or intensity.  They would 
properly go into an algorithm for action that might inform the “front-
line” forces of public health.  (Accordingly, they will be identified as 
“Quarantine Supporting or Intensifying Factors.”) 
 
In applying these “Dimensions” to planning, a policy-maker, 
legislator, or administrator would have to ensure that he or she had 
particularly good, up-to-date information about the state of 
biomedicine relating to each contagion of policy concern.  Once again, 
an expert advisory panel would be a valuable adjunct to policy-making 
here.  
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It must be repeated here, too, that these “Dimensions” are 
scientifically complex, and they can only be sketched briefly here in 
the interest of space constraints.  The primary focus of this 
Dissertation is the set of socio-behavioral controls over contagion, so 
technological controls will be discussed mainly in connection with the 
latter types of controls. 
__________________________________________________ 
5.  Dimension of Virulence Factors—Pathogen Survival in the 
 External and Internal Environments 
While not a crucial factor in decisions whether or not to 
quarantine, it may be worthwhile for planners to consider, among other 
variables, the pathogen-virulence factors relating to their durability in 
external and internal human environments.  For example, how long 
would a bacillus or virus remain active and virulent in some 
expectorated sputum?  Another consideration might be how much of a 
dosage of a pathogen would generally be necessary to inculcate illness 
in a secondary host.  For example, it takes infection with a high 
number of cholera bacilli for some to survive gastric acid and colonize 
the human intestine.  --By contrast, only 100 Shigella bacteria would 
be theoretically needed to inculcate the severe dysenteric disease 
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shigellosis, only one bacterium could cause a case of plague, and only 
one variola virion could provoke the lethal symptoms of smallpox. 
   
6.  Dimension of Host Susceptibility--Special Sub-Population 
 Groups 
In addition to the foregoing “Dimensions of Contagious 
Diseases,” public health policy-makers need to ask whether a 
communicable disease poses distinctive dangers for certain population 
sub-groups (and, conversely, whether the disease is unlikely to be a 
major danger for other sub-groups).  This applies to the variables of 
probability of contracting infection, probability of developing clinical 
disease, and probability of suffering severe impacts if disease is 
contracted.  A related consideration applies to the differential 
propensity of demographic subgroups to transmit pathogens to others. 
There are many examples of such variable host group susceptibilities 
(across different age groups, genders, pregnancy statuses, and other 
host sub-populations), but the present context only permits discussion 
of a few examples here:          
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With regard to the probable severity of illness itself, for example, 
rubella is generally a mild illness for children and adults; however, it 
has a major teratogenic propensity for human fetuses during the first 
trimester of pregnancy, so pregnant women and their unborn offspring 
would be considered an exceptionally vulnerable population sub-group 
to this disease. 
 
 Also, most seasonal influenza epidemics (which reflect a limited 
and incremental drift in the influenza virus’s genome) tend to have the 
severest impacts on the youngest and oldest persons in a population, 
with a consequential “V”-shaped mortality curve by age group.  
However, pandemic flu can follow some different patterns on these 
variables:  First, these global manifestations of the disease (which 
reflect a fundamental genetic shift) may be unrecognized by the 
immune systems of young adults, since they have never before 
encountered the reassorted or mutated forms of the virus’s 
haemagluttinin and neuraminidase surface proteins.  Moreover, the 
robust immune systems of many young adults may mount a 
pathologically-intense response to the viral challenge, potentially 
exacerbating the disease-induced pulmonary and systemic symptoms.  
Thus, some flu pandemics may generate a “W”-shaped mortality curve  
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by age—with a prominent “spike” in the middle range of ages, as well 
as at the extremes of age. 
  
Another phenomenon that relates to seasonal influenza incidence 
by age group involves schoolchildren: Not infrequently, this 
demographic group is least affected by flu in terms of numbers and 
severity.  However, the settings of schools and the behavior of children 
often leads to the relative rapid transmission of viruses between them 
and with associated adults; they then frequently carry the pathogens 
back to their homes, putting older and more vulnerable members of 
their families at risk of severe sickness with complications.  (This 
phenomenon is also true of some less-common contagions, such as 
hepatitis-A.)     
 
These special sub-population susceptibility and vulnerability 
considerations can often shape vaccination policies—since there is a 
need to triage limited stocks of available vaccine to the most 
vulnerable groups first.   But they might also conceivably affect 
quarantining policy to some extent.  Among other considerations, it 
might be necessary to impose certain “Modified Quarantine” 
restrictions on infected persons to prevent their coming into contact 
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with particularly vulnerable sub-populations.  For instance, it might be 
necessary to prevent persons with active TB from teaching or working 
in daycare centers for the duration of their demonstrable 
infectiousness.  As a separate matter, the frequent role of schools as 
incubators of fast outbreaks was early recognized, and it helped 
motivate the early school closures mentioned in the last chapter.)   
________________________________________________ 
The Last Four Dimensions of Contagion—The Presence or 
Absence of Technological Methods of Control 
The following four Dimensions of Contagion pertain to the 
current biomedical understanding of particular contagions, and to the 
biomedical and technological control methods that are currently 
available against those diseases.  As has been repeatedly stressed in 
this Dissertation, the broad set of contagion-controls is not disjunctive 
or alternative in most cases—usually, various controls should be 
employed together in a multi-pronged response to infectious diseases.  
The main issues relate to the development of optimal strategies that 
incorporate and coordinate those responses, assigning specific roles 
and timing to the different methods, both technological and socio-
behavioral.     
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Also, as shall be noted further below, the following Dimensions 
are particularly subject to change over time, which calls again for the 
building of some degree of programmatic flexibility into laws and plans 
for contagion-control.  In pragmatic reality, moreover, there may also 
be variability across places and jurisdictions in the actual availability of 
some technological responses to contagions.  For example, poorer 
developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa might lack access to some 
“high-tech” contra-contagion methodologies--such as drug protocols 
against HIV/AIDS--that are more readily available in richer countries.  
Even different American states, intra-state regions, and socio-
economic groups can vary in their access to technological 
preventatives and therapies.  However, these realistic differences in 
availability of technologies across jurisdictions do not necessarily call 
for a response when anti-contagion statutes are being drafted; they 
may be a more appropriate target for attention at the level of 
operational contingency planning.)  
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________________________________________________ 
7.  Dimension of Aetiology -- Has the Causative Agent Been 
Identified for the Contagion?  
This “Dimension” asks whether the causative pathogen of a 
particular disease (1) is currently known to science with relative 
certainty, (2) is subject to major controversy, or (3) is flatly unknown. 
 
As always in this schema, there is a great potential for variability 
in terms here:  As was noted earlier, much of science is an arena of 
conflict, and some disagreement can exist over many basic premises 
and concepts (even within a Kuhnian paradigm).   
 
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to state that, for some 
diseases, “facts” relating to their aetiology are largely settled, and they 
can be relied upon in making policy.  (For example, hardly anyone 
doubts at this point in medical history that the lyssavirus causes rabies 
or that variola virus was the historic agent of smallpox.)   
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By contrast, other alleged disease aetiologies are merely 
theories that are sharply contested by alternative explanations.  To cite 
instances of this, as early as 1873, G. Armauer Hansen isolated a 
bacterium that he termed “M. leprae,” which he claimed was the cause 
of leprosy; however, it proved to be very hard to grow in vitro or in 
vivo, so it could not meet Koch’s Postulates for establishing causality, 
and its role in leprosy remained controversial for decades.___  Hansen 
ultimately turned out to be right in that case, but other pioneering 
ideas of contagion-aetiology have not always been correct:  During the 
last years of the 19th century, for example, there was intense debate 
about the causative agent of hepatic yellow fever, with one dogged 
theory pushing a putative bacterial contender that it presumptuously 
called “Bacillus icteroides” (alluding to the jaundice that it supposedly 
called).  It would take decades before the incipient science of virology 
had advanced far enough to identify the real flaviviral agent of the 
deadly liver disease.  Early in the next century, too, microbiologists 
argued strenuously about the cause of the terrible Spanish Influenza 
that was killing people outside their lab windows.  One major proposal 
was “Pfeiffer’s bacillus,” and another was the bacterium that is still 
inaccurately named “Haemophilus influenzae”; these theories of 
causation—and others—would long have their staunch advocates.  
Here, too, the real agent--the A/H1N1 influenza virus, in this case--
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would not be identified for years.  (See, e.g., Barry JM, The Great 
Epidemic: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History [NY:  
Viking Penguin, 2004].)  As recently as the SARS epidemic of 2003, 
competing teams of investigators suggested various possible causative 
agents for the mysterious new scourge—including Chlamydia and a 
paramyxovirus—before a Hong Kong research group finally isolated the 
actual coronavirus agent, although in this case the aetiological period-
of-uncertainty was compressed into mere weeks.)   
 
Finally, the causes of some presumed contagions are flatly 
unknown at certain points in time, and there are few or no reasonable 
suppositions about them.  Of course, this state of knowledge is always 
changing, as inquiry and confirmation push back the margins of 
ignorance.  Sometimes the period of obscurity is brief:  In the case of 
SARS, it was only a matter of weeks from the start of the epidemic to 
the moment that the causative “SARS-coronavirus” was conclusively 
identified.  In other circumstances, the biomedical uncertainty may 
last for decades.  For instance, the causation of some seemingly non-
infectious diseases might ultimately turn out to have microbial origins, 
contributions, or at least triggers (for example, certain chronic brain 
pathologies like Alzheimer’s Disease, multiple sclerosis, or amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis), but, so far, no one knows whether this is true or not.  
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a.  Some Theoretical Problems in Identifying Causation 
Next, it might be noted that--as a theoretical matter in 
epidemiology--it is not a simple process to establish the etiology of a 
disease.  As was long the case with leprosy, it is sometimes not 
technically possible for a long time to comply with basic scientific 
criteria (such as Koch’s Postulates) for establishing pathogenic 
causation.  The mere repeated observation of a microorganism in 
association with a syndrome may be suggestive—but it is not 
considered determinative.  Moreover, nature being as complex as it is, 
“causation” itself can be more than simple, linear, or unifactorial:  
Often, multiple factors can be involved in the production of disease; 
some might be necessary, but not sufficient, others might be causative 
but unnecessary … and so forth.  To use leprosy as an example again, 
both the “environmental” factor of exposure to the pathogen, and the 
“genetic” factor of variable susceptibility to it, are apparently required 
to produce the syndrome—a reality that long confused the way that 
science, society, and law interpreted the disease’s contagiosity and 
then handled its victims. 
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Thus, in many instances, biomedicine and PH will have only 
discovered a potential contender for a causative pathogen--with 
experimental confirmation still unachieved.  Often, several competing 
researchers will be proposing different pathogen candidates for the 
title--and this state of affairs can persist for some time.   
 
b.  Causative Pathogens May Not Need to Be Identified to 
 Take Action Against a Putative Contagion 
  To be sure, the early step of finding a causative agent is not 
invariably necessary for developing diagnostic, preventative, or 
therapeutic agents against a disease:  Many great biomedical and PH 
procedures and medications that have controlled deadly contagions 
were made empirically, in the absence of a discovered pathogen.  (A 
few famous examples included the following:  Prophylaxes such as 
Jenner’s vaccine against smallpox and Pasteur’s vaccine against rabies 
long antedated isolation and observation of the causative viruses.  
Snow and Budd in England showed how cholera and typhoid, 
respectively, could be controlled by PH actions to clean contaminated 
water supplies—years before the causative bacteria of those diseases 
were identified.  Use and refinement of the drug quinine long preceded 
the discovery of the plasmodia that cause malaria.)  Even today, some 
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generic contagion-control steps can be taken early in an outbreak of a 
possibly “new” disease--days, weeks, or months before its infectious 
agent has been identified:  For example, it is always appropriate to 
practice universal infection-control precautions and barrier nursing 
techniques on a routine basis in a clinical setting—and it is all the more 
necessary when there are suggestive indicia that an unknown disease 
may be infectious in character. 
 
c.  The General Importance of Determining Aetiology 
  While knowledge of aetiology is not always necessary for 
disease-control, however, modern evidence-based PH tries to 
determine it as quickly as possible, since it can guide so much 
subsequent research, planning, and action.  Identification of the 
pathogen can narrow the myriad set of possible pathways to pursue in 
response.  (Identification of the agent of SARS in March 2003 enabled 
researchers to develop more targeted disease-control mechanisms.) 
__________________________________________________
8.  Dimension of Diagnostics--Has an Effective Diagnostic 
Test Been  Developed for the Contagion? 
 The next and related Dimension of a contagious disease that will 
have an impact on its control relates to diagnostic procedures:  Once 
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the responsible agent of disease has been firmly identified, the next 
step is generally to try to develop a diagnostic test or tests that will 
detect its presence in biological samples, such as sputum or blood.  
Thus, the present Dimensional issue for lawmakers and rule-makers 
preparing quarantine statutes and regulations would be whether there 
is currently (1) a well-established, reliable, and valid diagnostic test 
(or tests) for the contagion in question, (2) a controversial, 
inadequate, and/or impractical test (or tests) for it, or (3) no present 
diagnostic method for it at all.  (Again, this is really a continuum that 
will be treated as a discrete threesome for present purposes.)  
 
Here again, though, it is not necessarily an “either/or” situation.  
Diagnostic tests may indeed become available that are sub-optimal in 
various ways.  Generally, assessment tools can be evaluated by a 
number of standards, including their “reliability,” “validity,” 
“sensitivity,” “specificity,” “positive predictive value,” and “negative 
predictive value.”  The science here is extensive and complex, and it 
will be referenced here only briefly to the extent that it has an impact 
on the present concerns. 
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a.  Test Reliability 
A test’s “reliability” asks how similarly it records the same 
phenomena each time that it is administered (when, for example, 
different examiners apply it on different days).  How much error enters 
into its results?  
 
b.  Test Validity 
A test’s “validity” is the central concern, asking whether the 
instrument is “actually” measuring in nature what it purports to 
measure.  Associated concepts include the following:  How “sensitive” 
is the test? (In other words, to what extent does it successfully detect 
a disease-state that is actually present in the tested individuals?)  How 
“specific” is it?  (i.e., to what extent does it correctly identify the 
absence of infection in truly- uninfected individuals?)  Related concepts 
are the instrument’s “positive and negative predictive values” 
(Otherwise put:  If the test announces that a tested person is 
infected—or not infected, how often are these “findings” true in fact?)  
The higher a test rates on these criteria, the more valid it is. 
 
c.  Error 
In reality, virtually all tests devised by man will have some 
degree of error in them, whether random or non-random in character.  
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Various biases of design and implementation can reduce the reliability 
and validity of the diagnostic instruments—and these can occur at 
many stages of the testing, analysis, and response process.  (To cite 
an example from the last Chapter, leprosy “suspects” were subjected 
for thousands of years to observational “examinations” by clerics, 
doctors, and laymen that were often impressionistic, and that often 
falsely labeled uninfected persons “lepers.”  When the apparent leprosy 
bacillus was discovered in the late 19th century, it led to a 
bacteriological protocol of skin scrapings and microscopic examinations 
for diagnoses.  While this new procedure—used in conformity with 
continuing clinical examinations--was a more objective criterion for 
leprosy pronouncements, it also introduced another chance for 
subjectivity and error at a later stage in the process:  Inter-observer 
reliability now came up again at the point when bacteriologists 
reviewed the slide under a microscope to search for and count M. 
leprae.  Thus, while legal regulations in some places now mandated 
these new steps, and they thereby made the whole assessment 
procedure somewhat more reliable, there could still be false-
positives—with terrible life-long consequences for the misdiagnosed.)   
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d.  “Positive” and “Negative” Test Results—And Different 
 Points of View on Them 
Clearly, the general goal is to have tests that yield as many “true 
positives” and “true negatives” as possible, and as few “false positives” 
and “false negatives” as possible, relative to the number of tested 
persons—but few tests can be high in all these standards, and, in 
practice, there must often be “trade-offs.”  The prime desirables can 
vary somewhat depending on the situation and the perspective of the 
individuals involved: 
 
From the viewpoint of a zealous PH administrator, for example, 
an initial screening test should, above all, be highly “sensitive”—that 
way, it will reduce the risk that a truly infected individual goes 
unnoticed, and will continue transmitting his disease to others.  For 
instance, the administrator may seek a device that effectively and 
accurately measures the body temperature of persons moving through 
an airport or other public place, in order to take aside any would-be 
travelers who are truly feverish--and who may thus be carrying a 
pestilence of concern (such as SARS or avian influenza).   If this 
screening actually generates some “false positives” for the disease, the 
health officer may think, additional testing (slower, more cumbersome, 
and perhaps more invasive--but a more accurate indicator of this 
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disease) can then be administered to the febrile individuals, and it will 
free the ones who are not really infected.  Alternatively, if there is no 
such “gold-standard” test, the PH officer might detain the luckless 
travelers and isolate them to see if they start showing the telltale 
symptoms and signs of the contagion.  (Another example of this 
approach occurs in many HIV-testing protocols:  The initial screening 
test is often a method that will “finger” a relatively high number of 
potential HIV+ cases—but will also “rope in” some uninfected persons 
with them.  A negative first test ends the inquiry--but a positive test 
will lead to a second assay, which can then confirm or disconfirm the 
initial “finding.”)             
 
It can be readily seen that travelers may have a different outlook 
on these various prospects:  If they do not want to be found infectious 
(because it can lead to dire legal and social consequences—such as 
confinement in an isolation hospital), knowledgeable ones would prefer 
that the diagnostic test be highly “specific” (in other words, they would 
want a test that can readily pronounce them “disease-free” if they are 
in fact disease-free).  However, if a would-be airplane passenger does 
evince a sign (such as a high-grade fever) on testing, she might hope 
that the test that found this had a low “positive predictive value” (i.e., 
it may have pronounced her to be “sick”—but it is often wrong on this 
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point, and a second test may refute that finding).  On the other hand, 
if there is an effective treatment for the disease in question, the 
individual might have some mixed feelings:  While she would dread the 
isolation that will now be imposed on her, she might also share some 
of the PH officer’s goals of effectively detecting and treating her 
malady. 
   
e.  The Legal Need for Diagnostic Tests That Are Not “Over-
 Broad” 
Procedurally and legally, the presence or absence of diagnostic 
tests can be important for the fair, and evidence-based, imposition of 
contagion-controls:  If, in a crisis, PH authorities assess the public 
health situation, duly weigh the socio-legal considerations, and 
determine that “social-distancing” measures are required, they will 
need to make them fit the “conditions-on-the-ground” as closely as is 
reasonably possible.  As much as science permits, their control 
procedures will have to be informed by high-quality diagnostic 
instruments.  If quarantine and isolation are premised on unreliable or 
questionably valid screening tests for the contagion, they might be 
considered “over-broad” and “arbitrary,” and thus constitutionally 
unacceptable. 
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The presence or absence of a valid, workable test for a 
communicable disease would clearly affect the policy preparation for 
an outbreak, as well as the responses to it.  When there is a “great, 
buzzing confusion,” and no workable test for field personnel, the 
control options are fewer from the start.  Early in the SARS epidemic 
of 2003, for example, Chinese clinicians had to stumble around in the 
dark for several weeks as the disease started felling them in their 
wards; they had to make up an operational case-definition  “on the fly” 
for the seeming new syndrome, and they certainly had no 
confirmatory lab tests for it at that point.  Under those circumstances, 
they prudently had to depend on empirical observations, generic 
barrier nursing practices, and intra-hospital isolation units--pending 
laboratory identification of the causative agent.  At this stage of the 
epidemic, in other words, responses had to be broad—even rough—in 
character, necessarily erring on the side of caution and over-
inclusiveness. 
 
9.  Dimension of Prophylaxis -- Has an Effective Preventive 
Method Been Developed for the Contagion? 
The “Dimension of Prophylaxis” raises some of the same issues 
as the previous one.  Regarding any one contagion, policy-makers 
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need to ask:  Is there (1) a highly safe and effective prophylaxis (or 
prophylaxes) for it, (2) only an inadequate, outdated, or controversial 
preventative agent (or agents) for it, or (3) no technical specific 
prevention method at all? 
 
a.  Vaccines as Preventives 
 As is well known, the classic examples of prophylactic measures 
are vaccines.  These have sometimes been the most powerful agents 
of disease-control available—especially in the case of viral diseases, 
which still can only be met by a limited array of anti-viral therapies.  
Smallpox vaccination eradicated variola in the 1970s (unless some 
bioterrorists revive the scourge in the future).  If current efforts and 
natural and social circumstances permit, polio and measles vaccination 
might attain the same PH goals in coming years.  There are also well-
validated vaccines for such diseases as tetanus, yellow fever, mumps, 
rubella, pneumococcal pneumonia, Haemophilus influenzae –b, 
meningococcal meningitis, rotavirus, and Herpes zoster.   
 
Numerous community-vaccination strategies can be used in 
efforts to contain outbreaks.  During the 1960s and 1970s, for 
example, the Smallpox Eradication Campaign employed strategies of 
ring prophylaxis in many localities—conducting intense surveillance for 
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cases, providing incentives for reports of cases, isolating the confirmed 
cases, and vaccinating contacts to surround the variola virus with 
concentric walls of immunized human hosts.  Frequently, this strategy 
proved more cost-effective than using mass vaccination programs 
(e.g., Bishai J & Nelson K, “Measles and polio eradication:  Striving 
towards a post-infectious disease era,” Stanford J. Pub. Health, 
www.stanford.edu/group/sjph/cgi-bin/sjphs, posted 6/1/11, assessed 
2/9/12).      
 
Of course, as with diagnostic and therapeutic instruments 
against infectious diseases (see the prior and ensuing discussions), it 
is not by any means always a disjunctive, “either-or” situation in 
prevention—“there is a prophylaxis or there is none.”  Not infrequently, 
a vaccine is available as a weapon in an outbreak—but it is poorly 
validated, or it is demonstrably deficient in generating adequate 
immune responses in a population of vaccinees.  Given the 
inadequacies of past technology, for example, this was clearly the case 
for a long time with certain vaccines against bacterial diseases, 
including early-20th century immunizations for typhoid and cholera.  
Even today, there is only an outdated and questionable vaccine against 
plague, and only an old immunization (the Bacille Calmette-Guerin) 
against TB (which has yielded efficacy findings for adults that have 
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ranged from 0-80% in different research studies) (e.g., CCDM 2008, at 
467-68).  As for such diseases as SARS and Bolivian Haemorrhagic 
Fever, there are no specific prevention (or treatment) options at the 
present time, and individuals’ survival from these diseases may 
depend on such factors as host susceptibility, effective nursing, and 
luck. 
 
b.  Other Preventive Technologies, Including 
 Chemoprophylaxis 
In lieu of vaccination, sometimes chemoprophylaxis can be 
utilized as part of a preventative strategy.  (This involves using 
therapeutic drugs to prevent at-risk individuals and communities from 
becoming infected, to prevent infected individuals from developing 
clinical disease, or to prevent such individuals from spreading the 
disease to others [see, e.g., CCDM 2008, at 703].) 
 
In 2009, for example, the anti-viral drug oseltamivir was used as 
part of a ring-containment stategy against A/H1N1 pandemic influenza 
in closed military bases on the island of Singapore (Barclay L, 
“Oseltamivir ring prophylaxis may help contain influenza outbreaks in 
Asia,” Medscape Medical News, posted 6/9/10, 
www.medscape.com/viewarticle/723271, accessed 2/9/12; Lee VJ N. 
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Engl. J. Med. 362:2166-2174 [6/10/10].)  It has also been proposed 
as an early intervention against localized outbreaks of the feared HPAI 
A/H5N1 influenza.        
 
However, chemoprophylaxis carries some hazards, and it has a 
limited scope.  For example, there is an individual danger of side-
effects—and there is a mass danger of promoting pathogen-resistance.  
(see, e.g., Barclay L 2010).  Thus, this use of anti-microbials is often 
limited to individuals at relatively high-risk of infection, such as 
travelers to areas where malaria is highly endemic, or to persons who 
have been in close contact with known cases of diseases like influenza 
and TB. 
 
Some preventative measures are relatively “low-technology” in 
nature, but they have proven to be effective in a number of contexts.  
These include insecticide-impregnated bed-nets against the anopheline 
mosquitoes that carry malaria, and condoms to reduce the risk of 
contracting AIDS and other VDs.    
 
c.  Some Socio-Legal Controversies Regarding Prevention 
When highly effective preventive measures are available in an 
epidemic crisis, they may displant quarantines and isolation as the 
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preferred “front-line” methods of control.  However, this does not 
necessarily reduce the prospect of social and legal controversy; in 
some circumstances, the presence of such prophylaxes simply moves 
the conflict to another arena:  Vaccination itself has been a major 
battleground since its inception.  For example, there were riots in 
Colonial America during early campaigns to implement immunization 
procedures against smallpox (first variolation and later vaccination). 
After creation of the American republic, legal battles over the right to 
refuse vaccination recurred in various parts of the country for decades.  
Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court faced the issue in the 1905 case of 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643.  
In its ruling, the Court declared once again that “salus populi est 
suprema lex!,” and it upheld laws that compelled vaccination over 
most individual objections.  But that seemingly final ruling has hardly 
quelled the vaccination debate:  As is well-known, a new imbroglio has 
arisen in recent years over the claim that some vaccines can cause 
autism.  (Whether or not the allegation has merit—and most scientific 
research refutes it, it has lead to a reduced public use of such 
prophylaxes as the pertussis vaccine—with a resultant rise in diseases 
like whooping cough.)  The recent vaccine against strains of the 
human papillomavirus has raised issues of its own—relating to the 
wisdom and morality of immunizing young teen-aged girls, among 
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other concerns.  Thus, immunization is a whole field of conflict in itself, 
overlapping some of the issues of quarantines—and raising some of its 
own.       
 
Sometimes, the issues of quarantine and vaccination converge in 
practice.  For example, when PH officials threw their strict 
neighborhood quarantine over Chinatown during the 1900 outbreak of 
plague in San Francisco (see above, Chapter I), they conditioned 
individual residents’ escape from the quarantine zone on their 
accepting a plague-preventative called the “Haffkine Prophylaxis.”  
However, this vaccine was actually of rather dubious medical value, 
and it could have serious side-effects, as the members of Hawai’i’s 
Papa Ole found out personally that same year (see above, Chapter I);  
for these reasons and cultural reasons, many of the quarantined 
individuals objected to undergoing it.  Thus, the PH, socio-political, 
and legal issues raised by the quarantine itself were accompanied by 
related issues pertaining to vaccination.     
 
Even if demonstrably effective vaccines are available in principle 
against contagions, this does not guarantee that they will necessarily 
be available in the “front lines” against an oncoming epidemic.  
Technical problems can arise elsewhere in the chain of production and 
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distribution of prophylaxes, which can have an impact on their usage.  
For example, production against influenza has long been hampered by 
the slow method of growing the virus in eggs.  This has made every 
year another race to produce enough vaccine in time to overcome the 
new strains of influenza virus that usually come in the fall.  It is to be 
hoped that innovations in concepts and techniques will come to 
address this impediment (especially before the imminent arrival of the 
H5N1 “avian influenza”).   
 
Of course, even when there are modern specific preventative 
agents against a disease (such as immunizations—or sometimes 
chemoprophylaxes), quarantine-type procedures are not precluded 
from being part of a multi-pronged response to the threat.  They can 
be used as adjuncts to the more modern methodologies in a multi-
pronged social defense strategy.  (For example, it might take some 
time before a wide-scale vaccination campaign can be mounted, and 
before the vaccines generate adequate antibody titers in the 
recipients; pending that time, social distancing measures would be 
important.)  However, in situations where there are no specific, 
validated prophylaxes against a deadly disease (i.e., no modern 
missiles against it), it may be necessary to dust off the old  
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harquebuses (i.e., the quarantines), and bring them to the front lines 
of defense.    
 
10.  Dimension of Therapy – Has an Effective Therapeutic 
Method Been Developed for the Contagion? 
 Finally, another major variable--or Dimension--to consider in 
preparing controls against a contagion is whether there are any 
existing therapies for it.  Rather than focusing on preventing the 
inculcation of infection, this response strategy would seek to terminate 
infection in individuals who have already developed it.  Therapy for 
illness, of course, is an ancient goal of medicine in itself--but the main 
collective, PH purpose of therapeutics would be to kill pathogens to 
keep them from spreading to susceptibles in the patients’ contact 
environment.  
  
 Again, some of the same scientific issues arise regarding the 
“Dimension of Disease Preventability” pertain to the “Dimension of 
Disease Treatability,” viz.:  Is there (1) a generally-safe and effective 
treatment (or treatment) for the disease, (2) only an outdated, 
beleaguered, risky, or controversial therapy or therapies for it, or (3) 
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no specific therapies at all for it?  (This criterion does not regard 
generic treatments, palliatives, or nursing care--important as they 
often are--as being equivalent to targeted and validated therapeutics 
for particular diseases.) 
   
 Again, the thematic purpose of the instant work necessitates 
that the following discussion be summary in character, but it does 
deserve brief mention here to give proper context to the present 
model and algorithm. 
 
a.  The “Golden Age” of Therapeutics in Contagion-Control 
It is well-known that the “Antibiotic Revolution” of the mid-20th 
century introduced a variety of new responses to pathogenic attacks—
including some of the most effective agents in the age-old history of 
microbe-human interaction and conflict:  Within a short time, 
pharmaceutical science developed the sulfa drugs, penicillin and its 
derivatives, streptomycin, the cephalosporins, the tetracyclines, and 
many other products of this robust new paradigm.  During those heady 
years, drug companies would enlist people from around the world to 
send them samples of potential microbe-killing substances, and they 
would doggedly analyze those materials in the hopes of finding 
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successors to penicillin.  (Indeed, one professor went to the end of a 
sewer pipe in Sardinia, and he found the first raw material for the new 
class of cephalosporin antibiotics.)   For awhile, at least, this energetic 
effort changed the “balance of power” in the micro-environment, and it 
helped give Western societies a new sense of freedom from epidemics 
that would have been unimaginable a generation earlier.   
 
The new therapeutics had impacts on quarantine settings:  Once 
introduced into closed institutions for various diseases, the anti-
microbials helped change their mission from mainly social containment 
and asylum--to one of mixed containment … and cure.  In the special 
world of leprology (see Chapter I), the sulfones, rifampicin, and other 
therapeutic drugs of the 1930s and following “Window Era” decades 
appeared to be “miracles” that would bring down the fences around 
the old leprosaria, enabling their inmates to return to the wider 
societies outside—although, in practice, laws and social attitudes 
proved slow to tear down those walls.  Streptomycin, para-amino 
salicylic acid, isoniazid, rifampin, and other agents had a similar 
impact on the TB sanatoria of the 1940s to 1960s.  
  
Eventually, in this brave new world, the old lock-downs, placards, 
and closed institutions of quarantine did come to seem like the ancient 
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forces of cavalry in an age of rocketry.  --Thus, by the 1960s, the 
warhorses of quarantine and isolation were largely put to pasture for 
several decades. 
 
b.  A Rebound in Contagion 
Unfortunately, as has been noted throughout this Dissertation, 
many pathogens have developed a resistance to the antibiotic drugs of 
the 1930s to 1960s (and an analogous process has also developed in 
response to the more recent anti-viral agents).  As is well known, 
these processes reflect a complex web of inter-connected natural and 
socio-behavioral phenomena:  Microbes’ rapid capacity to mutate gives 
them an innate advantage over slower-moving human immune 
systems and human sciences in the eternal zone of inter-species 
combat.  Often, when anti-microbials kill off the weakest 
microorganisms in a human micro-environment, this removes natural 
competitive controls over pathogens.  In addition, strains of pathogens 
can appear that have developed genetic capacities to resist the drugs; 
with this selective advantage, they can rapidly proliferate in the altered 
micro-environment.  (In addition, some microbes can actually transfer 
their newly-acquired abilities to others.)  These biological 
developments are abetted by human weaknesses, complacency, and 
market economics:  For example, some patients demand antibiotics to 
348 
 
treat viral illnesses such as common colds—which can enable bacteria 
present in their environments to acquire resistance to those drugs.  
Other patients—especially in the Developing World—who can not 
obtain adequate medical care, self-medicate with erratic doses of 
antimicrobial drugs sold over-the-counter, furthering this same natural 
process.  Moreover, in many countries there is a “black market” in 
diluted and adulterated antibiotics, which can also accelerate the 
natural selection process for pathogens in human micro-environments.  
As a separate phenomenon, the American cattle industry has long put 
antibiotics in feed to stave off infection and promote livestock growth.  
Meanwhile, the paucity of profit for resuming the search for antibiotics 
slowed the stream of new products to the tiniest of trickles.  There are 
many other components to this complex emergence of microbial 
resistance, but these are some of the clearest causes. 
 
It is to be hoped that mankind can resume its hunt for 
pharmacological agents against pathogens.  Alternatively, it is hoped 
that another paradigm of treatment prove successful—such as 
developing antimicrobial drugs that can resist resistance, using viral 
phages as “allies,” or pushing immunotherapy forward. 
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In any case, pending the arrival of a new paradigm, it becomes 
necessary to consider once more whether a contagion at issue is 
treatable with current methods.  The algorithm needs to address this 
issue in deciding whether the old warhorses of quarantine are actually 
necessary again.    
 
c.  Sub-Optimal Therapeutics for Contagion-Control 
It should be added that, in the therapeutics area as in the other 
Dimensions discussed above, the situation is not always a disjunctive 
one, marked by the simple presence or absence of an effective and 
curative treatment.  In numerous cases, the reality is more complex, 
with an existing remedy (or remedies) that is hobbled by various 
deficiencies that make it rather sub-optimal for treatment and 
contagion-control.  (In principle, of course, perfection is an 
unattainable goal, and therapies—like all other medical modalities—can 
always be improved.  But at some point various standards of practice 
will hold that the drug or procedure is generally effective for the 
purpose for which it has been made.  Due to individual human 
variation, any agent will fail to cure—or even harm--some patients, but 
these preset standards will judge whether or not they are considered 
effective across their target populations.) 
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Ebolavirus and Marburgvirus Haemorrhagic Fevers are neither 
preventable by immunization, nor specifically treatable by 
standardized medications.   At the milder end of the “Severity” 
spectrum, there are also no vaccines or specific therapeutic agents for 
Herpes simplex (Type I) cold sores.  
 
Here again, when the longstanding armaments of science start 
failing, it may become increasingly necessary for policy-makers to 
leave some place in their plans for the ancient techniques of 
quarantine.  Arguably, those methodologies almost always have at 
least an ancillary role to play as part of a multi-pronged response to an 
epidemic—even when the therapeutic situation is reasonably good.  
But when the therapeutic situation becomes desperately deficient, they 
could become vital once more for preserving the public’s health.  (For 
example, this was illustrated by the recent case of Andrew Speaker 
[described in Chapter I, above], who had to be quarantined by the 
Federal government in Denver when he was found to have severe 
Multi-Drug-Resistant tuberculosis.  Even worse are the cases of 
“Extremely- Drug-Resistant” TB that have started appearing—where 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis has started to defy even some of the less-
optimal, second-line-of defense drugs.) 
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d.  Contagion-Controls as “Balancing Acts” 
In conclusion, it can be readily seen that a technically 
appropriate PH response to a burgeoning outbreak is not a simple 
matter of choosing one response tool or another.  Depending on the 
stage of the epidemic in a given area and population, on the 
immediate availability—and adequacy—of the defensive weapons 
themselves, on the manageability of various kinds of social-distancing, 
and on a host of other factors, it will often be necessary to use a 
combination of responses, either successively or conjunctively.  These 
might include quarantines and isolation in early stages of a mysterious 
outbreak on a hospital ward, and—once the agent is identified, 
appropriate vaccination and/or therapies may be used preferentially in 
other locations and stages of epidemic development….  To a major 
extent, an effective epidemic response may be a skilled balancing act.        
________________________________________________________ 
F.  The Independence of the “Dimensions of Contagion” 
 Finally, it is important to stress here again how different the 
above Dimensions of Contagion can be from one another—and how 
this divergence can have major impacts on public attitudes, policy, and 
PH law:  While there are sometimes overlaps between them, these  
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Dimensions are generally independent variables—height on one of 
these spectra does not necessarily signify height on another.   
 
One extreme example of the independence of these “Dimensions 
of Contagion” involves “the common cold” and pneumonic plague.  In 
reality, both of these diseases are very similar on the spectrum of 
“Transmissibility”:  As “Type I” contagions, they are both 
communicated very easily and rapidly via the respiratory modality, 
with the respective pathogens (various rhinoviruses, coronaviruses, 
and other viruses for colds; Yersinia pestis for the pneumonic plague) 
moving with extreme efficiency in respiratory droplets from primary to 
secondary human cases.  Being in the same airplane compartment as 
a victim of either the common cold or pneumonic plague presents a 
high probability of becoming infected by those pathogens (with various 
obscure susceptibility and exposure factors playing some role in 
whether or not one gets the clinical diseases).  Yet, the two diseases 
obviously vary dramatically in terms of their “Severity”:  Under 
ordinary circumstances, a cold is one of the mildest of diseases, 
causing little more than nuisance symptoms like coryza (stuffy head), 
tussis (coughing), and sneezing.  By contrast, pneumonic plague is 
arguably one of the worst diseases that can befall a human, with 
violent symptoms such as burning fever, expectoration of frothy, 
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bloody sputum, and a nearly 100% case-fatality rate when untreated.   
Thus, policy-makers and administrators would not follow the 
“Transmissibility” Dimension alone in deciding whether or not to 
quarantine a traveler:  Given the respective “Severity” of these two 
diseases, it would be absurdity incarnate to quarantine a cold sufferer; 
by contrast, it would verge on “public health malpractice” to fail to 
quarantine or isolate a possible carrier of pneumonic plague.   
 
Another example might be the parvoviral childhood ailment 
erythema infectiosum (a.k.a. “Fifth disease”) and variola major (the 
severe variant of smallpox).  Both diseases are readily transmissible 
via respiratory secretions—but as a generally mild, self-limited disease 
for immunologically-intact persons, fifth disease obviously differs 
considerably from variola in its symptomatic impacts, and policies to 
control them should evidently reflect this “Severity” difference.  (See, 
e.g., Handbook of Infectious Diseases 2000, at 100-01, 562.)    
 
Lest the above independence of the “Dimensions” seem obvious 
and unimportant for policy-making purposes, history has shown that a 
failure to distinguish between these independent Dimensions has often 
created major mischief and injustice: 
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For example, no one would argue that leprosy is a mild disease 
on a “Severity” spectrum: for thousands of years, HD’s potential 
physical effects of numbness, limb resorption, skin lesions, deformity, 
and blindness have helped provoked the deepest kind of terrors and 
social ostracism (see Chapter I).  In response to this gruesome visage 
of leprosy, it has been seen, many ancient laws—as well as some 
fairly-recent laws in Hawai’i, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Puerto Rico, 
the Virgin Islands, and other U.S. jurisdictions--banished leprosy 
victims to high-walled lazarettos on bleak islands and promontories.  
The lawmakers assumed—as did many of their constituents—that 
leprosy’s extremity on the “Severity” scale also implied a violent 
“Transmissibility.”  But this premise is scientifically wrong:  In reality, 
leprosy is one of the most least transmissible of all contagions.  
Genetic factors play a major role in susceptibility, making it only a 
danger to some 5-10% of all exposed people, and that usually after 
long-term, close interpersonal contact.  Of course, it is recognized that 
there remain elements of biomedical uncertainty about this disease, 
and they can add to public fears:  For example, it may be hard at 
present to easily determine just who might be vulnerable to the 
depredations of the pathogen, Mycobacterium leprae.  Also, the 
specific mode of leprosy transmission remains uncertain even today (is 
it transmitted by air? does it require tactile contact?).  Nevertheless, 
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as a policy matter, there is little scientific grounding for the extremely 
harsh, life-long quarantines that were long imposed by societies on so-
called “lepers.” 
 
Another classic differentiation on the Severity and 
Contagiousness spectra has been the one between the two important 
strains of influenza that have circulated during the last decade (see 
above discussion):  On the one hand, there is the new strain of 
A/H1N1 influenza that broke out in Mexico during 2009.  While the 
press took to calling this disease “swine flu,” it was readily transmitted 
from human to human, and it became pandemic within a very short 
time.  Fortunately, however, its mortality rate was relatively low for 
most population groups, being actually only about 4% of the ordinary 
manifestations of winter flu virus (although young children, pregnant 
women, and the immune-compromised were exceptionally prone to 
developing severe symptoms).  By contrast, the strain of highly-
pathogenic A/H5N1 influenza (so-called “bird flu”) that also appeared 
several times during the same decade was only poorly transmissible 
between humans during that period; at that time, it seemed mainly to 
infect people in East Asia and Egypt who worked with poultry.  Which 
was fortunate for mankind in general during those years, since this 
disease was spectacularly lethal, having a known death rate among 
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the infected of up to 60% (see, e.g., CDC, “Key facts about avian 
influenza (bird flu) and highly-pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) 
virus,” [11/21/10], www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen_info/facts.html, 
accessed 3/15/11).  (To put this rate in perspective, it has been 
estimated that the terrible “Spanish influenza” pandemic of 1918-1919 
that killed some 500,000 Americans and perhaps 40 million people 
across the globe only had a U.S. case-fatality rate of about 2.5%. 
[See, e.g., WHO, “Global alert and response—Avian influenza:  
Frequently asked questions,” 
www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/avian_faqs/en/#vaccine, 
accessed 3/15/11.])  …Of course, the most classic feature of influenza 
A virus is its mutability and plasticity:  It has great recombinant 
powers, so influenza experts are well aware that flu viruses from 
various host species can mix, “reassort” or adaptively mutate, and 
take on new properties; this can allow them to undergo periodic 
dramatic “antigenic shifts” as well as continual minor “antigenic drift.”  
-- Thus, a new strain of avian flu may well appear in which the 
divergent dimensions of severity and contagiousness converge, 
creating a deadly form that spreads like the common cold. 
 
The term “virulent,” which is often used to describe pathogens in 
ordinary parlance (and even sometimes in technical usages), reflects 
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such a blurring of conceptual Dimensions.  For example, one standard 
reference source defines “virulence” as “[t]he ability of an infectious 
agent to invade and damage tissues of the host; the degree of 
pathogenicity of an infectious agent, often indicated by case-fatality 
rates” (Control of Communicable Diseases 2008, at 716).  However, it 
is submitted here that such a definition groups together two attributes 
of pathogens that actually have important Dimensional differences:  
The first clause of the definition emphasizes mainly the Transmissibility 
of the agent (which is one Dimension), and the second addresses the 
Severity of the disease that it can produce in many hosts (which is a 
second—and, as has been seen, sometimes very different--
Dimension).   
      
 The other functional “Dimensions of Contagion” are also 
independent of one another in many important ways:  For example, 
measles and yellow fever can be prevented by excellent vaccines—but, 
once contracted, medicine can only offer good nursing to see the 
patients through and relieve their symptoms.  By contrast, there are 
presently no vaccines to prevent syphilis and gonorrhoea--but despite 
some rising problems with microbial-resistance, those diseases are still 
readily treatable with antibiotics. 
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________________________________________________________ 
G.  The Algorithm in This Model Would Incorporate the Above 
Dimensions—Checklist and Algorithmic Flow Chart 
Under this model, all of the foregoing hypothetical “Dimensions” 
of Communicable Diseases would go into an Algorithm to help draft 
laws for the control of such diseases by quarantine. 
Table 1 (below) presents a simple Checklist of normative 
contagion characteristics that legislative or administrative 
draughtsmen could first use in developing statutes or regulations that 
are pertinent to particular contagions, their varying manifestations, 
and their different phases during epidemics. 
  
Figure 1 (below) proposes a hypothetical Algorithmic Flow 
Chart that could assist lawmakers in the preparation of contagion-
control statutes and/or regulations that would be effectively targeted 
to particular contagions and their phases.  Like the Model above, the 
Chart directs the draughtsman to ask a sequence of “questions” 
regarding the normative character of the specific contagions, which 
might or might not indicate whether quarantines and like socio-legal 
controls were appropriate measures for the abating of such outbreaks.  
Also as in the Model described above, those “questions” would be 
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framed as “Dimensions” of contagion, and some of these Dimensions 
would either strongly favor or disfavor the use of such measures 
(“Quarantine-Directing Dimensions”), while other Dimensions would 
not preclude the use of Quarantines and the like, as part of a multi-
pronged strategy—but might make them particularly important in the 
absence of more technological control measures (“Quarantine-
Supporting Dimensions”).  
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Table 1:  A Proposed Checklist of Normative Contagion 
Characteristics for Guidance in the Preparation of Legislation 
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Figure 1:  Proposed Algorithmic Flow Chart for Developing 
Statutes/Regulations for Socio-Legal Contagion-Controls that 
Are Based on the Specific Characteristics of Contagions  
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H. An Example of Applying the Proposed Algorithm to a 
Particular Contagion:  SARS 
To illustrate the use of this Algorithm, one can take a contagion 
and see how it fits for policy-making purposes.  Once again, SARS 
would be a good example: 
 
1. “Severity” Dimension  
As its very name indicates, SARS is a “severe” disease: 
 
After an incubation period of two to twelve days (mean--4.6 
days; variance—15.9 days ), clinical SARS presents with two or three 
major symptom phases (Vijayanand, Wilkins, & Woodhead 2004):  
First, there is a high fever (exceeding 38o C.), chills and rigors, 
cephalgia, sore throat, malaise, and myalgia.  Tachycardia and 
tachypnea appear in a number of cases (Rainer et al. 2003). In about 
40-70% of the time, there are also some gastro-intestinal symptoms—
mainly diarrhea (Plague, SARS—Hong Kong 2006, at 70).__  There can 
then be a brief period of seeming abatement, with a reduction in fever.  
After a week of illness, however, some patients deteriorate, and a 
proportion of them now develop a severe atypical pneumonia with 
severe tussis and acute adult respiratory distress (e.g., Ooi, Lim, & 
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Chew, 2005), perhaps because of an excess immune reaction to their 
initial infection.   Hospital stays before recovery are often long (mean, 
25 days in Hong Kong); time from admission to death has been 36 
days on average (but with much variability) (Anderson et al. 2005). 
 
In some patients, the SARS infection process can consolidate 
pulmonary tissues into an impenetrable mass (visible on x-rays), and 
they become exhausted simply trying to breathe.  WHO made this 
form of “severe acute respiratory distress” the official name of the 
disease.  More graphically, Chinese observers began calling the disease 
“ling ren zhi xi de”—which meant “breath-taker,” or “breath-stalker” 
(Greenfeld 2006, at 89). 
 
(In early 2003, a Hong Kong virologist named Guan Yi 
surreptitiously entered the Guangzhou Institute for Respiratory 
Diseases in the PRoC’s Guangdong Province to obtain sputum samples 
from SARS patients for study [the outbreak was being actively hidden 
by governmental authorities at that time], and he later described the 
new syndrome to a journalist: 
Most striking was the depleted look in their eyes.  They didn’t 
move their eyes to follow [me] as [I] passed through their 
rooms, the way most patients did.  Nor were they asleep.  
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Instead, they gazed upward, the act of breathing required all 
their strength and concentration….  ‘Listless’ was too vibrant a 
word to describe  these cases …. They seemed to be the living 
dead.    
  
[Greenfeld 2006, at 105].)      
 
The average death rate for SARS was about 14% (although this 
varied considerably for different sub-population groups, see below). 
 
This standard syndromic pattern and mortality rate certainly 
makes SARS a prime candidate for aggressive public health 
intervention—including socio-behavioral controls. 
   
2.  “Mode of Transmissiblity” Dimension 
As a “Type I-B” contagion, SARS spreads via the respiratory 
modality—but its heavy-droplet vehicle provides a prospect of some 
control via standard barrier-protection practices.  This is yet another 
factor favoring isolation-type responses.  (The Amoy Gardens episode 
[see Chapter I] indicated that under some exceptional circumstances 
SARS can also spread by other modalities—including the aerosolization 
of infected foecal matter, but this appeared to be a very unusual 
means of spread [e.g., Peiris, et al., 2003], and it would not 
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necessarily work against an isolation intervention strategy.)  
  
3. “Epidemic Variables Dimension”—Including Ro 
The SARS-Covirus has an Ro of about R2-R3, which makes it 
prone to epidemic spread without proper controls—yet it does not 
spread so widely so rapidly that it virtually suffuses a population 
before it can be stopped (like measles).  This factor also favors SARS 
isolations. 
 
4. “Duration of Infectiousness and Disease” Dimension  
SARS also does not induce a prolonged asymptomatic carrier 
state—in fact, it appears to have a “lag period” of some 5 to 10 days 
after the onset of symptoms and before the point of maximum viral 
shedding (by contrast with the flu, which is communicable before its 
first significant overt symptoms).  This provides an opportunity to stop 
SARS by isolating its victims. 
 
Moreover, the somewhat limited epidemiological data on SARS 
did not disclose a major impact from asymptomatic carriage of the 
disease (see Day, et al., 2006; Chan, et al., 2003; Cherry JD & Lee,  et 
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al., 2003; Peiris, et al., 2003), which would argue at least for isolation 
of the symptomatically ill.      
 
The duration of SARS as a disease and as an infectious state is 
clearly acute and short-term in most patients, so isolation would not 
become a lifelong burden (as with leprosy, TB, or typhoid).   
 
5.  General Pathogenic Dosage of Agent 
Accounts of nosocomial SARS indicated that it could be contained 
by isolation and vigorous barrier-nursing practices.  (Spread among 
hospital staffs often followed the heroic use of certain respiratory 
intubation procedures, which could cause the wide emission of viruses 
within a certain area.  However, many clinicians and other staff 
members became exposed in the weeks before the disease’s mode of 
spread was recognized.  It would appear that the very careful use of 
such therapies only when necessary, and within the settings of closed 
isolation units, would considerably lower the dangers of transmission.)   
 
 
6. Susceptible Groups  
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The population demographics of SARS showed that it is 
particularly detrimental to some of the most immunologically-
compromised sub-population groups—including notably the elderly;  
however, youngsters seemed to be generally less prone to severe 
illness from it (e.g., Booth, et al., 2003; Cherry & Krogstad, 2004; 
Chiu, et al., 2003).  As noted previously, however, SARS’ 
infectiousness appears to have been marked by the disparate impact 
of some individual “super-spreaders,” who seemed to cause multiple 
cases of the disease among their contacts (see, e.g., Donnelly, et al., 
2003; Peiris, et al., 2003).  It should be noted that this reported 
phenomenon was to some extent anecdotal in character, rather than 
being closely studied epidemiologically or pathobiologically.  
Nevertheless, if it was a genuine phenomenon, it, too, would lend 
some support to the use of at least targeted and individualized 
isolation procedures.  
 
On the other hand, the evidence cast considerable doubt on the 
cost-effectiveness of some rough-and-ready SARS-control measures, 
such as the mass temperature screenings at airports and ports.  It is 
also debatable whether some of the authoritarian actions taken by 
countries like Singapore and the PRoC (including mass public 
quarantines) were justified by their outcomes in controlling SARS vis-
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à-vis their social impacts.   
 
7.  Technological Dimensions of Contagion 
As was indicated above, WHO coordinated an international 
“crash” program to identify the aetiological agent of SARS, and this 
endeavor did yield the causative coronavirus within a mere matter of 
weeks.  Relatively slow diagnostic tests followed (e.g., Chan, et al., 
2004; Cherry & Krongstad, 2004; Peiris, et al, 2003).    
 
However, it is regrettably true that medical research never 
developed any vaccines or therapies against SARS.  This clearly 
reflects human and societal failings:  Once the SARS epidemic was 
scotched by old-fashioned socio-behavioral controls, within just 8 
months of its first appearance, the disease no longer frightened 
governments and publics, and research money for it quickly dried up.   
 
On the other hand, SARS is not really gone—merely quiescent at 
this time in its animal reservoirs, ready to return to the human world 
whenever the right combination of natural factors and human 
sloppiness enable it to do so.  Then, there would be no “high-tech,” 
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21st-century defenses against it--just the ancient social-distancing 
methods that go back thousands of years (with a few simple 
refinements).   
 
In 2003, these antique public health weapons may have helped 
save the world from SARS—and they may also have to become 
mankind’s first-line response to a return of this contagion in the future. 
______________________________________________________  
I. Summary Statement for Chapter II 
 In conclusion, this Chapter of the present Dissertation has 
presented a functional model by which policy-makers, lawmakers, and 
PH administrators can evaluate individual contagions for purposes of 
deciding what controls would be optimal in particular types of 
contagion situations.   In the case of some highly mutable and 
changing communicable diseases such as influenza, different controls 
might even be employed for different epidemic manifestations of the 
same general contagions.  Even different phases of single epidemics or 
pandemics might sometimes call for different controls.  It is important 
that a certain rational and scientifically-supportable degree of flexibility 
be built into relevant laws, policies, and actions.     
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 While some of the characteristics of contagions mentioned in the 
above model are already recognized and used in the field, it is 
submitted that the present proposed functional use of them in a broad 
and multi-dimensional algorithmic combination is relatively new.  
Moreover, this model varies somewhat from standard approaches on a 
number of individual specifics, reflecting functional premises raised 
here.   
 
 At this juncture, it is worth stressing once more that although 
the focus of this Dissertation has been on the ancient socio-legal 
contagion controls such as quarantine and isolation, these measures 
would ordinarily be used as part of a pre-planned and coordinated 
multi-pronged response to threatened contagions.  Many host, 
pathogen, and environmental variables would have impacts on 
complex response plans, putting differing emphases on modern 
technological responses and ancient socio-behavioral responses in 
different circumstances.  The main goal would be to bring 
considerations of “rolling” scientific evidence--and jurisprudential 
thought—into the development of laws and plans.   
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  CONCLUSION OF DISSERTATION: 
THE ONCE AND FUTURE PLAGUES—AND MANKIND’S RESPONSE 
 
 As was noted at the start of this Dissertation, the Western World 
may now be seeing an end to its extraordinary “Window Era”—several 
decades that were unique in modern human history in having a 
relative freedom from most lethal pestilences.  Influenza and VD, 
including HIV/AIDS, were the main exceptions to this freedom during 
the “Window” years--and even those diseases may prove to have been 
only pallid versions of the scourges to come.  (Between the mid-1950s 
and 2012, influenza did reappear at least three times in major 
pandemic forms—as the so-called “Asian Flu,” “Hong Kong flu,” and the 
2009-10 A/H1N1 pandemic that started in Mexico.  However, these 
were not lethal manifestations of flu in any “Severity” sense that 
approached the “Spanish Influenza” of 1918-19--or in any sense that 
approach the sporadic forms of human HPAI H5N1 now being seen in 
Southeast Asia.  By contrast, HIV/AIDS and some other STDs were 
highly prevalent in the West during the “Window Era”; many of these 
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diseases were “Severe” in character, and HIV/AIDS remains basically 
incurable—but, like “Type V” contagions in general, they were almost 
lumbering in speed compared to the “Type I” contagions that may 
haunt the human future.) 
 
 Already, there is some awareness in the field of public health and 
allied disciplines that it is no longer tenable to retain the “Window 
Era’s” complacent dismissal of mass contagion as a major threat to 
human health and social well-being.  The possible imminence of 
mutated influenza in a deadly and fast-moving form has motivated 
some modern-day advance preparations—and this is certainly a 
notable improvement over the reactive and erratic responses to many 
epidemic threats in the past.  However, much remains to be done in 
order to develop a rational and flexible societal response to the HPAI-
influenza challenge.  Moreover, attention must be paid to the potential 
threat of diverse contagions besides flu in the current and future 
ecological situation.  As occurred in the very real case of SARS, a 
myopic focus on influenza could overlook the hydra-headed dangers of 
infectious diseases that have a plethora of different characteristics, 
calling for differently-tailored responses.   
 
373 
 
 Finally, it is also submitted here that while the global public 
health response system to contagion has made some strides forward 
in this millennium (as again exemplified by the SARS episode), it has 
also slipped back in many respects--under the impact of many socio-
political pathologies, including reduced PH funding in many polities.  
There also remain major differences in the contagion-preparation of 
different polities across the world—and major gaps in communication 
and coordination between them.  Some of these gaps relate to 
differences in wealth and ideologies, and some of them stem from 
ancient fragmentations of authority and cooperation within and 
between nation-states--but the long view of history has shown that 
pathogens will often benefit from the conflicts between humans. 
 
 This Dissertation has looked backwards to long-forgotten 
experiences in the history of public health and contagion-control in 
order to draw some understanding of how mankind once reacted to 
scourges before modern technology entered the picture.  It is 
submitted that many of those historic lessons are still valid—just as 
the old quarantine laws themselves remain in technical force in many 
modern jurisdictions.  Those old defensive measures will have a place 
in future human responses to pathogen threats—but they surely need 
thoughtful reexamination in the light of modern bioscience, social 
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science, and jurisprudential thought.  There is a need to rebalance the 
great policy scales to reflect the realities of the present-day world.  
And such a rebalancing should be done before the plague ships (or 
planes or flocks) appear over the horizon…. 
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